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This dissertation critically analyses the iN2015 Masterplan and pervasive computing by 
unpacking their discourses. I highlight how both are shaped by and shape their contexts, 
specifically, globalisation and its technologies, underpinned by neo-liberal values, post-Cold 
War techniques and technicity, coding needs and desires. I argue that the iN2015 Masterplan 
and pervasive computing produce active technological subjects needed to perpetuate the 
technological economy and the military, which, in turn, sustain their projects in a generalised 
cycle. In this cycle, humans are inducted into their codes that, paradoxically, subordinate 
them further under the logic of the technology. 
 
 Chapter One connects the iN2015 Masterplan and pervasive computing, situates them 
as products of neo-liberal values and Cold War technologies and technicity that function on 
the production of “blindness” and the consumption of their codes. I emphasise the mutually 
constitutive relationship between space, technology, discourse and embodiment. I also map 
out my methodologies and journey towards a critique of the iN2015 Masterplan and 
pervasive computing. Chapter Two situates myself and the development of my thoughts 
through a critique of my wearable artwork called the Smart Apron. Using the Smart Apron as 
a node, I complicate my belief in technological empowerment, vis-à-vis the wearable 
computing discourse of Steve Mann and the feminist cyborg discourse of Donna Haraway. I 
argue that despite differences in politics and ethics, the cybernetic subjects they valorise run 
the risk of feeding back into the technological economy and the military. Chapter Three 
analyses the iN2015 Masterplan through its video and rhetoric of technological 
empowerment, control and inclusion. I demonstrate how through the political economy of the 
sign and subject, patriarchal, neo-liberal technological subjects are produced to provide the 
conditions of possibility for Singapore’s technological political economy and military. I 
highlight how the construction of technological spaces, use of education and policies, 
coincide with the transparency of discourse and the ability of new media technologies to 
make things visible and invisible in the process. Chapter Four looks at Mark Weiser’s vision 
of ubiquitous computing and highlights how he creates transparent relationships with 
“invisible” technology through the “seamless” politics of everyday (future) life that erases the 
specific history underpinning ubiquitous computing. I bring in Genevieve Bell and Paul 
Dourish’s critique of Weiser and argue that their discourse, a reflection of its context, mirrors 
Weiser’s narrative and are equally productive of future technological development based on 
“alternative,” “messy” views/use of ubiquitous computing in the present everyday life. 
Chapter Five looks at the mutually constitutive relationship between the iN2015 Masterplan 
and the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces (3G SAF). In the synchronicity of their 
needs for and production of pervasive infrastructure and entrepreneurial technological 
subjectivities, I situate the iN2015 Masterplan as part of the larger militarisation of Singapore 
society, where through the circulation of elites and the “Total Defence” policy, no civilian 
space is spared, putting radical singular thought at risk. Finally, Chapter Six rounds up my 
arguments and considers the stakes of the iN2015 Masterplan and pervasive computing for 
our ways of being and becoming. 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
  
“Architecture does not simply enclose but rather it produces space” 
 (Ryan Bishop, John Phillips and Wei-Wei Yeo, Beyond 
Description: Singapore Space Historicity 5). 
 
“It is the created object which thinks us, and which sometimes 
thinks better than we do, and quicker than we do: which thinks us  
before we have thought it” (Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of  
Evil or the Lucidity Pact 42). 
 
1.1 Post-Cold War Technologies and Technicity: Situating the iN2015 Masterplan 
David is very excited and he cannot wait to show his mother, Nancy, the birthday gift 
he made for her. Earlier today, while on a school excursion to the Singapore 
Zoological Gardens, he has taken the opportunity to “scan” various animals, insects 
and plants using a special tablet issued by the school. This tablet not only enables him 
to call up his virtual “professor” to answer his queries about the flora and fauna at the 
zoo, but also to share the answers with his classmate, which he did by simply 
dragging the answer folder towards the direction of his classmate’s tablet. In the 
evening, as the family gathers to have dinner and celebrate Nancy’s birthday, David 
eagerly takes out the memory card where Nancy’s gift is stored. He inserts it carefully 
into a special device with a crystal ball and instantly transforms the family dining 
room into a virtual “jungle.” The immersive environment awes everyone in the 
family, but David is by now too distracted wondering about the technologies that will 
be available in the next ten years from his supposed year 2015. David is, after all, the 
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ideal subject presented (in a video) and valorised by the “Intelligent Nation 2015” 
(iN2015) Masterplan.  
 In May 2005, the Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore 
(IDA) set up a steering committee to spearhead Singapore’s ten-year Masterplan 
called “Intelligent Nation 2015” (iN2015). The vision of the iN2015 Masterplan, 
according to the IDA website, is to harness the latest information technologies and 
telecommunications to turn Singapore into “an intelligent nation, a global city, 
powered by infocomm.” Through “innovation,” “integration” and 
“internationalisation,” the Masterplan aims to provide businesses and individuals with 
a conducive space for creative and innovative technological experimentations. It also 
endeavours to achieve connectivity for fast and efficient harnessing of resources and 
capabilities among businesses, individuals and communities, and to furnish the 
Singapore populace with access to the world’s resources and the simultaneous export 
of Singapore ideas, products and services. In short, the iN2015 Masterplan claims to 
give every individual “seamless access to intelligent technology – and with it – the 
capability to take charge,” as well as the “new freedom to connect, innovate, 
personalise and create” (IDA, “iN2015 Masterplan” n.p.).1  
To achieve this ambitious plan, the iN2015 Steering Committee proposed 
several strategies that require IDA to work closely with various government agencies, 
“key” industry and business players as well as the public. These strategies include the 
establishment of “an ultra-high speed, pervasive, intelligent and trusted” wired and 
wireless infrastructure island-wide, the advancement of sophisticated and innovative 
                                                 
1 These were the initial words used to describe the iN2015 Masterplan on IDA’s 
website. However, the website’s rhetoric was significantly toned down during its 
revamp in June 2010. In addition, the iN2015 video Imagine Your World iN2015 was 




use of the latest technologies, as well as the development of a globally competitive 
information communications industry and an equally competitive information 
communications-savvy workforce. The iN2015 Steering Committee envisioned the 
iN2015 Masterplan to transform a wide range of sectors, specifically digital media 
and entertainment, education, financial services, healthcare and biomedical sciences, 
manufacturing and logistics, land and transport, tourism, hospitality and retail, as well 
as the realm of government and society (IDA, “Realising the iN2015 Vision” 19). At 
the same time, it highlighted various technologies that will enable and enhance these 
sectors. These technologies include communication networks in terms of wired and 
wireless broadband and mobile services, computing hardware such as embedded 
multi-core computing, wearable computing (Wearables) and mobile devices, 
computing software from “intelligent” agents, web-enabled collaborative 
infrastructures, real-time multi-lingual speech translation software, cryptography, to 
grid and cloud computing, as well as context-aware “intelligent” systems like “pro-
active smart things and environment” (IDA, “Innovation. Integration. 
Internationalisation” 117-124). Furthermore, as part of the focus on digital media and 
entertainment, the committee singled out human-computer interaction, sensor 
technologies, ubiquitous network connectivity, and media management for research 
and development (67). 
 The iN2015 Masterplan is Singapore’s sixth information technology (IT) 
master plan that professes to “enrich lives, enhance the nation’s economic 
competitiveness and ability to innovate through infocomm” (IDA, “Realising the 
iN2015 Vision” 3).2 As such, the iN2015 Masterplan engages a nation where 
information technologies and telecommunications already form a prominent part in 
                                                 




most people’s daily lives, from education to transport, work, and leisure. Under the 
iN2015 Masterplan, the spread of information technologies and telecommunications 
will not only be escalated, but their very patterns and structures will be intensified and 
pervasive computing will play a leading role in structuring the everyday life of the 
Singapore populace.3 Pervasive computing is defined as a vision for future 
applications of information technologies and telecommunications, highly miniaturised 
and embedded into everyday objects, the environment and even the human body, to 
allow wireless and “seamless” identification and connectivity. This technological 
vision is also known amongst pervasive computing researchers as ubiquitous 
computing and ambient intelligence (Köhler and Erdman 831-852; Bohn et al. 763-
785; Hilty, Som and Köhler 853-874). The particularities of pervasive computing 
include ubiquity and “invisibility” (Weiser 94-104), and particularly for wearable 
computing, operational and interactional constancy (“always-on”), as well as 
Artificial Intelligence in terms of situational-awareness and “augmentation” 
(Billinghurst and Starner 57-64; Mann “Humanistic Computing” 2123-2151).  
  
                                                 
3 For example, the iN2015 Masterplan had set targets of 90 percent home broadband 
usage and 100 percent computer ownership in homes with school-going children but 
as of this year, Singapore’s household broadband penetration rate has reached 103 
percent ahead of the 2015 target. Meanwhile, its mobile penetration rate stands at 146 
percent, or an average of more than one mobile phone per person (I. Tham “Wired 
Broadband Services”). Currently, and as part of the iN2015 Masterplan, the 
broadband network is being upgraded with a high-speed fibre-optic network called the 
Next Generation Broadband Network. This new network will allow speeds of 1 
Gigabyte per second or higher, and is expected island-wide by 2012 (H. H.Chua “All 
Set to Speed Down Internet Highway”). As of April 2010, thirty percent of the island 
is wired up with this national high-speed fibre-optic network (H. H. Chua “Ultra-fast 
Broadband”). In terms of the wireless infrastructure, the S$100 million 
“Wireless@SG” network that allows subscribers “always-on” and free (until 2013) 
wireless broadband connections to the Internet in most public spaces across Singapore 
is completed ahead of schedule with more than 7,500 hotspots and 1.3 million 
subscribers (Y. Tham “Editorial”). 
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Pervasive computing is hence regarded as being capable of providing access to 
information “anytime” “anywhere,” and to even act and react according to its user’s 
environment, filtering information on his or her behalf without any conscious actions 
and/or awareness on the user’s part. This “seamless ease” of use is certainly in line 
with the objectives of the iN2015 Masterplan. As the iN2015 Steering Committee 
pointed out, “iN2015 sets out to deliver on this promise of infocomm for every 
individual and business in Singapore. To do this, infocomm must not only be easy to 
use, it needs to be intelligent enough to cater to the needs of every user,” from 
“infocomm-savvy computer graduate” to “the elderly” (IDA, “Innovation. Integration. 
Internationalisation” 3). Moreover, Dr Lee Boon Yang, then Minister for Information, 
Communications and the Arts, claimed that the iN2015 Masterplan is also about 
developing “an inclusive digital society” in which information technologies and 
telecommunications is made “even more accessible to everyone – to work, live, learn 
and play with” (2). 
 Ensuring the proliferation of information technologies and 
telecommunications, however, is not as neutral or positive as it seems. This is 
especially so with pervasive computing, where highly miniaturised technologies are 
embedded into everyday objects and environments to mediate everyday life 
ubiquitously, constantly and invisibly. Ryan Bishop, John Phillips and Wei-Wei Yeo 
point out, in Beyond Description: Singapore Space Historicity, that architecture is not 
a benign entity and/or activity; it vitally produces space. Space as conceptualized not 
only in the literal but also in the figurative sense – spaces of thinking, interaction and 
dwelling that are inseparable from technologies of speed. In the case of Singapore, the 
authors maintain, these technologies of speed are reproduced and developed as part of 
a general discourse on efficiency and productivity that at the same time erases 
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positions and facts contrary to its sense of benign progress (5-6). Such instances point 
to the intertwined relationship between the literal and figurative, how the built spaces 
of Singapore (or what is empirical, material) cannot be separated from its “un-built” 
spaces (or what is invisible, immaterial). In fact, the authors argue that the un-built 
provides the condition of possibility for both literal and figurative conceptions and 
experiences of spaces. They contend: 
 
The built, of course, designates both the concrete structure and the  
various manifestations of its conception: plans, models, and blueprints.  
But for the design to have been possible one must consider the  
undetermined and thus un-conceptualized possibilities against which a  
design is always made. In this exact sense the un-built corresponds to  
that notion of space that constitutes the condition of possibility for both  
literal and figurative conceptions and experiences of it. (6) 
 
The iN2015 Masterplan’s objective to turn Singapore into “an intelligent 
nation, a global city, powered by infocomm,” therefore cannot be divorced from the 
larger national discourses on efficiency and progress, including the way Singapore 
narrates or broadcasts itself, its creation of the needs for perpetual capitalist and 
technological developments, and its rhetoric of technological neutrality, 
empowerment, control and inclusion. Simultaneously, these national discourses 
cannot be isolated from history, globalisation and its technologies which extend 
before the birth of Singapore and beyond its shores. In other words, Singapore’s 
context as an ex-British colony, its geopolitics as a small city-state with a majority 
“Chinese” immigrant population in Southeast Asia obsessed with race-relations 
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within itself and with neighbouring states, and its ambition to be a global city entail a 
continuous, complex and strategic engagement with colonialism, post-colonialism, 
globalisation and, fundamentally, Cold War technologies and technicity.  
 Singapore is one of the smallest countries in Southeast Asia with a land area 
of 714.2 square kilometres. It comprises an ethnically diverse immigrant society and 
has a current total population size of close to 5.2 million people, of which 3.3 million 
are Singapore citizens.4 Prior to achieving self-governance in 1959 and independence 
in 1965, Singapore was part of the Malay Peninsula and a British colony. Despite its 
small size and lack of natural resources (compared to its neighbours), Singapore’s 
geographic location as a gateway to both the Indian and Pacific Oceans made it a 
strategic British trading centre and military base. Its majority immigrant population 
depended on the British for defence until the latter’s withdrawal in 1971. Against the 
backdrop of volatile race relations with its immediate neighbours Malaysia and 
Indonesia, coupled with a deep sense of vulnerability and insecurity, the founding of 
Singapore also coincided with the Cold War rivalry between the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Singapore’s defence and foreign policies 
sided with the United States as the power crucial for its survival and the (continuation 
of?) peace and security of Southeast Asia (Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States 
Revisited 215-221). To this day, the Singapore-US link is still considered of 
paramount importance to Singapore’s security as the latter continues to supply 
Singapore with advanced military weapons and systems, together with training 
facilities in America. In return, Singapore remains a key transit point for American 
ships and aircraft (Singh Arming the Singapore Armed Forces 19). 
                                                 
4 Department of Statistics Singapore <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/keyind.html>. 
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The strong ties with America extend beyond security and trade, and are not 
limited to only material exchanges, but also include the transfer of ideologies and 
doctrines. Prasenjit Duara, in “The Cold War as a Historical Period: An Interpretive 
Essay,” points out that the United States, quite different from the Soviet Union, 
adopted a form of imperialism that is based more on indirect control through notions 
of limited self-determination and tutelage. This development-oriented imperialism no 
longer emphasised conquest; rather, it imposed through clientelistic structures based 
on modernising designs of enlightenment, such as fostering discourses on 
multiculturalism, development and modernisation. It also obtained informal control of 
key infrastructure and political institutions of the client states whereby the latter 
became “militarily dependent upon and economically mobilized for the sake of the 
metropole” (461). Ultimately, the United States’ strategic reorientation of the 
periphery, designed to attain global supremacy for itself, was sustained by, as much as 
it sustained, a vast military-industrial-complex. As a result, the crucial consequences 
of the Cold War on client states were not only constraints on imagination, old and 
new aspirations, but also the militarisation of the everyday (470).  
Similarly, Bishop and Phillips’ Modernist Avant-Garde Aesthetics and 
Contemporary Military Technology argues that Singapore’s move from the colonial to 
post-colonial contexts should not be seen as simply a transition from one condition to 
another. Rather, it should be understood as a transformation that very often retains 
and repeats fundamental elements of colonialism, such as the (post)colonial military 
body. The authors contend that the post-colonial moment in Southeast Asia is 
inextricable from the Cold War, its technologies and technicity, although this is often 
obfuscated by post-colonial discourses on nation building (120-123). Singapore’s 
nationalist project and its current transformation to a global city exacerbates the 
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necessary exposure to the exigencies of Cold War technologies and technicity, which 
have accelerated in the post-Cold War world under global capital and the global “war 
against terror.” As Bishop continues to observe, Singapore’s ambition to be a global 
city amongst the various global orders necessitates its embrace of the historicity and 
technicity of C3I, and this embrace is demarcated in every dimension of its urban 
landscape to the extent that the divisions between the military, economic, and political 
domains are remarkably fluid and fold into each other as the need arises (“The 
Vertical Order Has Come to an End” 62).  
C3I – Command, Control, Communications, and Information/Intelligence – is 
one of the most notable applications of cybernetics, military technologies and 
technicity that emerged from the Cold War. As we enter the twenty-first century, C3I 
is increasingly being overtaken by C4ISTAR – Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Information/Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance.5 C4ISTAR, premised on capabilities and systems that are networked 
in such a way to provide military commanders situational awareness in the form of 
fast and “accurate” information and intelligence, is believed to be necessary for 
achieving (though not guaranteeing) accelerated decisions during combat. The 
modification in acronym from C3I to C4ISTAR is in itself significant and signals an 
intensification of the role information technologies and telecommunications play in 
warfare, and their impact on the larger transformation within militaries at the doctrinal 
and organisational levels, as they sort to adjust to the post-Cold War era of an ever-
changing security landscape. These doctrinal and organisational changes in militaries 
                                                 
5 C4ISTAR is the term used in the British context. The American equivalence is 
C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information/Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance. C4ISR is also used by the Singapore Armed Forces, 
however, for this dissertation, I will keep to C4ISTAR as the theme of target and 
targeting remains relevant for my arguments. 
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are encapsulated in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), introduced by the 
influential Washington think-tank in 1993, which underpins today’s Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW).  
At the doctrinal level, RMA proposes a shift from the massive, heavy armies 
of the Cold War that fought “in place,” to lighter more deployable armies that can be 
operational around the world in times of war and humanitarian crises. It argues that in 
the post-September 11 climate, the strategies of deterrence and containment are 
inadequate and need to be complemented with pre-emptive strikes, that is, going to 
the “threats” and dealing with them as far away from the homeland as possible. 
Mobility, adaptability and flexibility are thus essential requirements of highly 
dispersed forces so that they can move and respond to changing situations, rapidly and 
precisely. RMA also calls for “jointness,” which is the ability of the air force, army 
and navy to operate as one, overcome incompatible hardware and software, and move 
from a platform-centric to network-centric warfare (Sloan 5-7). At the organisational 
level, RMA demands the creation of smaller units (though not necessarily force size) 
that can be added or deleted from the network architecture according to need 
(Mitchell 35-37). These units are made up of highly qualified, trained, educated 
personnel who are high-tech savvy, and able to work beyond the nation’s shores 
(Sloan 7).  
The transformation that is taking place in the post-Cold War era, however, 
should not be taken as a drastic break from Cold War technologies and technicity. 
Elinor Sloan, in Military Transformation and Modern Warfare, points out that RMA 
is itself an adaptation of the Soviet’s Military Technical Revolution (MTR) of the late 
1970s and 1980s (viii), just as the notion of “jointness” was already apparent in the 
Normandy landings during World War II that involved both land and sea power (27). 
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The display of American technologies and technicity in the 1991 Gulf War, moreover, 
is a culmination of their research and development in war games and simulated 
exercises throughout the 1980s (2). I concur with Sloan’s observation that in thinking 
about military technical revolution, it is more useful to conceive of these changes as 
“a series of concentric circles, each progressively more expansive but each continuing 
to encompass the earlier core or cores” (viii). Furthermore, I would like to extend this 
notion of expansion, that retains an earlier core, to the rest of my discussions on 
pervasive computing and the iN2015 Masterplan such as how they continue to 
embody total war strategies and Cold War techniques and technicity.  
By total war strategies, I am referring to the structure and heuristic 
frameworks founded in 19th century Europe that left an indelible mark on modern 
warfare, specifically, the decentralisation efforts of the French and Napoleonic Wars, 
when there was, for the first time in warfare, less differentiation between combatants 
and civilians. By referring to Cold War techniques and technicity, I am pointing in 
particular to the covert propagandist strategies of appealing to the hearts and minds of 
the people in support of war efforts. These strategies, I argue, are still present in post-
Cold War Singapore today, albeit in more intensified yet imperceptible ways. 
Additionally, the three core points I observe in this dissertation are:  
 
1) The persistence of central command and control, despite decentralisation and 
the move towards networks and distributed ways of thinking and doing things. 
2) The significant role of discourse (signs, rhetoric, visions) in shaping things, 
situations and thoughts, even as we enter an era where notions of “truth” and 
“reality” are no longer tenable. 
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3) The spiralling interplay between the material and immaterial in the 
constitution of technological spaces and technological subjects, and how they 
feed back into each other.  
 
In this sense, I would like to keep Bishop and Phillips’s understanding of 
technicity as a complex, multi-layered condition that implies, firstly, the privileging of 
practical methods and results and, secondly, the intensification of the active 
technicisation of all aspects of everyday life. Last, but equally important, technicity 
also implies a condition that develops its own momentum, spiralling beyond human 
control, as more technical innovations are used to deal with unforeseen consequences 
of earlier technical introduction, yet producing their own sets of problems/solutions 
further down the line (Bishop and Phillips, Modernist Avant-Garde Aesthetics 105). I 
understand that to make sense of this technicity will require a constant looking back at 
history, examining the links between the iN2015 Masterplan, pervasive computing 
and their larger connections to past and present events and, pivotally, the mutually 
constitutive relationships between language, thought and technology. My insistence 
on historical connections should not be mistaken by my readers as attempts to 
naturalise or universalise the phenomena I am studying. Quite the contrary, my focus 
on historicity is to stress how pervasive computing and the iN2015 Masterplan did not 
develop out of a vacuum, but are parts of a larger network of things, situations, 






1.2 C4ISTAR Techniques and Technicity: The Relationships between Technology, 
Discourse and Embodiment 
C4ISTAR technologies and technicity, which underpin the current transformation of 
the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces (3G SAF) into a network-centric, 
knowledge-based fighting force, are synonymous with pervasive computing and 
equally fundamental to the iN2015 Masterplan. Singapore’s unflinching embrace of 
post-Cold War technologies and technicity are regarded by many as a “natural 
progression” of its modernisation and globalisation programme. Indeed, her rapid rise 
since gaining independence in 1965 into a prosperous nation and success as one of the 
world’s most efficient and “clean” city-states has generated admiration from many. 
However, these achievements have also resulted in an unquestioning faith in 
technologies and their capacities, encouraging a certain hubris and “blindness” to the 
polluting effects of these technologies. Bishop, Phillips and Yeo highlight the 
electromagnetic pollution that comes with information technologies and 
telecommunications, in terms of how they reorganisation human experience and 
spatial relations, and how the virtual shapes and impacts actual conditions of 
experience and the political economy. Critically, the authors emphasise how this 
“blindness” is created by a discourse on the supposed immateriality of 
electromagnetic networks and a binary between the “clean, post-industrial global 
urban site and the dirty, industrializing sprawl of developing cities” (Beyond 
Description 14-15).  
 The production of “blindness” is, in fact, part of and proper to C4ISTAR 
technologies and technicity in several ways. Paul Virilio, in his studies of the 
relationship between war, cinema, and what he calls dromology, argues that there is a 
synchronicity between the war machine and representation that makes war weapons 
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not just tools of destruction, but also of perception (War and Cinema 6). The logistics 
of military perception, he points out, involve not simply targeting in terms of 
ubiquitous surveillance, simulation and the replacement of war objects with pictures 
and sounds, but also the directing of propaganda to the civilian population (1-4). 
Therefore, Virilio suggests, the first victim of war is always the concept of reality 
(33), just as the political economy rests on the persistence of signs and dominant 
trends, rather than on mere facts (80). However, apart from discourse and signs 
producing “blindness” under the logistics of military perception, the negative aspects 
of information technologies and telecommunications are rendered invisible also by the 
speed of these machines. According to Virilio speed that results from miniaturisation 
and ubiquity is causing the disappearance of places and human consciousness, and 
consequently the dissimulation of people and bodies (Virilio and Lotringer 98-102). 
Speed, as it mediates human actions in picoseconds, is leaving little space and time 
for human reflections, making them “blind” to the technologies’ potential for violence 
and accidents. Virilio warns that the question of technology is not only about the 
substance, but also the accidents manufactured, since “[e]very technology produces, 
provokes, programs a specific accident” (46). Furthermore, he reminds us, speed is an 
environment, a domain with specific properties, defined in equal measures by time as 
they are by space (Virilio Live 61). Hence, as speed increases, control over cities also 
increases in the hope of anticipating the future or what is coming (62-63). 
The iN2015 Masterplan’s establishment of a nation-wide “ultra-high speed, 
pervasive, intelligent and trusted” infrastructure, therefore, entails a spread of 
information technologies and telecommunications and a simultaneous increase in the 
integration of all aspects of Singapore society under the central command and control 
of not only the government and its military, but also the technologies and their logic. 
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At the same time, this is achieved through a constant tight control over the 
perceptions of these technologies. Through discourses that stress the positive aspects 
of the technologies, and present the negative aspects as avoidable and/or controllable, 
these technologies appear neutral and ultimately empowering, despite their potential 
for violence and accidents. So, the persistence of equating technology with progress 
or as the only reliable source for improving the human condition is due, in no small 
part, to the historical and definitional understanding of technology as a tool. In this 
regard, any setbacks are attributed to socio-cultural misuse rather than to the 
technology itself. Technology then is seen as inherently value-free and only obtains 
its particular socio-cultural meaning and moral standing depending on where and how 
it is put to use (Winner, “Technologies as Form of Life” 103-113). However, simply 
understanding technology as socially constructed (in the limited sense of 
instrumentality) is not enough to recognise the hold of technology over humans. Such 
a position disregards particular features or designs within the technology which 
provide structure for human activities that, in turn, encourage specific patterns of 
power by favouring certain social interests and groups (Winner, “Do Artifacts Have 
Politics?” 289-302). It also neglects how technology fundamentally shapes our 
thoughts and structures our ways of being. Virilio’s insightful observation of the 
relationship between discourse and the techniques of the war machine is therefore 
instructive for this dissertation. In critically analysing the discourse of the iN2015 
Masterplan and its technologies, I must also focus on their techniques and technicity.  
Philosophers and theorists of technology have argued that technical devices 
and systems are not neutral, but shape our culture and environment, alter human 
activities and thereby, influence who we are and how we live. Martin Heidegger in his 
work “The Question Concerning Technology” (311-341) suggests that technology is 
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not simply a benign object. He argues one of the most important aspects of human’s 
ordering and driving of technology forward is their becoming “blind” to technology’s 
essence. Heidegger states that “we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way 
when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we 
particularly like to pay homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology” 
(311-312). The essence of technology, for Heidegger, is nothing technological; rather, 
it refers to the human attitude and/or enframed mind that regard technology simply as 
a means to an end, and/or as inevitable. In other words, the essence of technology is 
the enframed mind that sees technology instrumentally, solely as an extension of 
human activity and a mere tool that humans are in control of when, in fact, technology 
is capable of manufacturing its own reality. This instrumental and anthropological 
conception of technology, Heidegger further points out, leads to an “un-free” 
relationship with technology as it requires a constant need for mastery and control 
over it. Enframing is hence one of the “truths” generated by technology and is 
dangerous because it not only rules out other ways of being and seeing the world, but 
also makes humans “blind” to its revealing or destining (333).  
Although Heidegger may come across to some as being too technologically 
deterministic, I hesitate to throw out the baby with the bathwater here as his notion of 
enframing remains relevant for this dissertation.6 One way of understanding how 
technology structures human thoughts through activities is by looking at the 
relationships between technology, discourse and embodiment. Heidegger points to the 
inextricable relationship between language, thought and technology by highlighting 
                                                 
6 Haraway, for example, sees Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” as 
dogmatic, but as her interviewer, Goodeve, points out Heidegger’s thinking and 
questioning of the technological was within the historical context of war, fascism, and 
technology being intricately entwined (How Like A Leaf 22-23). As I will show in this 
dissertation, war, totalitarianism and technology today are still closely entwined, 
albeit in subtle ways, which is why I find Heidegger still relevant. 
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how they draw from the same root. He highlights how the Greek word for technology 
– techne – suggests not only “activities and skills for the craftsman but also for the 
arts of the mind and the fine arts” (318). In this sense, skills, language and technology 
are mutually constitutive (or language is a technology) that, in turn, pivotally shape 
human thoughts and subjectivities. This is certainly the case with how computers 
shape patterns of thoughts, while Cold War ideologies and politics simultaneously 
shape their technical design. Paul Edwards in The Closed World: Computers and the 
Politics of Discourse in Cold War America, looks at how the digital computer played 
a central role during the Cold War not just physically as a tool, but also 
metaphorically in shaping its discourse and ideology. In turn, the computer functions 
as an embodiment of Cold War related ideas of information, symbols and logic (ix-x). 
He argues that “tools and their uses thus form an integral part of human discourse and, 
through discourse, not only shape material reality directly but also mould the mental 
models, concepts, and theories that guide that shaping” (30). In short, Edwards points 
to how ideas and devices are intertwined with politics and culture, and how these 
manifest in their mutually constitutive discourses. He argues “tools shape discourse, 
but discourse also shapes tools” (30).  
Another way to understand how technology structures human thoughts 
through activity is provided by Don Ihde in “A Phenomenology of Technics” (137-
159). Ihde contends that our interaction with technology is also a bodily engagement – 
an existential technical relation with the world. In other words, this embodied relation 
with technology entails activities that need to be learned or constituted. Techniques, 
then, imply “the symbiosis of artefact and user within a human action” (138). 
Essentially, Ihde continues, technology as it extends human’s bodily capacities also 
transforms them. Hence technology is not neutral as it changes the basic situation, 
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however subtly. Ihde gives the example of the telescope that greatly extends human’s 
sense of sight, which paradoxically also led to a reduction in sight because, “what is 
revealed is what excites; what is concealed may be forgotten” (142). Therefore, Ihde 
concludes, “there are latent telics that occur through inventions” (142). 
This brings me back to the point made by Virilio about the “blindness” 
produced by the relationship between discourse and the techniques of information 
technologies and telecommunications. In this dissertation, “blindness” means 
disavowal, ignorance and/or forgetfulness (intentional or otherwise) that result from 
both the latent telics of pervasive computing and the optimistic discourse surrounding 
the technology that are, in turn, productive of the continued development of the 
technology. Hence, this dissertation will demonstrate that pervasive computing’s 
inherent capacity for abstraction, surveillance, speed, and control are products of the 
historical mix of techniques and technicity from liberal trade, scientific developments 
and military strategies. At the same time, the technology’s discourse on efficiency, 
freedom, empowerment, connectivity and machine “intelligence” are productive of 
the current intensification of C4ISTAR technologies and technicity, underpinning 
global capital networks and the network-centric transformation of Singapore’s 
military. Furthermore, I will show that the proliferation of these technologies and their 
uses, in turn, are structuring human thoughts and discourses according to the 
machines’ logic, such as how the prototypes and discourses of pervasive computing 
and the iN2015 Masterplan repeats total war strategies and Cold War techniques and 
technicity, while the active technological subjectivities they extol and shape, 
simultaneously mirror global capitalist neo-liberal ideologies. Far from being a simple 
coincidence, the synchronicity of discourse between pervasive computing and the 
iN2015 Masterplan, here points to how the logic of the technologies are enframing 
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thoughts that are then used effectively to ensure their continuous research and 
development in a continuous cycle, feeding back into and reinforcing each other. 
The iN2015 Masterplan embodies the current networked context of post-Cold 
War technologies and technicity, which in turn demands the production of active 
technological subjects needed by both the military and technological economy. The 
technological economy or informational society sums up the overlapping realms and 
mutually constitutive forces of politics, economics, and information technologies and 
telecommunications. What results is a particular way of life, variously described as 
the post-industrial/post-Fordist society, knowledge-based economy, network society, 
new economy, cultural economy and economy of signs; but what links them all is the 
generation, through innovation and creativity, of new knowledge and immaterial 
goods, regarded as critical for the survival of the economy (Barry and Slater 1). 
Therefore, just as the iN2015 Masterplan’s establishment of pervasive information 
technologies and telecommunications is not neutral, its objective of a “digitally 
inclusive society” is equally not as benevolent as it seems. 
 
1.3 Society of Control Meets Consumer Society: Singapore in the Age of “Mutated 
Capitalism” 
In “Postscript on the Societies of Control” Gilles Deleuze asserts that the disciplinary 
societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries expounded by Michel Foucault are 
increasingly being superseded today by complex societies of control (35-39). The 
latter operate through a sophisticated combination of what Deleuze calls “mutated 
capitalism,” information technologies and telecommunications, and their feedback 
loops. Under mutated capitalism, there is a shift from capitalism’s focus on material 
production to the dispersive “higher-order production” of information and services, 
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which, in turn, require complex forms of control through information technologies 
and telecommunications and their feedback loops (Deleuze 38). According to 
Deleuze, some key features of societies of control include the proliferation of digital 
technologies and their logic; the modular rather than discrete forms of operation and 
control; the supremacy of code or password over the signature or watchwords; and the 
conversion of individual and masses to ‘dividuals’ (39).  
 In other words, unlike the disciplinary powers that are exerted on individuals 
as they move through discreet forms of institutions, like schools, factories, clinics, 
prisons, military, et cetera; social control in societies of control is diffused, no longer 
independently confined within a single entity and/or institution, but becomes modular 
through digital technologies which plug into each other) and, therefore, are perpetual. 
Deleuze observes, “control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also 
continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and 
discontinuous” (38). Furthermore, this shifting, modular, and insidious form of 
control presents rivalries and competitions as excellent motivational forces to be 
emulated while perpetual training (following the logic of digital technology and 
perpetual innovation) is made an essential part of life. With the dispersal of 
information technologies and telecommunications, the individual (signature) and his 
or her position within the mass do not matter as much as his or her access (code or 
password) to information. In this context, the distinction between the individual and 
masses becomes less consequential since they can all be transformed into active data 





The Singapore government, apart from building and deploying the necessary 
infrastructures and technologies, has always ensured that its education and training 
systems are geared towards the needs of its political economy. The iN2015 
Masterplan continues this well-coordinated effort to align the deployment of 
education to the needs of mutated capitalism. As such, the iN2015 Steering 
Committee recommended several strategies to encourage the sophisticated and 
innovative use of the latest technologies, which will in turn help develop the 
‘infocomm-savvy workforce’ and ‘globally competitive infocomm manpower’ it 
needs. Specifically, they identified two ideal subjects to be nurtured for the 
technological economy – ‘the techno-strategists who have the ability to combine 
technical know-how with domain experience to develop innovative solutions’ and ‘the 
technologists, who need to be equipped with deep technical expertise to engage in 
R&D [Research & Development]’ (IDA, “Innovation. Integration. 
Internationalisation” 61). These subjects are also expected to have “strong analytical, 
communication and interpersonal skills,” able “to be more risk-taking, entrepreneurial 
and … tolerate greater ambiguity” (70); in short, innovative, neo-liberal, 
technological subjects. 
David Harvey, in A Brief History of Neoliberalism, elucidates neo-liberalism 
as a theory of the political economy that proposes that human well-being is best 
advanced by encouraging individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework of strong (intellectual) property rights, free market and free 
trade (2). Here, the neo-liberal assumption is that individual freedoms are guaranteed 
by the liberation of the markets (7). Therefore, according to Harvey, neo-liberalism 
ultimately works on an ethics that brings all human actions and domains into relation 
with the market, while negating or erasing other ways of living and being in the 
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world. Today, neo-liberalism operates and is dependent on information technologies 
and telecommunications to create, accumulate, store, transfer, and analyse 
informational goods and services essential to the informational society (Harvey 3-4). 
Furthermore, just as Cold War technologies and technicity pervade a wide range of 
architectural and spatial practices, neo-liberalism similarly permeates influential 
spheres from education and media to key national and international institutions. 
Harvey argues that neo-liberalism has become “hegemonic as a mode of discourse … 
[and] has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become 
incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand 
the world” (3). 
 Key to the successful spread of neo-liberal thought or values is a complex mix 
of implementation and enforcement of neo-liberal policies by western industrial 
nations in the 1970s (Harvey 16, 23), and the programmatic advancement of the neo-
liberal cause through the media, universities, think tanks and civil society groups 
funded by corporations (40, 44, 54). However, more fundamentally, the expansion of 
neo-liberal thought is in the grounding of its discourse on concepts of “human 
dignity” and “individual freedom” (5) which simultaneously obfuscate its ultimate 
objective of capital accumulation and the restoration of power to the economic elites 
(19). The tensions between neo-liberal ideals and its actual pragmatics, Harvey 
continues, extend also to the neo-liberal supposed distrust of all state powers that, 
ironically, are needed to enforce and protect the rights of (intellectual) private 
property, individual liberties, and entrepreneurial freedoms (21). Harvey notes that 
although neo-liberalism is fundamentally about the restoration of economic power, it 
does not necessarily return power to the same people. Instead, it rewards those 
intimately tied to capital, including a new disparate class of key capitalist operators 
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and leaders in the corporate, financial, legal, scientific, technical, media and, I add, 
educational sectors, who are now connected by their common belief in neo-liberalism 
(31-36) and in their shared stakes in the perpetuation of neo-liberal values. It is not 
difficult to see why there is strong enthusiasm and support for the iN2015 Masterplan 
not only from industry and business players, but also from the public. Pivotally, the 
iN2015 Masterplan’s discourse of technological empowerment repeats the neo-liberal 
strategy of translating desires for liberation into the “liberty of consumer choice,” not 
only in terms of products, but lifestyles, ways of expressions (42), and ultimately 
modes of being.  
Jean Baudrillard, in the “The System of Objects” (13-31), “Consumer Society” 
(32-59), and “Marxism and the System of Political Economy” (131-177), elaborates 
on a new humanism where competition has moved from the realm of production to 
consumption, and where subjectivity and freedom are performed through 
consumption. Under the mutation of capitalism, consumer objects (including digital 
media) form the code through which an arbitrary system of classification and value is 
assigned, and this code then provides a false transparency of social standing and 
social relations; its network of signs incites desires and creates needs. According to 
Baudrillard, needs here refer specifically to the desire for difference or social 
meaning, and since needs are created from a code of floating signifiers, they can never 
be satisfied. This, in turn, makes consumption limitless and therefore a good form of 
social control. In other words, Baudrillard is pointing to the political economy of the 
sign in shaping needs and desire, and how consumption of signs and objects (and, 
therefore, of codes) remains vital for the reproduction of mutated capitalism. He 
states, needs are “produced as a force of consumption, and as a general potential 
reserve within the larger framework of productive forces” (“Consumer Society” 45). 
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Hence, Baudrillard argues, production and consumption are two sides of the same 
coin, they are one and same logical process of productive forces of control. 
Technological consumption under the iN2015 Masterplan then becomes a ‘citizen’s 
duty’ (51) that needs to be performed in the service of the nation and the neo-liberal 
technological economy.  
Since information technologies and telecommunications are fundamental to 
the operations and success of mutated capitalism, ensuring its consumption (and thus 
production), is of central priority for the iN2015 Masterplan. Whether it is in the 
development of a competitive information communication-savvy workforce for the 
political economy or ensuring a “digitally inclusive society,” the iN2015 Masterplan 
intensifies the consumption and production of these technologies for all. Apart from 
the construction of pervasive infrastructures, enacting policies and harnessing the 
educational system, innovative neo-liberal technological subjects are also produced 
through the coding of needs and desires. The merging of post- Cold War technologies 
and technicity with neo-liberal values and rationality, indeed, are resulting in complex 
societies of control and Singapore is one good example of such a society.  
Admittedly, Deleuze and Baudrillard do not always see eye to eye in terms of 
their strategies for dealing with mutated capitalism, especially in terms of their 
positions on productive desires. Although Deleuze (and later with Felix Guattari) 
points to the twin forces of machinic and capitalist systems as insidiously structuring 
subjectivities under their logic of consumption and (social, moral and digital) codes, 
he nevertheless sees technological embodiment panning out differently for different 
bodies, largely depending on how information technologies and telecommunications 
are harnessed. In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
recast desire, not as a lack like conventional psychoanalytic postulations, but as an 
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active and positive force that can be harnessed to change structures. According to the 
authors, nature is a process of production and there is no distinction between 
production and consumption, as well as between man and nature (3-4). Hence, 
Deleuze and Guattari formulate the body-as-desiring-machines that are continually 
producing, consuming, yet, at the same time, processual (becoming) and thus full of 
potentials. The authors propose a move away from the body-as-desiring-machines that 
only creates more desires and suggest instead the assumption of the “body without 
organs” that belongs to the realm of both production and anti-production (6-8). “Body 
without organs” can then appropriate desiring-production for its own use; in their 
case, for anti-capitalist revolution (11).  
Baudrillard, however, in “The Mirror of Production” (102-130) argues that the 
“productivist discourse” that engages productive desires, in fact, is a “mode of 
production” that leaves the “principle of production” intact (102).7 Such revolutionary 
calls not only (to?) simulate radical alternatives, but also point to the limits of critical 
thinking that cannot move outside or beyond the dominant schema of capital and the 
political economy that is production (103). Baudrillard adds that under such 
productivist calls for liberation, humans stop “being” themselves and mirror the 
political economy by “producing” themselves as visible value, while confusing the 
liberation of productive forces with their freedom (“Mirror of Production” 103-106). 
According to Baudrillard, the false dichotomies created by productivist discourse, 
                                                 
7 In Forget Foucault, Baudrillard points to Deleuze’s positive dissemination of flows 
and intensities as a direct result of Foucault’s power, which he formulates along the 
same operational line as desire that then allows Deleuze to develop the notion of 
desire along the line of future form of power (35-36). Pivotally, both discourses 
function on pro-duction, not in the sense of material manufacture, but in the original 
sense of pro-ducere, that is, to render visible, cause to appear. Furthermore, 
Baudrillard suggests that Deleuze’s molecular topology of desire colludes with 
science and is complicit with cybernetics in their eventual convergence in genetic 
simulation and code manipulation (46-47). 
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between use value and exchange value, labour power and products of consumption, 
are effects of the code, which leaves the political economy’s condition of possibility – 
the rationale of productive subjectivity – unchallenged (“Mirror of Production” 108-
109). Baudrillard reiterates that behind the concept of consumption are the 
anthropological codes of needs and use value, which join with production to become a 
productive force in shaping subjectivities in material production to satisfy those needs 
(“Mirror of Production” 105). For him, “the system of the political economy produces 
not only the individual as labor power sold and exchanged, it produces the concept of 
labor power as the fundamental human potentiality” (“Mirror of Production” 113). 
This, in turn, leads to “not only the quantitative exploitation of man as productive 
force by the system of capitalist political economy, but the metaphysical over-
determination of man as producer by the code of the political economy” (“Mirror of 
Production” 113). 
This is why for Baudrillard the main repercussions of the mutation of 
capitalism, besides its departure from material production and its reach and subjection 
of everything and everyone under the system of exchange value, remain at the level of 
social relations (“Marxism and the System of Political Economy”138-139). The 
movement from the commodity form to the sign form, from material to digital, shifts 
the law of exchange under general equivalence to the “operationalization of all 
exchanges under the law of the code” (“Marxism and the System of Political 
Economy” 140). He warns that under the “hegemony of the code,” control and power 
is “much more subtle and more totalitarian than that of exploitation” (“Marxism and 
the System of Political Economy” 140). This is because under this new ideological 
structure, the code engages productive energy, manipulates minds and produces 
meanings and differences that no longer refer to any objective or subjective “reality,” 
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but only to its own logic, that is, the disappearance of its use value “to the benefit of 
its commutation and exchange value alone” (“Marxism and the System of Political 
Economy” 146).  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to probe this tension between 
Baudrillard’s argument and Deleuze and Guattari’s position in depth, except to say 
that while Deleuze and Guattari’s desire for anti-capitalist production can be arguably 
an effect of the very systems they are targeting, Baudrillard’s opinion of the principle 
of production, if taken too intact, becomes too pessimistic, total, and leaves no room 
for manoeuvring. I take the position that Baudrillard’s as well as Deleuze and 
Guattari’s observations remain at the forefront for contemplating and critiquing the 
current post-modern, post-industrial, globalised arrangement, even though their views 
were expressed well before the twenty-first century. In addition, despite the 
differences in their approach to production, they nevertheless do share similar views 
of the threats to the individual and radical singular thought posed by the complex 
infrastructure of mutated capitalism.  
 
1.4 The Paradoxical and Reversible as Methodology: Situating My Thoughts and 
Mapping My Journey 
The use of theories in this dissertation is admittedly eclectic and, at times, 
contradictory. This is because as I work through concrete examples and phenomena, I 
am mobilising theories that I feel are most directly relevant to help think them 
through. At the same time, these contradictions also reflect on the empirical situations 
that ultimately no theory is ever comprehensive enough to explain. For example, even 
as Deleuze describes societies of control as replacing disciplinary societies, the case 
of Singapore shows that very often this is not fully the case. The situations of how the 
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government here uses the educational and legal systems to constitute technological 
subjects, show that Louis Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses, even if it is a 
structural theory, remains relevant to my discussion (in chapter five). In the context of 
Singapore, the closed command and control specific to disciplinary societies co-exist 
with the rapid, fluid, free-floating control articulated by Deleuze. 
 Nevertheless, one central theory that structures and runs through the entire 
dissertation is Baudrillard’s theory of the object. In Passwords, Baudrillard describes 
the object, not simply as a manufactured thing, but as something that speaks, and 
speaks to each other, developing systems of signs beyond what humans intend for it 
(3-5). So while humans regard objects as dumb and inert because we produce them, as 
Baudrillard sees it, objects have autonomy, they can seduce and have the capacity to 
avenge themselves on the subjects over-sure of controlling them. This is because 
objects operate on symbolic and semiotic levels, forming systems of codes (social, 
moral and digital) that structures the way we think and how we live our lives. At the 
same time, because objects are ambiguous – they mediate and yet are immediate and 
immanent – they both gratify and disappoint, moving beyond the codes, meanings and 
definitions imposed on them. Working on both dual and duel relations, objects are 
thus reversible, with the potential to break the cyclical. Here, the reversible is anti-
determinism, the built-in ability of objects and systems to undermine themselves by 
their very functioning. Therefore, objects, for Baudrillard, provide the potential to 
break from control and from the subject, both of which are intensifying under mutated 
capitalism. 
  In this regard, I would like my readers to view this dissertation as a 
performative object within a system of objects. This dissertation is performative in not 
only mapping my thoughts and journey, but also in shaping them in return. This 
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dissertation, at times, mirrors the almost totalitarian account of Singapore in its 
critique, even as it strives for the paradoxical and the reversible. It is a part of but also 
departs from discourse, in the Foucauldian sense of its relations with power and the 
production of “truth.” Foucault observes the manifold relations of power that pervade 
society which, in turn, constitute the social body through their production, 
accumulation and circulation of a functioning discourse. He argues, “there can be no 
possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which 
operates through and on the basis of this production” (Power/Knowledge 93). In this 
sense, this dissertation acknowledges Foucault’s point on the intertwined relations 
between the material and immaterial, as well as in the productive, accumulative and 
circular function of discourse. Yet, it wants to depart from Foucauldian discourse in 
its attempts to move away from dialectics and the search for “truth” or “reality” 
and/or any kind of subject position. This dissertation embraces and relies on rhetoric, 
according to Roy Sellars’ point that “rhetoric teaches one how to begin, even or 
precisely when beginning seems impossible” (“Rhetoric” 59). It engages persuasion 
that is at the same time contingent on context in the sense where “one already is” and 
that there is “nothing outside context” (59). This situated thinking is akin to 
Baudrillard’s position, which he clarifies in Passwords: 
 
[T]he inalienable presence of that undecidable does not lead me to an  
unsituated thinking, concerned only with abstract speculation and with  
manipulating ideas from the history of philosophy. I attempt to free  
myself from a referential, teleological thinking precisely in order to  
pursue the play of a thinking which is aware that something else thinks  




He concludes, “thought must play a catastrophic role … in a world that wants 
absolutely to cleanse everything … But it must at the same time remain humanist, 
concerned for the human, and, to that end, recapture the reversibility of good and evil, 
of the human and the inhuman” (Passwords 92). And so, this dissertation ultimately 
performs the dual form of thought, the world that thinks it, and the resistance to the 
inhuman.  
As a way of situating my thoughts, and this dissertation within a system of 
objects, I begin chapter two by looking back at my earlier wearable artwork called the 
Smart Apron. The Smart Apron was realised outside Singapore, under the auspices of 
the “Artist-in-Labs: Processes of Inquiry” art residency programme that places artists 
from several countries into various science research centres in Switzerland. It consists 
of two sets of aprons that incorporate a range of sensors and telecommunication 
technologies intended as a metaphor for “empowering” certain foreign domestic 
workers in Singapore. The main objectives of the Smart Apron were, through the use 
of a well-designed and technologically “enhanced” apron, to present housework as 
professional work and hence to remind people to accord the persons doing it respect 
and dignity. Secondly, through particular features of the apron, to highlight specific 
problems faced by certain foreign domestic workers in Singapore.  
 Using the Smart Apron as a technological probe of my feminist politics and of 
wearable computing, I complicate my belief in technological “empowerment” by 
comparing and contrasting the discourses of Steve Mann and Donna Haraway. I focus 
on Mann because not only is he an artist, he is also a pioneer and leading figure in the 
research and development of wearable computing. Furthermore, his claims of 
personal empowerment in wearable computing “inspired” me to think that foreign 
31 
 
domestic workers can equally be “empowered” through the Smart Apron. I draw on 
the discourse of Haraway because her feminist politics of situated knowledges 
exemplify my feminist concerns for a responsible, accountable feminist politics that is 
aware, at the same time, of its complicit relationship with technology in the context of 
the “homework economy” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 304). Eventually, the Smart Apron 
also complicates itself as complicit in its role as “immaterial labor” – the interface 
between production and consumption, not only of information, but also of active 
subjects in the consumption of science and technology (Lazarrato 138). In my critique 
of the Smart Apron, I also gesture to the challenges feminist politics face within the 
integrated circuit of empowerment.  
Feminist projects of valorising cyborgian subjectivities, in fact, are in line with 
the needs of the current political economy. Singapore’s case is instructive in terms of 
how women are used metaphorically and materially to meet the needs of its 
technological economy. Chapter three begins by critically analysing the discourse 
surrounding the iN2015 Masterplan, particularly through its video entitled Imagine 
Your World in 2015, where Singapore is depicted in the year 2015 and thoroughly 
integrated with pervasive computing.  In this chapter, I draw on Baudrillard’s 
argument that the social construction and control of subjectivities function through the 
“political economy of the sign” resulting in the “political economy of the subject” 
(“For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign” 60-100). Through a system of 
floating signifiers, needs and desires are coded that then become productive forces in 
disciplining and motivating subjects into active neo-liberal technological subjects. 
These codes are constructed through language and, particularly for this chapter, the 
myths of origin, tradition, difference, inclusion and technological empowerment. 
Together with the digital logic of participation, abstraction, control and acceleration, 
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information technologies and telecommunications are rendered positively 
transformative, efficient, seamless and empowering for all, while the paradox of 
control and exclusion in digital participation made invisible. 
Singapore’s vision of pervasive computing is not unique to itself. Chapter four 
investigates the visions articulated by Mark Weiser, whom many consider the “father” 
of pervasive computing or ubiquitous computing. Here, I argue that the striking 
similarities between Weiser’s scenario, painted in his seminal article of 1991 “The 
Computer for the 21st Century,” and that of the iN2015 video, even though they are 
almost two decades apart, are far from a simple coincidence. It points to similar 
strategies of deploying visibility and invisibility in their discourses, which I argue are 
an effect of the techniques and technicity of the technology as well as its history. 
Weiser’s discourse grounds itself on the politics of “everyday life” by connecting to 
“tradition” and the familiar, making ubiquitous computing seem positively 
transformative, seamless and empowering. In Weiser’s establishment of normative 
relationships with ubiquitous computing by linking it to older forms of technologies, 
he simultaneously erases from view the crucial differences in techniques and 
technicity between new media and the old media he highlights. Hence, Weiser’s 
seamless vision of ubiquitous computing achieved through the language of “tradition” 
and technological continuity, is paradoxically based on a discontinuity with the 
historical values and social contradictions linked to the technologies fundamental to 
ubiquitous computing, that is, networks, Virtual Reality and Artificial Intelligence. 
This “blindness” is an effect of the Cold War technologies and technicity 




Crucially, Weiser’s ubiquitous computing prototypes and discourse then 
repeat military thoughts and strategies, particularly the total war strategy of 
“empowering” the peripheries, and the Cold War tactic of soft power based on 
attraction and disorientation. Simultaneously, as a result of the history of liberal trade 
with Enlightenment notions of progress that pervades networks, Weiser’s neo-liberal 
utopian views of networks not only disguise the capitalist rationale of work and 
efficiency, but also the desire to perfect the world and humans under one 
language/code. Throughout Weiser’s discourse, the mutually constitutive relationship 
between academia, industry and the military, as well as the reversibility of their 
technologies and technical knowledge are obscured. Bringing in Genevieve Bell and 
Paul Dourish’s critique of Weiser, I also argue that despite Bell and Dourish’s attempt 
to situate ubiquitous computing in the present, to take account of the “messiness” of 
the technology and everyday life, their rhetoric mirrors Weiser’s productive move, 
albeit differently. By creating a series of false binaries between Weiser’s seamless 
discourse based in the future and their discourse based on the current messiness of 
everyday life, as well as “Western” individualism and “Eastern” collectivism, Bell 
and Dourish’s narrative is based on culturally essentialist views that are a product of 
their time and are themselves productive of future waves of research and 
development, grounded on the basis of “difference” or “alternative” views and use of 
ubiquitous computing. Written at a time of growing disenchantment with the “West” 
and academic focus on “alternative” views to “Western” thoughts, which in turn 
coincides with the economic rise of the “East,” their discourse opens up new spaces of 
enquiry for what they observe as a stagnating “Western” research and development in 
ubiquitous computing.  
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This production of “difference” works by enforcing the rigidity of the pairings 
and obscuring the complex, mutually constitutive relationship among the categories. I 
argue that Bell and Dourish’s desire for “difference” actually obeys the digital logic 
of abstraction (general equivalence), simulation and circulation demanded by 
information technologies and telecommunications and reflects the context of neo-
liberal production of “difference” or social relations for consumption that has 
pervaded universities. In this instance, mainstream views of ubiquitous computing 
(embodied in Weiser’s vision of a future ubiquitous computing environment in 
America) and “alternative” views of the same technology (exemplified by Bell and 
Dourish’s account of present ubiquitous computing environment in Korea and 
Singapore) are equally productive and form two sides of the same academic-
technological development coin.  
Chapter five situates the mutually constitutive relationship between academia, 
industry and the military, as well as their reversible technologies and technical 
knowledge in the context of Singapore through the mutually constitutive relationship 
between the iN2015 Masterplan and 3G SAF. This chapter begins by closely 
analysing the discourse surrounding 3G SAF’s transformation, which aims to harness 
the latest C4ISTAR technologies to integrate and “empower” the various military 
services (army, navy and air force) into one network-centric and knowledge-based 
fighting force, equipped for network-centric warfare. Here, I demonstrate how the 
techniques and technicity of C4ISTAR technologies, as well as neo-liberal values and 
rationality, structure military thoughts and actions. In particular, I highlight the highly 
optimistic discourses promoting C4ISTAR technologies and valorising neo-liberal 
technological subjects needed by such technologies. While these discourses focus on 
the positive and ignore the negative side of the technologies, they simultaneously 
35 
 
monitor deviating thoughts and reservations about the technologies (within the 
military ranks) carefully.  
Furthermore, I argue that the tremendous faith in the technologies, grounded 
on the rhetoric of machine “intelligence,” speed, accuracy and control, provides the 
conditions of possibility for more machines to eventually remove humans (argued as 
the “weak” link) from the cybernetic loop. The desire to replace humans (and thus 
their will and responsibilities) with machines is grounded on “blindness” to the fact 
that these technologies, paradoxically, are based on inherently flawed codes. I argue 
that this blindness is caused as much by the digital logic of speed as by the reversal of 
capitalist rationale and neo-liberal values pervading military thought and strategy. In 
the case of Singapore, how the success of its defence industries influences the 
production of defence entrepreneurs who are also motivated, innovative risk-taking 
network warriors – network warriors who are the same active neo-liberal 
technological subjectivities produced by the iN2015 Masterplan. 
In looking at the coinciding needs of 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan, I 
point to the synchronicity of scientific and technological development equally useful 
for the industries promoted by the iN2015 Masterplan and 3G SAF. Since the subjects 
extolled and nurtured by both the Masterplan and the 3G SAF are fundamentally the 
same, these subjects intensify the “circulation of elites,” put in place historically and 
politically. Moreover, under the rubric of “Total Defence,” any further distinction 
between the iN2015 subjects and the network warriors are effectively dissolved. In 
fact, this chapter situates the iN2015 Masterplan as part of the larger militarisation of 
Singapore society where the “Total Defence,” promoted by the government and 
tasked to every citizen, encompasses not just military and civil defence, but also 
psychological, social and economic defence. Here, defence or security, like 
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consumption, becomes a productive force in producing active subjects in support of 
its project.  
Singapore, via the iN2015 Masterplan, is instructive of the shifting political 
landscape brought on by globalisation and its technologies. With the proliferation of 
information technologies and telecommunications, and their accompanying post- Cold 
War techniques and technicity, as well as neo-liberal values and rationality, traditional 
forms of power are increasingly being complemented by more insidious and total 
forms of control. Crucially, these forms of control work not so much through 
repression, as through persuasion, disorientation and induction into the governing 
codes. These codes are perpetuated via material and immaterial means, in the case of 
Singapore, through discourse (including myths, narratives and rhetoric), education, 
“friendly” policies, and the building of the necessary infrastructures and 
technologised spaces. As a result, active technological subjects are produced, in the 
consumption of these codes, to sustain the complex globalised and militarised 
structure.  
The role of information technologies and telecommunications is pivotal to this 
process of persuasion, disorientation and induction, and in fact intensifies their 
efficacy. Here, the transparency of discourse is complemented by the capability of the 
technologies to invisibly code needs and desires, just as the pervasiveness of political, 
economic, and military control is supplemented by the ubiquity of the technologies. 
What results is a proliferation of consumption of information technologies and 
telecommunications mistaken as “progress” and acts of “empowerment,” when such 
consumption in fact strengthens the very structure that is creating a corresponding loss 
of civilian space, putting radical singular thought and responsibilities under threat. By 
drawing out the various intricate connections between the iN2015 Masterplan, its 
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technologies, and their histories, I hope to map a picture of this globalised and 
militarised structure, its expansion and intensification. This is crucial precisely 
because these globalised and militarised networks, not only create repercussions 




Chapter Two:  
From the Smart Apron to the Cyborgs: Re-assessing the Claims of Personal 
Empowerment in Wearable Computing 
 
“The most fundamental paradigm shift that wearable 
computing has to offer is that of personal empowerment”  
(Steve Mann, “Wearable Computing as Means for  
Personal Empowerment” 4). 
 
“If all is movement all is at the same time accident and our existence 
as metabolic vehicle can be summed up as a series of collisions, of 
traumatisms… but above all a different mode of being” (Paul Virilio, 
The Aesthetics of Disappearance 103). 
 
2.1 The Smart Apron, the Cyborgs, and Personal Empowerment: An Introduction to 
their Interconnections 
In 2003, I wrote an art proposal for a “smart” apron that sought not only to redress the 
social and cultural perceptions governing domestic work, but also to reflect upon the 
working conditions of foreign domestic workers in Singapore.8 In the proposal, I 
quoted Steve Mann and his point about wearable computing and personal 
empowerment, and argued that there is no one more deserving of personal 
                                                 
8 At that time, I was involved with a non-governmental group called The Working 
Committee 2 (later renamed Transient Workers Count Too), an ad hoc gathering of 
individuals from different strata of Singaporean society (including foreign domestic 
workers), concerned with the growing abuse and poor working conditions some 
migrant workers face working in Singapore. See Transient Workers Count Too 
<http://www.twc2.org.sg>. However, before this project, I was already working on 
issues of housework and domesticity, from a feminist standpoint, using my art as 
symbolic devices for discussing female subjectivities in the larger patriarchal culture. 
See <http://web.mac.com/margetan>. 
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empowerment than foreign domestic workers. That proposal won me an “Honorable 
Mention” in the 2003 “Digital Pluralism” UNESCO Digital Arts Award, and 
subsequently in 2004, a five-month residency to realise the project at the Swiss Centre 
for Electronics and Microtechnology (a Swiss commercial laboratory specialised in 
making microelectronic devices and systems), under the auspices of the “Artist-in-
Labs: Processes of Inquiry” residency programme. In 2005, as part of my application 
proposal to pursue research for this PhD at Communications and New Media 
Department, National University of Singapore, I proposed developing a wearable 
computing prototype that takes into account the experiences and life-contexts of its 
users in its development, particularly the “Asian” context of Singapore. Here again, I 
quoted Mann on his point about wearable computing as personal empowerment.9  
 Using my wearable artwork the Smart Apron as a technological probe, this 
chapter is an attempt to go back and re-read Mann and the rhetoric of empowerment 
in wearable computing, a subset of Human-Computer Interaction in the larger 
pervasive computing research – areas targeted by the iN2015 Masterplan for research 
and development. Wearable Human-Computer Interaction can be broken up into two 
main groups. The first, “computing under the skin” are wearable computers implanted 
under the skin to regulate physiological parameters and/or act as cognitive and 
sensory prostheses. They range from microchip implants to medical devices such as 
                                                 
9 See “Digital Pluralism,” UNESCO 2003 Digital Arts Award 
<http://www.iamas.ac.jp/unesco_award/e/index.html>, CSEM: Swiss Centre for 
Electronics and Microtechnology <www.csem.ch/>, AIL: “Artist-in-Labs: Processes 
of Inquiry” < http://artistsinlabs.ch/>, and Communications and New Media 








cochlear implants and are meant to extend human’s sensory motor and information 
processing abilities. The second, “wearable computing” are self-powered and self-
contained computers that can be worn on the body, in the form of clothing or 
accessories. They aim for hands-free operations and to provide users access to and 
interaction with information “anywhere and at anytime” (Barfield and Caudell 4-7). 
By the fact that wearable computing is “always on” and with the wearer, it is also 
regarded as “well placed” to “invisibly augment” human intelligence, aid 
communication and collaboration, and boost productivity (Billinghurst and Starner 
57-64). 
 Starting with the Smart Apron allows me to both situate and complicate my 
feminist art politics and the development of this dissertation in the context of 
technocratic and post-colonial Singapore, as well as highlight the double-edged and 
reversible nature of empowerment that I have come to realise in the making of, and 
now writing about, this artwork. To show the double-edged and reversible nature of 
empowerment, I compare and contrast the discourses of Steve Mann and Donna 
Haraway. I single out Steve Mann because as the “first cyborg” (Lotringer and Virilio 
79), he is considered a pioneer and influential figure in the research and development 
of wearable computing both as an academic and as an engineer/artist. Moreover, as 
highlighted above, Mann’s claim that personal empowerment is fundamental to 
wearable computing had a direct impact on my Smart Apron, through which I sought 
to “empower” and represent the working conditions of certain foreign domestic 
workers in Singapore. I draw on the discourse of Haraway because I was also inspired 
by her call for “subversive” uses of cybernetic technologies that is, simultaneously, 
responsible, accountable and aware of its complicit relationship with technology in 
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the context of the “homework economy” and “integrated circuit” (“A Cyborg 
Manifesto” 304, 307). 
In comparing and contrasting Mann’s masculinist “photoborg” (“I am a 
Camera” n.p.) with Haraway’s feminist cyborg, I show that while Mann is single-
minded in his quest for individual freedom and consumer market alignment as a 
“counter” to the military whilst Haraway is very conscious of social justice, of her 
complicit relationship with the military-industrial-complex and, hence, the double-
edged nature of empowerment. Nevertheless, I argue that despite Haraway’s 
conscious and socialist-feminist politics, her celebrated mobile cyborgian subject 
lends itself easily for misinterpretation and misappropriation, especially in today’s 
context of intensified convergence of military research with industrial, academic, 
political and artistic experimentations that, more often than not, leave the structure of 
technological consumption intact. Since the Smart Apron, an artwork about 
Singapore, is realised in Switzerland under an art residency programme developed 
and hosted by a Swiss university that puts international artists in Swiss laboratories, it 
clearly embodies this complicity, mobility and convergence.10 The Smart Apron 
points to how such art-science residencies that have proliferated in this context of 
convergence, aimed at producing the art-science hybrid subjects that they need 
eventually to feed back into the knowledge-based technological economy.  
 The chapter is broken up into two main sections. The first section starts by 
situating the Smart Apron vis-à-vis the rhetoric of Steve Mann and highlights how his 
claim of wearable computing as personal empowerment is based on a non-reflexive 
                                                 
10 The Swiss programme and university mentioned here is the Institute of Cultural 
Studies in Art, Media and Design, School of Art and Design Zurich, University of 





neo-liberalism. For example, Mann’s demand for personal rights (to be left alone) and 
his distrust of state power recapitulates neo-liberal discourses that pitch individual 
freedoms against state power, while disguising the fact that neo-liberalism and the 
state are mutually constitutive in consumer-driven societies. At the same time, I argue 
that Mann’s innovations “blind” him to the ways his Wearables shape his subjectivity, 
the way he narrates himself and his solutions for what he perceives as an Orwellian 
world of ubiquitous surveillance – solutions that, paradoxically, subject users to more 
surveillance and control by cybernetic technologies. This section also brings in the 
arguments of Paul Virilio to show how these technologies are not neutral but 
fundamentally change the mode of being. Through miniaturisation, speed of 
information processing, and ubiquity or what Virilio terms “the aesthetics of 
disappearance,” such technologies produce a series of “blindings,” which result in the 
human loss of “concrete presence” in the world and the dissimulation of the Other 
(Open Sky 10). In other words, these technologies are structuring human thoughts, 
making users “blind” to how the empowerment of one is often accompanied by the 
relative disempowerment of another, as Mann’s narrative demonstrates. 
 The last section of this chapter situates the Smart Apron vis-à-vis the socialist-
feminist discourse of Donna Haraway, particularly her points on the possibility, 
complicity and responsibility of the international women’s movement in the 
integrated circuit and homework economy. This section highlights that, unlike Mann, 
Haraway is fully conscious of the violence of miniaturisation, its potential for 
dematerialising humans and politics; in short, the double-edged nature of 
empowerment. However, using the arguments presented by Maurizio Lazzarato in 
“Immaterial Labor,” and through the challenges faced by me in the development of 
the Smart Apron, I highlight how Haraway’s call for socialist-feminist networking in 
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the integrated circuit and the subversive use of cybernetic technologies gets 
misinterpreted and misappropriated. In the face of the current knowledge production 
economy that depends on active subjects of communication, abetted by technologies 
that operate on the aesthetics of disappearance, the dual nature of empowerment 
becomes invisible just as Haraway’s call for responsibility, apart from pleasure, in the 
integrated circuit gets forgotten. 
  
2.2 Wearable Computing and the Logic of Disappearance: the Duality of 
Empowerment 
To fill the gaps left by women in Singapore leaving their homes for the labour market, 
the city-state has seen a steady climb in the employment of foreign domestic workers 
(20,000 in the early 1980s to 190,000 today) to fill the roles vacated in the homes. As 
these foreign domestic workers come mainly from “poorer” countries like the 
Philippines, Indonesia and the Indian sub-continent, social, cultural and language 
differences often pose huge challenges for both employers and employees to 
understand each other, and especially for the latter to integrate into Singapore’s ways 
of life. Yet, the strong Singapore currency and the lack of work opportunities in the 
foreign domestic workers’ home countries continue to compel these women to seek 
work here. On the Singapore side, the creation of double-income families, the lack of 
adequate and cheap childcare and eldercare systems and the aversion of government 
bodies and companies to flexi-work hours, continue to fan this increasing reliance on 
foreign domestic workers. One social consequence of this situation are persistent 
cases of abuse of foreign domestic workers, ranging from subtle forms of exploitation 
such as sleep and food deprivation, the absence of rest days (exacerbated by the lack 
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of legal protection, in particular for the Indonesians), to extreme physical abuse 
resulting in prolonged torture and even death (Gee and Ho 22-46).11  
 The Smart Apron is my feminist artwork that sought to address this issue of 
foreign domestic workers in Singapore and the problems they face. The Smart Apron, 
through its technologically “enhanced” design, aimed to present housework as 
professional work and to remind people to accord the persons doing such work 
respect and dignity. Through particular technological features embedded in two sets 
of aprons, it also wanted to highlight specific problems faced by some of these 
workers such as their risk of falling from high-rise apartments, their isolation and lack 
of social networks or recourse for help in situations of need (I will address these 
later). I was at the time convinced by Mann’s claim that personal empowerment is 
fundamental to wearable computing, and wanted the foreign domestic workers to 
“have” this empowerment through the Smart Apron.  
 Steve Mann is a pioneering and prolific researcher in wearable computing, 
who has over 200 research publications, books, and patent publications. He has been 
the keynote speaker at more than 25 scholarly and industry symposia and conferences, 
and invited speaker at more than 50 university Distinguished Lecture Series and 
colloquia. Mann is currently a tenured professor at the University of Toronto, Faculty 
of Applied Science and Engineering as well as the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, after 
obtaining his PhD degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 
                                                 
11 In 2009, the official number of deaths from accidents or by suicide has come down 
from forty in 2004 to nine. Meanwhile, the number of complaints of salary arrears has 
dropped from three hundred and forty-seven in 2005 to two hundred and nineteen, 
while the substantiated cases of maid abuse has declined from one hundred and fifty-
seven in 1997 to fifty-three (T. Tan “Life Looking Better for Foreign Maids”). 
Although the number of deaths and abuse cases of foreign domestic workers have 
declined through the years, subtle forms of exploitation, however, remain hard to 
detect and prosecute. Furthermore, the absence of rest days persists as the Ministry of 
Manpower reiterates its position not to legislate compulsory rest days for foreign 
domestic workers. 
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1997. Apart from being an established and influential researcher, Mann is also an 
accomplished artist. He has consistently applied his engineering and computational 
skills to an art practice beginning in the 1970s that continues to this day, winning 
numerous awards along the way. Together with two of his students, Mann has also set 
up a Canadian company to commercialise the “cyborg technology” developed by him 
and his students (Mann, “One Page Biography” n.p.). 
 In 1998, during his keynote speech “Wearable Computing as Means for 
Personal Empowerment” for The First International Conference on Wearable 
Computing, Mann defined and differentiated wearable computing from other 
handheld devices like laptops and personal digital assistants (PDAs). He argued that 
as wearable computers are “always ready” (“always on”), they afford wearers total 
encapsulation, “augmentation” of the intellect and senses, thus allowing users 
solitude, privacy and safety (“Wearable Computing” n.p.). Furthermore, according to 
Mann, because wearable computing is tether-less, it provides users mobility and 
freedom to do other activities, without the need to focus attention primarily on 
computing. Hence, he claimed, the technology is attentive to not only the users and 
their environments, but also responsive to their needs. At the same time, however, 
Mann maintained that wearers remain “in control” of the technology because they can 
manually override or “break open the control loop and become part of the loop at any 
time” (“Wearable Computing” n.p.). Finally, Mann pointed to the communicative 
aspect of the technology, as a tool for direct communication and collaboration, as well 
as an expressive medium for artistic production.  
Mann drew on the history of military inventions and situated wearable 
computing within this context to stress the point of wearable computing as personal 
empowerment. He argued that early civilisations were fundamentally equal but with 
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every military tool invented – first the stirrup, then gunpowder and later guns – this 
balance is breached only to return when individuals had access to these inventions of 
their time. He contended that wars today are fought with information, and cameras 
and computers have become the new instruments of social control. Mann highlighted 
this system of social control as characterised by “total surveillance” and “micro-
management,” from mass media, advertising, to elevator music, intruding on peace 
and solitude, and resulting in the unhealthy “homogenization of society” and a 
“certain loss of human dignity” (“Wearable Computing” n.p.). However, Mann 
maintained that as with the stirrup and gunpowder, the advent of low-cost consumer 
electronics is levelling the playing field of electronic surveillance. He pointed to how 
the Internet is ushering in new and “alternative” contents and how the increasing 
numbers of personal computer ownership provided a counter to major media 
conglomerates and central control, both of which are “threats to human individuality 
and freedom” (“Wearable Computing” n.p.). With ubiquity and speed, in terms of the 
adoption rate of the technology by the masses, Mann argued, “the military is losing its 
edge” since “consumer technology has already brought about a certain degree of 
personal empowerment” (“Wearable Computing” n.p.). He claimed, wearable 
computing will level the playing field “should the major consumer electronics 
manufacturers beat the military to raising this invention to a level of perfection 
similar to that of the stirrup or modern handguns” (“Wearable Computing” n.p.). 
Mann concluded that wearable computing functions “as a true extension of the mind 
and body” with the “capability to enhance the quality of life for many people” 
(“Wearable Computing” n.p.). 
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As I have highlighted before, inspired by Mann’s point on personal 
empowerment and wanting to add a situated feminist perspective, I wrote the art 
proposal for the Smart Apron, laying out its main technological features. These 
included a language-translation mechanism (especially between Bahasa Indonesia and 
English), a physiological monitoring device (heart-rate, blood pressure, sleep, 
movement, et cetera), and a free peer-to-peer communication unit. However, I have 
come to realise that Mann’s vision of wearable computing is influential but 
potentially stratifying, in terms of how the technology of wearable computing is 
understood and received. In “Introduction: Technological Visions and the Rhetoric of 
the New,” Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas point out that the history of 
technological development is often accompanied by a parallel history of visions about 
the technology (1-18). In the forms of rhetoric and/or metaphors, these visions 
encapsulate the fears, desires and hopes of how technology can have profound 
influences on human subjectivity and society. While the rhetoric surrounding 
technology tends to focus on how technology can alleviate needs or the sense of lack, 
metaphors flesh out compelling representations of some of these thoughts, sometimes 
at the risk of other possible ways of envisioning technological meanings. The authors 
argue, these “visions impact how technologies are marketed, used, made sense of and 
integrated into people’s lives” (3). In this sense, Mann’s rhetoric certainly influenced 
the way I thought of wearable computing, but it is time now for me to re-assess his 
narrative in terms of how they are themselves shaped by his larger social-cultural 
context, as well as by the logic of his technological innovations. 
First, let me begin by looking at the person making the claims of 
empowerment. As indicated in his biography and highlighted earlier, Mann has 
benefited from the technologies he developed. These developments would be 
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impossible if Mann has not had access to certain resources. My point here is not to 
negate Mann’s competence and hard work, but to point out the larger socio-cultural 
context where some technological development gets more conducive environments 
than others do, as my own example shows. In The New Production of Knowledge, 
Gibbons, et al. point to a new mode of knowledge production which is created in 
“broader, transdisciplinary social and economic contexts” (1). In this broad scope, 
social science and humanities are equally harnessed to solve problems of a particular 
application, as opposed to a particular discipline, but the question remains how these 
“problems of a particular application” are identified based on funding influences. 
Despite Mann’s rhetoric of pitching the consumer market against the military, the 
research and development of wearable computing is as much (if not more) supported 
by the military as by industry. In fact, by creating a dichotomous relationship between 
consumer markets and the military, even as he situates wearable computing amongst 
the history of military inventions, Mann obfuscates the current intensified 
convergence of military and industrial interests in wearable computing, and certainly 
their capacity to shape research and development in academia.12  
Robbins and Webster, in Time of the Technoculture, remind us that the current 
push and embrace of information technologies and telecommunications, render 
invisible the military roots of these technologies and hence the logic of control and 
domination that is embedded in these new technologies. They argue that the continued 
                                                 
12 In 1992, for example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
in America established the Head-Mounted Display (HMD) programme to seek out 
ways of providing soldiers on the battlefield hands-free, immersive and 
communicative operations. Some of their creations include the Land Warrior and the 
Force XXI Soldier. Adapting commercial off-the-shelf (COT) equipments and 
modifying them for military use is standard practice here although they come with 
both benefits and challenges. The biggest challenges of this practice are cross 
platform compatibility and the need to support multiple protocols. These problems 
have in turn prompted the emphasis on network-centric applications taught at the 
undergraduate levels of many universities (Tappert et al. 625-647). 
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use of information technologies and telecommunications in Information Warfare 
should not be regarded as some kind of misapplication, rather it should be understood 
as an example of how these technologies exert their controlling power over humans. 
Furthermore, the close link between the military (as the main funding body) and the 
industry, have resulted in science and technology research being harnessed “as a 
productive and innovative force to the pursuance of war (and the maintenance of a 
credible defence)” (Robbins and Webster 154). In today’s context, Nick Turse, in The 
Complex, demonstrates how this complex web of relationships between the military, 
industry and academia has intensified. Giving many examples, he points out how, 
particularly for heavily consumer-driven societies, military technologies and 
technicity are nearly everywhere and pervade almost everything. From technological 
products to children’s toys, movies to catering services, the military footprint can be 
found visibly and invisibly as military and civilian lives become highly entangled. 
The ability of the military to co-opt civilian cultures (for example, the “culture of 
cool”) and penetrate academia has allowed it to shape public opinions as much as 
research agendas. “The Complex,” according to Turse, hence points to the military-
industrial-technological-entertainment-academic-scientific-media-intelligence-
homeland security-surveillance-national security-corporate complex (16).   
 Mann’s focus on consumer technologies as a source of empowerment also 
repeats the productive neo-liberal strategy of channelling the desires for freedom into 
acts of consumption. As highlighted in the previous chapter, neo-liberal rhetoric has 
effectively exploited (and continues to capitalise on) desires for liberation by 
translating them into a very particular kind of freedom, that is, a market-based 
populist culture of choice, differentiated consumerism, lifestyles and individual 
libertarianism (Harvey 41-42). This focus on consumer technologies as a source of 
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empowerment is certainly beneficial for Mann’s innovations, since his claim that 
wearable computing will “bring about a much greater paradigm shift” ends in an 
appeal for consumer electronic manufacturers to raise the development of the 
technology to “perfection.” Mann’s neo-liberal slant extends to his desires for solitude 
and privacy based fundamentally on the neo-liberal conception of subjects as 
entrepreneurial individuals with strong private property rights, linked to free market 
and free trade (Harvey 2). Further linked to Mann’s neo-liberal notion of the 
entrepreneurial subject with strong privacy rights is his distrust of state power. 
Mann’s narrative of pitching individual freedoms against state power, consequently, 
disguises the fact that neo-liberalism and the state are mutually constitutive in 
consumer-driven societies. 
The role of the state in neo-liberal discourse is supposedly limited to creating 
and preserving an institutional framework that is appropriate to the freedom of the 
market and of trade. This framework includes the setting up of monetary, legal, and 
military structures, functions and environment conducive for secure and stable trade. 
If markets do not exist, then they are to be created. Once these conditions are met, 
state intervention into the market is to be kept to a minimum (Harvey 2). In practice 
however the state plays an active role, as it does in the case of Singapore, in 
sustaining the notion of free enterprise. This is achieved sometimes by force, violence 
and authoritarianism, but more often than not, through the rhetoric of freedom and 
empowerment as means of constructing consent because they resonate widely (37-
39). It is precisely through the latter means that neo-liberal logic pervaded (and still 
pervades) corporations, media, think tanks, civil societies and universities through a 
programmatic advance of the cause of individual freedoms, while paradoxically 
disguising the drive to restore economic class power (40). Hence, in neo-liberal 
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discourse, such as Mann’s rhetoric, all state powers continue to be constructed as 
oppositional to corporations (defined as individuals), entrepreneurial freedom and 
individual liberties, even though this is not necessarily the case.  
Besides neo-liberalism shaping his mode of being, the way Mann narrates 
himself and his innovations are equally structured by C4ISTAR technologies and 
technicity. A majority of Mann’s inventions are reactions to what he perceives as an 
Orwellian world of ubiquitous surveillance. His response to the encroachment of his 
privacy by a society under constant surveillance by the state is twofold. His first 
strategy is to turn his body into what he terms a “photoborg” (“I am Camera” n.p.). 
Using the “photoborg” then to “shoot” establishments, government and their 
automated machines, Mann argued that this was his way of turning the tables on them 
(“Privacy Issues” n.p.). His second strategy was, through wearable computing, to 
create a digital space for “personal solitude” and extend the privacy of the home “out 
into the world” (“I am Camera” n.p.; “Wearable Computing” n.p.).  
In line with this rationale of counter-surveillance, Mann distinguished 
surveillance into different categories, depending on who is performing the 
surveillance.13 To him, surveillance is “desirable” when aimed at “Big Brother” and 
“Big Business” (“Privacy Issues” n.p.). Here, Mann contradicts himself since the 
government/military and corporations are what he needs in order for his innovations 
to reach the consumer markets. To counter the “machine vision [that] has become a 
little too pervasive,” Mann recommended access to surveillance technology as a way 
of obtaining power by individuals – an access made easy by miniaturisation and its 
resulting ubiquity. He argued that “miniaturization has turned the technology into an 
                                                 
13 For Mann, government and establishments looking at people is unacceptable/unfair, 
establishments looking at establishments or people looking at people are neutral, 
while people looking at establishments and government is acceptable/fair (“Privacy 
Issues” n.p.). 
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equalizer rather than an oppressor” (“Privacy Issues” 6). As a result, Mann 
recommended “sousveillance,” an inverse form of surveillance by the masses, as a 
way to balance what he regards as an era of increasingly one-sided surveillance 
(“Sousveillance” n.p.). 
Mann’s rationale of “sousveillance” has generated its fair share of criticism, 
namely, that by strapping more cameras to the bodies of ordinary citizens, he is 
creating a vigilante society (Strauss “Little Brother is Watching You!”). Moreover, 
his notion of surveillance is trapped in a simplistic “us and them” dialectic, while his 
views on privacy are based on culturally specific Enlightenment concepts of distinct 
public/private spaces and the “cult of the individual” (Lane qtd. in Leech “Lost in 
Cyborgspace”). What I want to stress here is how the irony of “sousveillance” is 
adding to, rather than removing, the problem of ubiquity, suggesting an enframed 
mind that repeats the logic of its technology. Mann’s solutions for escaping the 
ubiquity of surveillance are, paradoxically, to distribute more cameras into an already 
saturated environment and to enclose himself (and others) with miniaturised systems 
that constantly “sense” or monitor users invisibly. By pitching miniaturisation as a 
way out of “machine vision,” Mann clouds the fact that miniaturisation is what allows 
for its speed, automation and ubiquity, eventually leading to “the vision machine,” the 
very technology Mann is supposedly opposing and yet constructing.  
 According to Paul Virilio, vision machines are technologies capable of 
automated perception, replacing humans from the realm of direct observation. In these 
sightless visions, machines generate synthetic images for machines, removing human 
intentionality and control. What results is also an inversion of perception, where 
pervasive objects observe humans rather than the other way around (The Vision 
Machine 59-62). Hence, Mann’s Wearables, instead of affording wearers control, 
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paradoxically removes the users’ intentions and subjects them under the control of the 
machine’s logic. Virilio further points out that vision machines are “absolute-speed” 
machines that undermine “traditional notions of geometric optics” (72); instead, they 
function on intensive time (speed of light), where speed is less about getting around 
easily than about seeing and conceiving more or less clearly (71). The production of 
sightless vision, Virilio argues, is therefore a reproduction of intense (human) 
“blindness” (73). Hence, through miniaturisation and speed (mediation of time in 
picoseconds), humans become “blind” to the mediation of their existence under 
C4ISTAR techniques and technicity; in short, to the violence of speed and its 
accidents. 
Therefore, unlike Mann’s account that regards such wearable computing as 
ultimately separate and neutral, Virilio argues that miniaturisation, by reducing to 
next to nothing the size of machines and incorporating them pervasively into human 
environment and within the human body, is creating para-sensory competition for 
subjectivity and affecting the very mode of being (The Aesthetics of Disappearance 
67). The aggression in Mann’s zero-sum strategies of shooting, surveillance and 
counter-surveillance, as well as his military analogies, are clear examples of this 
repetition of C4ISTAR techniques and technicity or what Virilio calls the “military 
architecture” (Virilio Live 51). The military architecture comprises the architecture of 
ballistics, where gazes, masks, screens and other means of deflecting shots, as well as 
acts of destruction, are part of its construction (Ibid.). Thus, Mann’s notions of 
constancy, mediation and augmentation in wearable computing, are all operational 
modes based on policing effects that are very much a part of this logistics of 
perception in the military architecture (Virilio Live 187), which is masked and 
deflected by his rhetoric of empowerment, freedom and control. Under the logistics of 
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military perception, Virilio continues, there is a deadly harmony between the 
functions of the eye and weapon (War and Cinema 69), which at the same time 
operates on and effects the “aesthetics of disappearance” (Virilio Live 124). The 
aesthetics of disappearance “blinds” humans to the fact that research and 
development, such as those of Mann’s, play a leading role in the constitution and 
perpetuation of the military architecture (The Vision Machine 70). In this case, 
Mann’s contention that increasing personal computer ownership creates “alternatives” 
to mass media conglomerates and the state ignores how such decentralised 
consumption and creation are easily re-appropriated by these core systems.14 
Crucially, Mann’s positioning of wearable computing as the ultimate “paradigm shift” 
to counter total surveillance and micro-management, grounds itself on the disavowal 
of the technology’s military logic and neo-liberal values that then “blinds” users to 
how wearable computing repeats and, in fact, intensifies total surveillance and micro-
management. 
The aesthetics of disappearance, therefore, produces “blindness” at several 
levels. It “blinds” humans to the mediation of their existence under cybernetic 
techniques and technicity that, simultaneously, is a consequence and perpetuation of 
the violence of speed (Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance 103-104). Under the 
aesthetics of disappearance, the disappearance of technology (through 
miniaturisation) is directly linked to the disappearance of the violence of speed 
(grounded in the mediation of time in picoseconds) and the resulting double 
disappearance of matter and places (Virilio, Speed and Politics 134). Virilio 
highlights that as bodily perceptual faculties are being transferred increasingly to 
machines, there results a “killing” of present time by isolating it from its here and 
                                                 
14 I address this point of the decentralisation of control for the tactical consolidation of 
the centre in chapters four and five. 
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now in favour of a commutation elsewhere, which in turn removes humans from the 
“concrete presence” of the world (Open Sky 10). This then facilitates the 
dissimulation of people and bodies (Virilio and Lotringer 102).  
Mann’s other strategy to turn wearable computing towards “personal solitude” 
further accentuates the dissimulation of the Other. His notion of the “photoborg,” a 
combination of photographer-cyborg, is reminiscent of the Modern Man’s obsession 
with vision, a particular “gaze of domination over the exterior world” (Colomina 
112). What Mann proposed – a body as a photographic machine – is not far removed 
from what Le Corbusier proposed for his architecture – a house as a photographic 
machine. Mann accesses the world through the camera lens, just as Le Corbusier 
looked through the window, framing and thereby taming the “overpowering” 
outside/landscape, in a process of domestification (56). Furthermore, his idea of 
“sous” (below) rather than “sur” (top) –veillance, harks back to the modern flaneur, or 
the avant-garde Situationist drifting mindlessly in the city for chance encounters. 
These subjectivities are based on an elite, masculine subject, privileged in his 
mobility, with a distaste for domesticity yet at the same time intent on turning public 
spaces into his private playground (McLeod 1-37). At this point, I turn to the feminist 
discourse of Haraway to discuss the double-edged nature of empowerment in terms of 
the complicated and complicit relationships with the military and technological 






2.3 Complicating the Smart Apron and Situating the Cyborgs: The Role of Immaterial 
Labour under the Neo-liberal Logic of Communication 
In “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century”, Donna Haraway uses the figure of the cyborg as a metaphor to 
describe the kinds of subjectivities, both fictional and real, which are constituted by 
today’s information society (291-324). Haraway’s feminist cyborg, in contrast to 
Mann’s masculinist “photoborg,” raises the issues of possibility, complicity and 
responsibility of the international women’s movement within “the integrated circuit” 
(Harraway “A Cyborg Manifesto” 307). Meant as an ironic, self-conscious reflection 
on women’s engagement with technology, Haraway’s cyborg points to the 
complicities and possibilities of its own ontology. She highlights “the main trouble 
with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and 
patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are 
often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential” 
(293). The “Cyborg Manifesto,” she contends, is “an argument for pleasure in the 
confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction” (292). Since the 
cyborg world is about both the “final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, 
about the final abstraction” and the potentials when “people are not afraid of their 
joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities 
and contradictory standpoints,” Haraway argues that the political challenge is to see 
from both perspectives at once (295).  
 Unlike Mann, therefore, Haraway is well aware of the dangers of modern 
machines that are everywhere and invisible. She highlights how miniaturisation and 
microelectronics have changed human’s experience of mechanisms. She argues that 
“miniaturization has turned out to be about power; small is not so much beautiful as 
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pre-eminently dangerous, as in cruise missiles” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 294). She 
points to the evolution of television in the 1950s to the current portable hand-held 
video cameras and argues that the “best machines are made of sunshine; they are all 
light and clean because they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section 
of the spectrum, and … eminently portable, mobile – a matter of immense pain in 
Detroit and Singapore” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 294). In other words, Haraway 
reminds us of the microelectronic workers and their working conditions that are 
fundamental to our light and “clean” technologies, which remain “invisible” or 
dematerialised by the effects of these machines. Haraway maintains that the “ubiquity 
and invisibility of cyborgs is precisely why these sunshine-belt machines are so 
deadly. They are as hard to see politically as materially” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 294). 
Consequently, she distinguishes different cyborgian subjectivities. Haraway points 
out that “[w]ho cyborgs will be is a radical question. The answers are a matter of 
survival” and the subversive potential of the cyborg and its seeming “ability” to 
transgress race, class and gender boundaries are not without ironic implications or 
signs of privilege, “which progressive people might explore as one part of needed 
political work” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 294-295). For Haraway, therefore, in this 
complex information hierarchy of the integrated circuit, even as one is compelled to 
be a cyborg in order to survive, the empowerment of one is really linked to the 
survival of another. 
 In this spirit, the Smart Apron wants to raise issues of ethics and responsibility 
in this integrated circuit by highlighting the working conditions of certain foreign 
domestic workers in Singapore in the context of the homework economy. The 
homework economy, according to Haraway, is an effect of the global economy where 
the extreme mobility of capital merges with the international division of labour, made 
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possible by information technologies and telecommunications, to weaken familiar 
groupings (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 304). Although Haraway points to these systematic 
developments as “neither gender- nor race-neutral,” the homework economy is really 
about issues of production, reproduction, sexuality, consumption and culture that 
affect both men and women (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 304). For Haraway, a key 
concern of the homework economy is the formation of “a strongly bimodal social 
structure … controlled by high-tech repressive apparatuses ranging from 
entertainment to surveillance and disappearance” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 307). 
Therefore, while information technologies and telecommunications provide new 
opportunities for the scientific and technological class, these same machines (through 
automation) are putting more and more people in the lower strata of societies out of 
work and without replacement, necessitating their movement (as in the case of foreign 
domestic workers) to seek jobs outside their home countries.  
 At the same time, Haraway reveals how the homework economy is also a 
coming together of nationalism, imperialism and multi-nationalism and their 
corresponding aesthetic period of realism, modernism and postmodernism. In this 
convergence, facilitated by information technologies and telecommunications, public 
life is eradicated and the home, factory and market are being integrated at an 
unprecedented scale, affecting different women differently (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 
305). This is contrary to Mann’s insistence of the home as the last bastion of space 
untouched by surveillance. Mann’s maintenance of the clear distinction between 
public and private space and his denial of the role of personal computers blurring the 
two spheres, allows him to then pitch wearable computing as securing this “personal 
space,” even as the same technology ironically invades every space with its 
surveillance technologies, through its mobility. 
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 By contrast, the dual nature of technologies is clear for Haraway as she points 
out that the technologies that promise ultimate mobility and perfect exchange are the 
same technologies that facilitate tourism, the militarisation of society and 
biotechnology. Hence, Haraway argues, who controls these technologies is a major 
feminist issue (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 306). However, well aware of the “deeply 
predatory nature of photographic consciousness” produced by these machines, she 
maintains, “self-help is not enough” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 306). Instead, Haraway 
calls for networking, an appropriation of corporate strategy, among women in the 
integrated circuit to develop a socialist-feminist science/technology politics that is at 
the same time subversive of the military and capital (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 307-309). 
This can be done, according to Haraway, through a contest for meanings. She claims 
“[c]yborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original 
innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as 
other … Feminist cyborg stories have the task of recording communication and 
intelligence to subvert command and control” (“A Cyborg Manifesto” 311). 
 Although I agree with Haraway on many of her observations and points raised, 
I am becoming unsure about the effectiveness of her calls to appropriate and subvert 
cybernetic technologies. In the face of the current knowledge production economy, 
which is also adapt at translating desires for liberation into a very particular type of 
freedom achieved only through technological consumption, such a strategy is not as 
straightforward as it seems. Let me demonstrate this by first highlighting the tensions 
of my feminist “liberation” project embodied in the development of the Smart Apron. 
In my initial proposal for the Smart Apron, I had proposed features that included a 
language-translation mechanism, a physiological monitoring device (heart-rate, blood 
pressure, sleep, movement, et cetera), and a free peer-to-peer communication unit. My 
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rationale for the language-translation mechanism was to facilitate the communication 
between the foreign domestic workers and their employers, while the free peer-to-
peer communication unit was for networking opportunities among the workers 
themselves. As for the physiological monitoring device, it was to allow the apron to 
tabulate the total energy expenditure and time of physical activity in order to make the 
“invisibility” of housework visible. More importantly, the physiological monitoring 
device was also meant to monitor the stress level of the foreign domestic worker and 
her general physical well being and alert authorities of abuse. However, since I am 
working with technologies embedded with C4ISTAR techniques and technicity, the 
disempowering potential of surveillance for the foreign domestic workers gave me 
second thoughts about the physiological monitoring device. Before dropping this 
feature from the Smart Apron, however, I contemplated the possibility of “rigging” it 
to reflect the zero-work strategy espoused by the Italian Marxists to challenge the 
capitalist and socialist system of waged-slavery (Negri). Of course, this would mean a 
corresponding disempowerment of employers, many who do treat their employees 
well and fairly. Eventually, the idea of the physiological monitoring device was 
dropped from the Smart Apron altogether.  
 As an artistic project, the Smart Apron’s final technical design is also a 
complex mix of technologies shaped by what was available (or not) to me, dictated as 
much by the market as by the conditions of my residency in Switzerland. The idea of 
getting technology to translate Bahasa Indonesia to English was an almost impossible 
task to begin with for, despite existing research and development in this area, the 
complexity of electronic translation itself is nowhere near the sophistication of actual 
languages. Furthermore, such technologies displace efforts for face-to-face 
communication or what are really needed for the relationship between the foreign 
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domestic workers and their employers. Apart from the issues regarding available 
technologies, putting artists into science laboratories also poses its own set of 
challenges. Such “collaborations” are often dependent on the individual personalities 
and skills of the collaborators, their ability to work together, the time and resources 
available to them, patent issues, and so on.15 As a result, I eventually created two pairs 
of aprons with different technological features through different circumstances, one 
with the help of the laboratory, the other with the help of an independent programmer. 
 The first set of aprons, made using existing research from the Swiss Centre for 
Electronics and Microtechnology, incorporate a fall detector (symbolic of the fall of 
foreign domestic workers from high-rise buildings – a prominent architectural form in 
Singapore). The fall detector consists of an accelerometer attached above the waist 
and a main unit in the lower pocket of the apron (see fig. 1 and 2). It can detect an 
actual fall by calculating the force of impact of the body against the time it stays in 
the reclined position (see fig. 3). A signal is then sent out of the detector for help in an 
actual fall, which currently is indicated through light-emitting diodes or LEDs (green 
light for actual falls and red light for false alarms) mounted within the main unit of 
the fall detector. I had intended to send this signal out of the detector to my laptop for 
use in my performances but this part of the work remains incomplete. With the help 
of an independent programmer, I made a second set of aprons using a range of 
commercial off-the-shelf sensors. Each apron consists of a heat sensor (symbolic of 
the abuse faced by certain foreign domestic workers), a tilt/mercury sensor that 
sounds a buzzer when the user is bent-over forward for more than the pre-set amount 
of time (symbolic of the back-breaking household tasks), a panic button that sends an 
SMS message for help when activated, and a cord that when pulled, lights up three 
                                                 
15 These are some of the issues I encountered making the Smart Apron in the Swiss 
laboratory (M. Tan 122-125). 
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LEDs while sending an SMS message “call me” to the other apron (see fig. 4 and 5). 
All sensors are attached to a (second-hand) mobile phone that sends these SMS 
messages from the apron to my laptop when the sensors are triggered. I had planned 
to complete this work with a performance based on sound files (of dialogues with 
some foreign domestic workers) triggered by the signals from the apron. Again, this 
part of the work remains incomplete. 
The Smart Apron remains incomplete because I have come to realise that the 
tensions surrounding subversive use of technologies cannot be easily resolved. Apart 
from using information technologies and telecommunications that are foundational to 
and perpetuate military technology and information warfare, my attempt to inject an 
“alternative” perspective in wearable computing and doing this necessarily in the 
context of the “Artist-in-Labs: Processes of Inquiry” residency programme, also 
suggests complicity in the larger knowledge production economy. Maurizio 
Lazzarato, in “Immaterial Labor,” discusses how the post-industrial 
enterprise/economy grounds itself on the manipulation of immaterial labour, “the 
labor that produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity” (133). 
These labours, according to Lazzarato, are provided by the likes of scientists, 
technologists, academics, designers and artists, with skills involving cybernetic and 
computer control as well as activities (intellectual, creative) that define, fix cultural 
and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms and more strategically public 
opinions (133). Furthermore, the requirements of production include and incorporate 
the personalities of immaterial labourers who are expected to become “active 
subjects” in the coordination of the various functions of production rather than simply 
being subjected to its command (Lazzarato 134-135).  
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Fig. 1. (Left) The accelerometer is kept in a little pouch attached to the apron string located 
above the waist. Fig. 2. (Right) The base unit of fall detector (without casing in picture) is 






Fig. 3. (Left) Testing and checking the fall detector unit. Fig. 4. (Right) Testing the heat 





Fig. 5. (Above) Technical layout of one of the second pair of aprons detailing the sensors and 
what they can do.  
 
 
In other words, the subjects needed here are those capable of communication (and 
imagination); however, this communicational relationship is “completely 
predetermined in both form and content; it is subordinated to the ‘circulation of 
information’ and is not expected to be anything other” (Lazzarato 135).Lazzarato, 
therefore, argues that this “mandate to ‘become subjects of communication’” is “even 
more totalitarian than the earlier rigid division between mental and manual labor 
(ideas and execution)” (136). This is in line with what Baudrillard notes, highlighted 
in the previous chapter, that the production of active subjects whose 
production/consumption of signs and codes provide the condition of possibility for the 
reproduction of the political economy. Furthermore, this new ideological structure is 
subtler and yet total in its control and manipulation of productive energies, in the 
continued consumption and perpetuation of its codes. 
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In a clear departure from the Taylorist model of organisation, immaterial 
labour is the interface between production and consumption through the process of 
communication (Lazzarato 138). The main product generated by immaterial labour is 
not only information but also subjectivity. Lazzarato points out that the “concept of 
immaterial labor presupposes and results in an enlargement of productive cooperation 
that even includes the production and reproduction of communication and hence of its 
most important contents: subjectivity” (140). In short, immaterial labour, by being the 
interface between production and consumption, produces social relationships of 
innovation, production and consumption that are then translated into capital relations 
(Lazzarato 138). Consumption here is not limited to consuming commodities and 
instead of being an act of destruction, consumption is necessary for new creation 
(Lazzarato 141). Within the cycle of immaterial production, the process of 
valorisation is crucial and consumption is inscribed a priori in the product since it is 
necessary for creating new products (Lazzarato 140-141). Immaterial labour, 
therefore, underpins capital relations by producing subjects that consume the 
information they produce in order to guarantee the next cycle of immaterial 
production.  
 As with the case of the “Artist-in-Labs: Processes of Enquiries” residency, its 
main objective is to produce art-science hybrid subjects. The organisers and partners 
of this art residency indicate that placing artists in scientific environments can be 
productive in terms of new knowledge and innovation for both artists and scientists. 
Moreover, they highlight, artists can help link science to the public and/or bring up 
ethical or social issues to be accurately addressed in research (Scott, “Introduction” 
6). Artists can even be “catalyst[s]” and “liberator[s] for science” (Scott, 
“Introduction” 7). Jill Scott, the main organiser of the residency elaborates that the 
 66
art-science hybrids can then become a “solid base for valuable innovation, production, 
distribution and social-cultural consumption potentials” (“Suggested 
Transdisciplinary Discourses” 24). Quoting several famous feminists of science, 
including Haraway, on their valorisation of the role of artists and women in science, 
Scott points to another project she is involved in, called the Relational European Art 
and Science Network, with the objective of exploring solutions to shared creativity by 
training more artists in science. She highlights, “we can also harness the potentials of 
transdisciplinary practice to involve women in a more creative approach to science” 
(“Suggested Transdisciplinary Discourses” 28). Scott’s and my narratives, which are 
inspired by Haraway’s discourse as well as the rhetoric by the other organisers and 
partners of the art residency, are based on an ideological component and process of 
valorisation.16 In all cases, the production of active hybrid subjects of art, science and 
technology is directly productive because “the role is to construct the 
consumer/communicator – and to construct it as ‘active’” (Lazzarato 143). For 
Lazzarato, the ability of immaterial labour to produce subjectivity and economic 
value at the same time indicates “how capitalist production has invaded our lives and 
has broken down all the oppositions among economy, power, and knowledge” (143).  
I argue however that Haraway’s proposed “oppositional cyborgs” not afraid of 
“disrupted unities” and able to take pleasure in high-tech culture in hope of “changing 
the rules of the game,” may inspire works that end up exacerbating “the Complex” 
(“A Cyborg Manifesto” 307-309). The notion of taking pleasure in high-tech culture 
also obfuscates the fact that it is not only the “most vulnerable” that are subjected to 
the “massive intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment” in the 
                                                 
16 I have also been involved in organising a similar art residency project that puts 
international artists in new media and technology laboratories in Singapore, as part of 
a juried exhibition event of the International Symposium on Electronic Art 2008. See 
<http://www.isea2008singapore.org/>. 
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“informatics of domination” (Harraway “A Cyborg Manifesto” 309). In the relation 
with capital, immaterial labour itself is also subjected to precariousness, hyper-
exploitation, mobility and hierarchy (Lazzarato 137). I am not denying that there is a 
divide between “the most vulnerable” and “the progressive people.” In fact, such a 
divide is becoming increasingly wide and yet forgotten by the technological class (I 
will return to this point later). In this sense, Haraway’s reminder of the dual nature of 
empowerment and her call for responsibility for our creations, remain pertinent. 
However, her appeal for a cyborgian subjectivity that takes pleasure in high-tech 
culture can be misappropriated to feed today’s technological economy, where 
hybridisation is the order of the day and where continuous production/consumption is 
exactly based on the creation of needs and desires.   
 To be fair to Haraway, her call for transgressions was made in 1984 at the 
height of the Cold War arms race, threat of nuclear warfare, and fractures within 
American feminism and its uneasy relations with essentialism and techno-science. In 
today’s world where cyborgian subjects are increasingly celebrated and extolled, 
however, it is time to re-look the usefulness of such a subject position. Nigel Thrift, in 
“Donna Haraway’s Dreams,” observes that while Haraway’s cyborg was 
predominantly “organismal” in character, in today’s context of pervasive computing, 
her notion of hybridisation is undoubtedly hastened, with the accompanying radical 
surveillance and control by technologies, and new ways of defining what body and 
human community are (189-195). Additionally, Thrift points to Haraway’s treatment 
of the economy as failing to take into account the contemporary enterprise concerned 
with realising the sensible – desire, hopes, beliefs and pleasures – that precedes 
production. In other words, Haraway’s strategic commandeering of the cyborg 
metaphor to contest its ontology and meaning in order to push for a post-identity 
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politics is not without problems today.  
Although Haraway’s cyborg is very complex and encompasses both real and 
metaphorical instances, the valorising of the cyborgian subject can end up becoming a 
mandate to become subjects of communication, as Lazarrato observes, which can be 
more totalitarian than earlier rigid divisions of labour, and more oppressive than 
earlier forms of dualisms. Indeed, Virilio argues, the invasion of the body by 
machines or what he terms the “endo-colonization of the body by technology” moves 
beyond prosthesis to a new form of eugenism, forced onto humans who do not need 
or want them (Virilio Live 42). He observes that in this “attack” of the body, coupled 
by ubiquity, the able-bodied paradoxically is modelled after the disabled and 
equipped to control his or her environment without much effort or physically shifting 
(Virilio Live 33). For Virilio, the “tragedy of the fusion of the ‘biological’ and the 
‘technological’” results in the body being subjected to the topology of the technology 
– its laws of efficiency and proximity (through miniaturisation, speed and ubiquity) 
and the resulting laws of least effort and least action (Virilio Live 50-51, 57). As 
highlighted in the previous section, the corresponding loss of journey in the 
interactive, “real-time” communication space of information, then encourages a 
deliberate limiting of the body’s area of influence to a few gestures or impulses 
(Virilio, Open Sky 15-17) or a general inertia. When the journey becomes needless, 
there is a loss of solid ground, the “playground of being in the world” (Virilio, Virilio 
Live 34). Ultimately, the “freedom” achieved by the transgressions between humans 
and machines in information and communication spaces that is also promised by 
Mann, paradoxically, leads to a general entropy or inertia of the body and a “frailty of 
reasoning” (due also to speed) as the field of action vanishes (Virilio, Speed and 
Politics 143). 
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Nevertheless, it is worth keeping Haraway’s cyborg for its ability to see from 
both perspectives. Ingrid Hoofd, using Haraway’s notion of complicity to structure 
her writing, substantiates the “frailty of reason” due to the speed of communication 
and the loss of fields of action in her analysis of feminist networked politics. In 
“Feminist Activism in the High-tech West: The Complicity of Transversal and 
Networked Politics of Speed,” Hoofd looks at contemporary feminist networked 
politics as practiced in three separate digital spaces, namely “Undercurrents,” 
“Nextgenderation” and “Indymedia” (19-35). She observes that there seems to be a 
“false fantasy” in these feminist networked politics of their progressiveness and 
strength of their alliances through common goals. This she argues is exaggerated by 
the instantaneity of online connection and the notion of online spaces as “neutral,” 
which then facilitates the “imaginary erasure of the situated embodiments within geo-
political structures of power” (“Feminist Activism” 19). Hoofd maintains that these 
feminist networked politics, in a departure from Haraway’s self-conscious politics, 
display a lack of self-reflexivity of their complicit relations with new media and 
military technologies, an effect, she argues, of current neo-liberal globalisation and its 
technologies that function on speed and circulation (“Feminist Activism” 20, 23).   
Drawing from the works of John Armitage and Gayatri Spivak, Hoofd uses the 
term “speed-elitism” to describe the current proliferation of optimistic discourses or 
what she calls “suppression of despair” (“Feminist Activism” 22-23). These 
discourses are the ones that stress on “connection, instantaneity, liberation, 
multiplicity and boundary overcoming, which go hand in hand with the validation of 
highly mediated spaces for action and communication between allied groups” 
(“Feminist Activism” 23). Such discourses then erase their violent colonial and 
patriarchal history, while enforcing an imaginary “unity of struggles,” through the 
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“myth of ‘truly’ allowing for radical difference and multiplicity within that space” 
(“Feminist Activism” 24). In this enforcement of “unity of struggle,” difference is 
excluded a priori through the larger scheme of “alliance” (“Feminist Activism” 25), 
and connections are created to supposed “radical others,” who in fact reside very 
much in the centre of power despite their “narratives from the margin” (“Feminist 
Activism” 28). Speed-elitism’s emancipatory dream, Hoofd further points out, is 
based on a humanist conception of an active, productive, resistant subjectivity, 
capable of “asserting its individuality in opposition to power” (“Feminist Activism” 
25).  
 Similarly using Haraway to structure her MA thesis, “Cyborg Ontology and 
Politics in Intelligent Nation Singapore,” Shirley Soh argues that the iN2015 
Masterplan is speeding up the cyborgisation process in Singapore. This process is 
marketed under the promise of empowerment in a digital future for everyone. Yet, the 
iN2015 cyborg, Soh observes, is based on a one-dimensional technological 
citizenship that obliges citizens to be technologically knowledgeable to the extent of 
being mainly media-savvy users and consumers of new technology. Soh argues that 
the iN2015’s promise of empowerment is driven mainly by consumption and living a 
life of technicity, addicted to speed, constant innovation, and the hyperreal.  
 On June 16 of this year, Soh and I were invited to be part of one of AWARE’s 
monthly roundtable discussions. AWARE or the Association of Women for Action 
and Research is one of Singapore’s leading gender equality advocacy group, of which 
Soh and I are members (AWARE). Soh was the speaker, and I the respondent, of the 
topic “Intelligent Nation? Technology, Gender and Empowerment in Singapore.” The 
session was chaired by Robin Ann Rheaume, the Website, IT & Volunteer Consultant 
of AWARE. It became clear during the roundtable discussion and in the aftermath of 
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the session (via email correspondence with Corinna Lim, the Executive Director of 
AWARE) that Soh’s and my critique of technological empowerment did not sit very 
well with the audience and members of the association. There was a sense of 
impatience with our critique that was read as anti-technology and a result of being 
“less immersed” in technology, which perhaps have to do also with our age, compared 
to the “younger” audience. This impression was perhaps further reinforced by 
Rheaume, who started the question-and-answer session by taking a count of those 
who have or do not have a Facebook account, which I chose not to have one. This 
choice is of course a luxury.  
The episode at AWARE clearly demonstrates what Hoofd describes above as 
the “suppression of despair” and “unity of struggle” amongst speed-elites, intent on 
seeing only the empowering side of information technologies and telecommunications 
(“Feminist Activism” 22-24). But such a narrow view of technology not only 
measures our relationships to technology and know-hows based on what we have 
and/or use, but also (as pointed out by Soh) is un-reflexive. Soh points out in our 
email exchanges with Corrina, AWARE’s use of social media tools for out-reach and 
activism is already targeting a certain audience (educated, computer-savvy, middle-
class, also probably English speaking), which Soh contends is fine so long as 
AWARE realises it is promoting a kind of feminism that includes some and excludes 
others. What is more crucial for Soh is the impact of new technology on those who 
are already marginalised, and for those who are empowered, what this empowerment 
really means?17 
                                                 
17 Email correspondence between myself and Corrina, 17 June 2011, 1.45PM, 
2.44PM, 4.06PM, 6.05PM; email correspondence between Shirley and Corrina, 20 
June 2011, 12.29AM. For AWARE, see <http://www.aware.org.sg/about/overview/> 
and for the roundtable discussion, see <http://www.aware.org.sg/register/aware-
roundtable-discussions/>. 
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2.4 Re-assessing the Smart Apron: Some Concluding Thoughts 
The Smart Apron remains incomplete. Yet, its incompleteness is perhaps its greatest 
strength; otherwise, this dissertation would not be speaking the way it speaks now. I 
have come to realise that in my use of cybernetic technologies, I have been enframed 
by the technologies’ rhetoric of freedom, empowerment and control. I have come to 
realise that my mobility and empowerment will always come at the expense of 
another, while my “liberation” project simulates difference by inevitably 
homogenising the foreign domestic workers as victims and naturalising their position 
in servitude. The homogeneity of women as a stable category is produced here not 
through “biological essentials,” but through “secondary sociological and 
anthropological universals” – such as the basis of a shared oppression – that elides 
“women” as a discursively constructed group with “women” as material subjects with 
their own history (Mohanty 53). In other words, in my desire to represent the working 
conditions of certain foreign domestic workers in Singapore, my act of differentiation, 
paradoxically, is premised on the creation of some enforced Same-ness. Crucially, the 
“difference” produced ends up as information for circulation and consumption. 
Feminist production of active subjects of science and technology, as in my case, is 
complicit with and increasingly being demanded by the current technological political 
economy. The next chapter highlights Singapore as an example of how such needs 
and desires for the consumption and production of information technologies and 
telecommunications are coded through the political economy of the sign and subject. 
Through the iN2015 Masterplan women are used, metaphorically and materially, by 
the Singapore government to play active roles in sustaining the values of the ruling 
elites, the logic of the technologies, and ultimately, our own subordination.  
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Chapter Three:  
The Visible and Invisible: Consumption and the Political Economy of the 
Subject in the iN2015 Masterplan 
 
 
“It is the cunning of form to veil itself continually in the evidence of 
the content. It is the cunning of the code to veil itself and to produce 
itself in the obviousness of value. It is in the “materiality” of content 
that form consumes its abstraction and reproduces itself as form. That 
is its peculiar magic” (Jean Baudrillard, “For a Critique of the 
Political Economy of the Sign” 80). 
 
 
3.1 Coding Needs and Desires: Introducing the Strategies of the iN2015 Masterplan 
The previous chapter has shown, through my wearable artwork the Smart Apron, how 
the wearable computing discourse of Steve Mann and socialist-feminist discourse of 
Donna Haraway are different in terms of their politics, values and ethics, but how, 
ultimately, the mobile cyborgian subject lends itself easily for misinterpretation and 
misappropriation by today’s technological systems. This chapter brings my arguments 
even closer to home by looking specifically at the iN2015 Masterplan, and how its 
championing of active technological subjects feeds back into Singapore’s 
technological economy and military. Drawing on Jean Baudrillard’s point on the 
political economy of the sign that then produces the political economy of the subject, 
I argue that the iN2015 Masterplan, including its digital video Imagine Your World 
iN2015, socially shapes subjects through the latter’s consumption of a manufactured 
system of codes and meanings that naturalise needs and desires, and their correlating 
use value and exchange value. These codes, constructed through the language of new 
media technologies and discourse around globalisation and its technologies, become 
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productive forces in cultivating subjects in line with the Singapore ruling elites’ needs 
and requirements.  
 Specifically, I argue the iN2015 video functions structurally for Singapore to 
narrate and broadcast itself as a global city, vis-à-vis pervasive computing, to both its 
populace and an international audience, shaping their desires, while obscuring the 
harsh demands of globalisation. In other words, the iN2015 video embodies the larger 
discourse of Singapore’s ruling elites. It harnesses identity politics to naturalise social 
relations and normative relationships with information technologies and 
telecommunications, while disguising the upheavals caused by the global 
restructuring process, abetted by the same technologies. Straddling the “visible” and 
“invisible” at will, the iN2015 video repeats the national myths of “origin” and 
“tradition,” but departs from the conventional discourse of survival (or crisis) through 
its rhetoric of empowerment, control and inclusion in the use of information 
technologies and telecommunications, to produce the active technological subjects 
needed by Singapore’s complex technological systems. Additionally, by combining 
Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra, Virilio’s observations of chronophotography and its 
aesthetics of disappearance, and David Rodowick’s critique of digital culture, I argue 
that the transparency of the official discourse is matched by the transparency of new 
media technologies. In the disappearance of the discursive technologies, the needs and 
desires of Singapore’s ruling elites are perpetuated by the populace as their own, that 
in turn, subject everyone under the technologies’ digital logic of abstraction (general 
equivalence), control and participation (interaction). 
 This chapter consists of three main sections. In the first section, I focus on 
how the iN2015 video, through cleverly constructed and selective use of the “Asian 
values” ideology, the valorisation of “the middle-class,” “foreign talent” and 
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“cosmopolitans,” points to globalisation and nationalism as restructuring processes 
that are sustained through identity politics, which naturalise a variety of hierarchies 
and subjectivities. In particular, I highlight how women as metaphors for development 
are deployed by Singapore’s ruling elites to subject female and feminine labour 
structurally, institutionally and morally to take active roles not only to ensure 
continued capitalist development, but also to perpetuate the hegemony of the ruling 
class, its patriarchal and neo-liberal values, and eventually, women’s own 
subordination.18 
 In the next section, I look at how the iN2015 video’s depiction of pervasive 
computing as positively transformative, efficient and seamlessly integrated into 
people’s daily lives, reinforces and normalises prevalent views of such technologies 
as empowering for everyone, when, in fact, its consumption (in both material and 
immaterial forms) effects a disciplinary code for all. This section highlights the use of 
both material and immaterial means by the iN2015 Masterplan to expand 
technologised spaces and encourage the active consumption of information 
technologies and telecommunications. Through the building of the necessary 
infrastructures, enacting policies, and the rhetoric of empowerment, control and 
inclusion, the iN2015 Masterplan creates and valorises technological subjects, active 
in the production and consumption of information technologies and 
                                                 
18 Although the focus of my dissertation is on how structures produce subjects based 
on coding needs and desire through the manipulation of signs, this does not mean that 
the structures are themselves neutral and un-gendered. In fact, the post-Cold War 
techniques and technicity as well as the neo-liberal values that imbue these structures 
are arguably masculine. By this, however, I do not mean that they are exclusively 
man-made structures. Rather, certain women too share these masculine values, just as 
certain men are against such rationality. Therefore, my use of the terms “patriarchal” 
and “patriarchy” encompasses a set of beliefs, values, practices that are aligned with 
masculine thoughts and rationality, which can be shared, expressed and perpetuated 
by men and women alike. 
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telecommunications. Using Baudrillard’s concept of consumption as a productive 
force, I show how the nurturing of such active technological subjects eventually feeds 
back into Singapore’s technological systems. Hence, I situate Singapore, via the 
iN2015 Masterplan, as a prime example of mutated capitalism where social control is 
diffused, motivated, defined by market imperatives, as well as underpinned by 
consumption and the digital logic of control, participation and its feedback loop. In 
this cycle of consumption/production, the paradoxes of how the positive effects of the 
iN2015 Masterplan and pervasive computing are exactly due to the negative effects of 
the Masterplan and its technologies are made invisible.  
 In the last section, I summarise and reiterate the conditions of possibility for 
the iN2015 Masterplan and Singapore’s technological economy. Apart from looking 
at the mobilisation of the political economy of the subject through discourse, this 
section also looks at the role of new media technologies in coding needs and desires, 
and shaping sociality by what it makes visible and invisible. Here, I connect Paul 
Virilio’s concept of the aesthetics of disappearance, and David Rodowick’s study of 
digital technologies and its impact on moving images, to Baudrillard’s observations of 
the cunning of the form to hide itself in its content, highlighted in the epigraph. I point 
to how regardless of the changes in the contents of the iN2015 Masterplan website 
and video, the iN2015 project of perpetuating technological consumption remains, 







3.2 The Political Economy of the Sign and Subject in the iN2015 Masterplan: Women 
as Metaphors for Development 
Globalisation has traditionally been seen and understood primarily, as an economic 
(followed by political) and universalising process, with trans-national corporations, 
states, financial institutions and information technologies and telecommunications 
playing key driving roles. Conversely, focus on regional, cultural and sociological 
relations points to globalisation as specific and heterogeneous in effects. In either 
case, global restructuring is an on-going process practiced and sustained through signs 
and metaphors that naturalise various hierarchies and subjectivities (Marchand and 
Runyan 1-22). The rise of neo-Confucianism or a “hypermasculinised” code of 
development and its corresponding “hyperfeminine” models in East Asia and 
Singapore, for example, attest to the interaction between the structures of capitalism 
and patriarchy (Truong 133-165; Ling, “Sex Machine” 277-306). These codes also 
demonstrate how the construction of tradition, ironically, far from negating and being 
negated by modernity is crucial to the process of modernisation that in return 
maintains the hierarchical status quo. Yet while globalisation depends on making 
visible, sanctioning and maintaining a given social code, it also, paradoxically, hinges 
on the “politics of forgetting,” a process of erasure driven by powerful dominant 
groups such as global capital and the neo-liberal state, who “actively control and 
manipulate space” in order to maintain existing power structures (Lee and Yeoh 4). In 
the iN2015 Masterplan, this is most clearly demonstrated in its discourse around the 
valorised “foreign talent,” “cosmopolitans,” “the middle class” and their 
corresponding “invisible” Others, particularly the foreign workers and foreign 
domestic workers. Thus, the visible and invisible equally structure the discussion of 
global restructuring at the level of representation, identity and everyday life.  
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 Everyday life is a site of struggle since this is where the economic, political, 
material, cultural and symbolic converge; where “different portions of power and 
resources, their presence or absence, are keenly felt” (Kim 7), and where experiences 
and identities are produced and/or contested and subjectivities constituted. 
Significantly, media consumption plays an integral role in the “politics of everyday 
life” with its “poaching, tireless, invisible, quiet but potentially transformative 
activity” (Kim 8). Media’s ubiquity and its potential to affect meaning making in 
everyday life are two fundamental yet paradoxical points in the politics of the iN2015 
Masterplan. Crucially, the iN2015 Masterplan via pervasive computing will intensify 
new media’s ubiquity and consumption in everyday life, as well as their powerful 
capacity to affect meaning making. In the case of the iN2015 Masterplan, new media 
is used to reinforce not only the patriarchal and neo-liberal values of the ruling elites, 
but also the continued consumption/production of new media technologies and their 
codes.  
A case in point is the iN2015 digital video that accompanies the iN2015 
Masterplan. As part of the iN2015 Masterplan launch, a nation-wide competition 
called Express iT! iN2015 was held to generate ideas and “visions of a colourful 
infocomm future for Singapore” (IDA “Express IT! iN2015 Competition”). It drew 
more than three thousand entries over a period of two months, with sixty percent 
coming from primary schools, eighteen percent from secondary schools and pre-
university institutions, and twenty-two percent from the public. Co-opting some of 
these visions, the six minute-six-second video, entitled Imagine Your World iN2015, 
was produced by IDA to show-case what Singapore will be like in the year 2015, 
when the city-state would be thoroughly integrated with pervasive computing. 
Specifically, the iN2015 video depicts snapshots of how life will be for a middle-class 
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Singaporean-“Chinese” family as they go about their daily lives. The seven characters 
and roles identified in the video are Nancy, a mother who works as a digital animator; 
Mark, the father and manager of a logistics company; David, their son and primary 
school student; Karen, their teenage daughter and consumer; Madam Lee, the 
grandmother and senior citizen; Tobey, a European-descent male expatriate and 
executive of the same logistics company as Mark; and Sazali, the male “Malay” taxi 
driver.  
The video begins with a time-lapse image of the Singapore urban landscape 
and cuts to Nancy at work. As she orally commands multiple screens to switch on and 
proceeds to have a meeting with various people from different parts of the world, each 
occupying a screen, Nancy’s earpiece churns out real-time translation of their 
respective languages to English. After her meeting, Nancy removes her wristwatch, 
which morphs like liquid metal into a small handheld device allowing her to send a 
text email to Sazali to pick up her son, David, from his excursion at the zoo. While 
reading the day’s news through a transparent tablet, Sazali receives Nancy’s email 
and proceeds to call up a map on the same device, showing the location of the 
Singapore Zoological Garden and the distance from where his taxi is to the zoo. The 
next scene is of Mark driving on the highway. By pressing one of several buttons near 
his steering wheel, Mark makes a call to Tobey, who answers it through a pair of 
sunglasses (see fig. 1). In their mediated communication, Mark gets a view of Tobey 
in his new apartment and Tobey “sees” Mark as the latter continues to drive. Through 
his sunglasses, Tobey is also able to receive the shipping invoice sent from Mark for 
customs clearance and to call up his “sexy” Asian female avatar to complete the task 
(see fig. 2). The avatar proceeds to inform Tobey that his favourite performance, 
Misty, is on show at The Esplanade – Theatres on the Bay, books the tickets for it and 
 80
sends Mark the details, as instructed by Tobey (see fig. 3). Meanwhile, Mark turns off 
the expressway, and is informed by the “intelligent agent” of his car the number of 
available parking lots in a building nearest to his location. The scene then transitions 





Fig. 1. Tobey communicating with Mark through a pair of sunglasses. Source: Info-
communications Development Authority of Singapore (IDA Singapore). All copyright and 






Fig. 2. The avatar as she appears on Tobey’s sunglasses. Source: Info-communications 
Development Authority of Singapore (IDA Singapore). All copyright and intellectual 




Fig. 3. Mark receiving Tobey’s message about Misty on his car windscreen. Source: Info-
communications Development Authority of Singapore (IDA Singapore). All copyright and 




At the zoo, David is on a class excursion and using a similar transparent tablet 
to Sazali’s, he “scans” a rhinoceros and proceeds to call up his virtual “Malay” male 
“professor” to explain how the name for the animal came about. David then shares 
this file with his classmate seated next to him by simply using his finger to select the 
file and dragging it out of his screen in the direction of his classmate’s tablet. David 
continues to “scan” many animals and insects at the zoo before receiving an audio-
visual message from his mother, Nancy, informing him that she is running late and 
has arranged for a taxi to pick him up and send him home. As Sazali arrives at the 
zoo, David receives an email of his arrival. Meanwhile, David’s sister Karen is at a 
shopping mall alerted to a particular brand of lipstick that is on sale through a 
different hand-held device, which she then uses to track her location to the sales 
counter. When she arrives at the counter, Karen calls up a picture of her mother, 
Nancy, on the device and by scanning the lipstick across it, a menu of colours appears 
on the screen before different shades of colours are juxtaposed on the lips of Nancy’s 
image. After making her choice, Karen proceeds to pay for the lipstick by simply 
scanning the palm of her hand on a black tablet at the payment counter.  
 The following scene shows Madam Lee, a senior citizen, exercising at the 
balcony of her home. An alarm goes off on her wireless heart rate monitor worn on 
her wrist. A screen is then projected from the device with an image of her “concerned 
doctor” enquiring after her as the system has registered her heart beating too fast. She 
informs “him” that she might have exercised for too long and thanks “him” for his 
concern. The “doctor” is reassured and signs off. In the final scene, Madam Lee enters 
with a cake and it appears that it is Nancy’s birthday. Mark, her husband, has gotten 
her tickets to watch the theatre performance Misty; Karen has bought her the lipstick, 
and David has a different surprise for her. As the family gathers round to have their 
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dinner, David inserts a memory card into a device with a crystal ball. Instantly the 
dining room is transformed into a “jungle” with moving images of flora and fauna 
captured by David at the zoo (see fig. 4). While the family enjoys the simulated 
environment, David, in a voice-over, wonders what else will be invented in the next 




Fig. 4. The family in their dining room as they enjoy the simulated environment created by 
David. Source: Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore (IDA Singapore). 
All copyright and intellectual property rights in the digital image are owned by IDA. 
 
 
While the iN2015 video seeks to present a pristine and novel image of 
pervasive technologies as they manifest themselves in the everyday life of the 
Singapore populace, there is nothing actually new about the visions of the technology 
or the rhetoric of everyday life used. I address this point in the next chapter. What I 
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want to highlight in this chapter is how the video deploys the political economy of the 
sign and subject to naturalise normative relationships with new technologies, disguise 
the upheavals caused by the intensification of such technologies and the larger global 
restructuring process, through the myths of “origin” and “tradition.”  
In “For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign,” Baudrillard critiques 
classical (Marxist) political economy for failing to take into account the political 
economy of the sign, its systems of value, exchange and circulation, in the 
organisation of relations (60-100). According to Baudrillard, signs are arbitrary 
systems of classification, grouping and categorisation that then become falsely 
transparent codes used to legitimise production and social relations. However, these 
codes are not forced; rather, they operate under a complex arrangement of needs and 
desires for social meaning and difference, where use value and exchange value are 
constructed as binaries and reduced to the status of utility. In this sense, subjects as 
much as objects are equally exposed to use, regardless (or precisely because) of their 
oppositional construction. Hence, the political economy of the sign is an arbitrary 
construct of subjects, objects, their values and hierarchical relations – codes that then 
give rise to and are in turn sustained by the political economy of the subject.  
With the political economy of the subject, Baudrillard maintains, needs and 
desires work hand in hand with the political economy of the sign, use value and 
exchange value, to produce disciplinary forces that valorise individuals to become 
useful subjects. Paradoxically, these needs and desires are simulated and naturalised 
as something original to the subject and beyond the discursive and material 
construction of the political economy. Baudrillard argues, “every great social order of 
production ... maintains an ideal myth, at once a myth of culmination and a myth of 
origin. Theology supported itself on the myth of the fulfillment of man in the divine 
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law; political economy is sustained on the great myth of human fulfillment according 
to the natural law of needs” (“For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign” 77). 
The power of such myths, according to Baudrillard, is their ability to create 
“transparent” relationships between humans, the products of their labour, their 
instruments, and crucially, the very conditions of their beings. As highlighted in the 
epigraph, the ultimate intelligence of the code is its capacity to abstract itself, make 
itself invisible even as it simultaneously produces content and the consciousness to 
receive the content it produces (Baudrillard,“For a Critique of the Political Economy of 
the Sign” 80). 
 The need for capitalist and technological development in Singapore is founded 
precisely on a series of myths that eventually became transparent codes regulating 
local subjects. Historically, at the end of British colonial rule, after Singapore was 
kicked out of the Federation of Malaysia and to assuage apprehensions, the ideology 
that the nation’s survival is tied to and can only be achieved through economic 
development was championed (B. H. Chua, “Racial-Singaporeans” 30-31). 
Capitalism’s promise of material comforts, underpinned by the logic of individual 
competitiveness, meritocracy and private accumulation, were used to persuade and 
“unite” an ethnically diverse population to see this form of development as just, 
impartial and desirable (B. H. Chua, “Racial-Singaporeans” 33-37). The discourse of 
survival (or crisis) as well as the promise of material comforts, persist today and have 
resulted in an internalised national psyche of understanding capitalist development as 
inevitable and the quality of everyday life as being economically-determined and 
materially measured (Koh 186-187). Equally, these discourses have also created 
disciplined, competitive subjects “blind” to how the capitalist ideology, despite its 
claims to “unite” the population, fundamentally makes people compete against each 
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other, resulting in ambivalences to the structural injustices based on racist, patriarchal, 
heterosexist and class relations of rule. The notion of meritocracy, for example, has 
created subjectivities of self-justification for those who are successful and self-
deprecation for those who are not (B.H. Chua, “Racial-Singaporeans” 33), while valid 
objections to such an alienating ideology underpinned by competition and 
consumption, were instead silenced as being “Islamic fundamentalist” and 
“economically irrational” (PuruShotam, “Disciplining Difference” 88). 
 Currently, with the advent and expansion of globalisation, the use of discourse 
as a disciplinary technology to regulate the Singapore populace has intensified. Aaron 
Koh, in “Living with Globalization Tactically: The Metapragmatics of Globalization 
in Singapore,”observes how the leaders of Singapore have countered the 
unpredictability of globalisation by mobilising “a rhetoricist position to persuade its 
populace to accept the implementation of certain policies” (179-201). By defining 
globalisation narrowly as being about “competitiveness,” “innovation,” “creativity,” 
“techno/entrepreneurship,” and “foreign talent,” it is deployed as a mechanism for the 
government to shape, normalise and instrumentalise the Singapore polity in the name 
of “making globalisation manageable” (Koh, 180). As such, Koh highlights, the 
fundamental logic underpinning Singapore’s management of globalisation is “an 
instrumental rationality,” a “calculated pragmatism” aimed at “making the Singapore 
economy tick ... at whatever cost” (181). Koh continues to point out that the art of 
government in Singapore works not only by managing the territory but also by 
influencing the populace’s dispositions of thinking and behaving. This is achieved 
through a combination of both “totalising forms of power,” such as public policies, 
and “individualising forms of power,” such as cultivating a certain mind-set, targeted, 
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especially, on maintaining Singapore as an economic powerhouse (183-184).19 
Overall, the “tactical” deployment of public policies and control of individual 
thoughts and behaviour are invariably performed using culturalist assertions that 
valorise “traditions” and values centred on the construction of “place,” “home” and 
“roots,” in an era of de-territorialised market and de-terroritorised nationalism (196). 
The iN2015 video complements the Singapore government’s long-standing 
strategies of using the “home” to construct normative relations with globalisation and 
pervasive computing. Specifically, the final scene of the video, where three 
generations of the family gather to have their dinner and celebrate Nancy’s birthday 
(see fig. 4) is instructive of how the construction of the home (ways of life, eating, et 
cetera) is crucial for the social reproduction of culture and specific subjects – in this 
case, conventional subjects engulfed literally by modern technologies and virtuality. 
“Home,” “tradition” and “origin,” hence, play central roles in Singapore’s nationalist 
project and its production and mobilisation of conventional yet contradictory 
subjectivities that fit the needs and desires of the ruling elites.  
In their analysis of capitalist development in East Asia and Singapore, Truong 
Thanh-Dam and L.H.M. Ling separately argue that ideological constructs in this 
region are predominantly based on a neo-Confucianist, “hypermasculinised” code and 
their corresponding “hyperfeminine” models. Under this particular model of 
development governments cite “Asian values” to argue the dominance of community 
over the individual to justify state sovereignty and the primacy of economic 
development over political freedom, while narratives of the virtue of self-sacrifice are 
                                                 
19 Some of the maneuvers used by the government that Koh discusses, include: the 
Foreign Talent policy that aims to attract mobile talent/capital (187); the language 
campaigns (Speak Mandarin Campaign and Speak Good English Movement) that 
strives at meeting the needs of (new) centres of capitalism (189-190); and the 
National Education programme intent on inculcating Singaporean youths with forms 
of Singaporean identity and patriotism against the tides of globalisation (194). 
 88
used to discipline women, the labour force and society at large (Truong 145-147). 
Based on this neo-Confucianist “hypermasculinised” code, women also become 
metaphors for development in the service of the household, the state, the economy 
and capital that in turn are used to regulate female and feminised labour (whether 
performed by men or women) and their roles in the family and society. This 
regulation of subjectivities is achieved through cleverly cultivated images where 
select Confucian ethics and values are extended from the home to the political 
economy and the larger globalisation process, which in turn act to induct these labour 
forces into service structurally, institutionally and morally (Ling, Postcolonial 
International Relations 162-165). 
The Singapore brand of the “Asian values” ideology is a hybrid of Pancasila 
in Indonesia and select Confucian Ethics, resulting in a hierarchical setup of nation 
before community, and society before self. In this setup, the family is made the basis 
of society, and the individual placed in the care of the community, while racial and 
religious harmonies are upheld, just as consensuses, and not conflicts, are promoted 
(Englehart 561). This carefully constructed ideology and its focus on 
communitarianism, self-sacrifice and the patriarchal, heterosexual family as the basic 
unit of society, was promoted by the government particularly in the 1980s, as a 
reaction to what they established as a growing “Western” liberal individualism and 
threats to the Singapore society and family (B.H. Chua, “Asian-Values Discourse” 
573-592). More importantly, this ideology also functions as a pre-emption to the 
growing popularity of the Opposition parties in the 1980s and, therefore, threats to the 
ruling party’s own position (Englehart 551-554).  
The selective use of Confucian Ethics that underpins Singapore’s brand of 
“Asian values” thus springs more from political and ideological reasons to militate 
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against the globalised notions of democracy and human rights, rather than from any 
traditional mores of the population (Englehart 549).20 Ironically, prior to the 
introduction of “Asian values,” the Singapore government was actively promoting the 
English language, culture and a different kind of national identity – that of “rugged 
individualism” – while systematically destroying the network of traditional Chinese 
schools (best placed to advocate Confucian Ethics) because they were seen as hotbeds 
of communism (Englehart 555-556; H. C. Chan, “Nation-Building in Southeast Asia” 
12). This shift to “Asian values,” premised on a select neo-Confucianist focus on 
communitarianism, self-sacrifice and deference to paternalistic authority, therefore, is 
an astute move to position the ruling elites as “virtuous men and rulers” (Englehart 
558-559), and the general population as uninterested or unsuited to democratic ideals 
and individual rights (565).  
 Indeed, Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan, in “State Fatherhood: The 
Politics of Nationalism, Sexuality, and Race in Singapore,” argue that Singapore’s 
brand of Confucianism, which works on the metaphor of state as the family, 
guarantees the transfer of paternal signifier from the family to the state, “rendering 
‘natural’ an ‘omnipotent government’” (208). However, the authors continue, by 
recuperating the entire history of Chinese culture in a seamless narrative of continuity 
and cohesion with Singapore’s history, the ruling elites problematically reconfigure 
Confucianism itself under racial and trans-national identity. They also effect an 
“internalized Orientalism” that submits citizens to “a structure of values which best 
subtends, with minimal fuss and resistance, the efficient working of state corporatism 
                                                 
20 Englehart points out that Confucianism is not widely practiced in multiracial 
Singapore and even among its predominantly “Chinese” population who are a diverse 
mix, religiously and culturally. Even the majority of the ruling elites (including 
former premier and now Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, a strong proponent of 
“Asian values”) are English-educated “Chinese,” rather than Mandarin scholars well 
versed in Confucian Ethics (555). 
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and multinational capital” (206-207). Through their construction of an idealised 
“Chinese-ness,” values that are in line with the requirements of Singapore’s modern 
market economy are valorised, while qualities that are deemed as “undesirable” may 
be contained and/or excised (207). Consequently, the anti-“Western” rhetoric within 
Singapore’s “Asian values” discourse acts as an ideal regulative machine to process 
certain aspects of western culture deemed undesirable and a threat to the ruling elites’ 
dominance, while concealing the state’s own re-inscription of western modes of 
discourse and rationality.21 What are rendered invisible in the ruling elites’ discourse 
are the rich variety of cultures within Singapore society, the diversity and materiality 
of Chinese history, and the range of contradictory tenets within Confucianism (Heng 
and Devan 208).22 Pivotally, the “Asian values” ideology creates and maintains 
binaries, in order to obscure the neo-liberal rationality underpinning its discourse that 
seeks to restore class power to the ruling elites. 
The Singapore government’s attempt to create a narrative of “common 
origin,” (Yuval-Davis 26) through the “Asian values” ideology, is based on 
essentialised notions of “race,” ethnicity and the simplistic view of cultures as static, 
reified homogeneous phenomena (41). As a result, under the “Asian values” ideology, 
ethnicity is reduced to culture and culture is in turn essentialised into a simplistic 
dichotomous framework of “Eastern” versus “Western” values. This ethnic nationalist 
project, based on identity politics or the politics of difference, constructs the 
                                                 
21 Heng and Devan refer specifically to the Singapore government’s strategic 
deployment of genetics and socio-biology in its large-scale social and biological 
engineering projects to control Singapore’s population as instances of state collusion 
with western institutions of power/knowledge (207). 
22 Englehart makes a similar point when he highlights that Confucianism is not a 
simple tradition but possesses a complex variety of strands. One of these strands, 
ignored by the ruling elites, is the liberal strand that emphasises the “tradition of 
philosophical individualism, a spirit of free inquiry, and a history of criticizing 
despotic rulers for abuse of power” (560). 
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“collectivity,” defines its “interests” and perpetuates its advantages, by creating 
collectivity boundaries, dividing the world into binary constructs of “us” and “them” 
(Yuval-Davis 44), and private and public spaces. Equally important, this project, like 
many other ethnic projects, requires the constant production and policing of subjects 
and spaces to fit within the given norm. Women, in particular, “are often required to 
carry this ‘burden of representation’, as they are constructed as the symbolic bearers 
of the collectivity’s identity and honour, both personally and collectively” (Yuval-
Davis 45). The “Asian values” ideology and the role of women as metaphors for 
development is most prominently perpetuated by the iN2015 video, through its 
depiction of idealised femininities with the added promise that “upward mobility” and 
“control of one’s life” can be achieved through the active use of information 
technologies and telecommunications. 
 The key role of women as metaphors for development and guardians of 
Singapore’s updated “Asian values” ideology is most prominently played by Nancy, 
the female protagonist in the iN2015 video (see fig. 5). Nancy’s profession as a digital 
animator is significant, emphasising the Singapore government’s belief of the need 
for “innovative” individuals needed to aid and sustain the technological systems in an 
age of global competition and dispersed technological installations reliant on 
information and simulation. Yet while Nancy is depicted as a productive global 
worker, she is at the same time a productive wife and mother, bearing at least two 
children and being their primary caretaker by making sure, for example, that David is 
picked up from school. As and when Nancy is unable to perform her domestic 
responsibilities, these can easily be transferred to technology and feminised labour 
often performed by racialised Others, like Sazali the “Malay” taxi driver, or the 




Fig. 5. Nancy as she appears before the start of the iN2015 video, towering over the 
Singapore urban landscape. Source: Info-communications Development Authority of 
Singapore (IDA Singapore). All copyright and intellectual property rights in the digital image 
are owned by IDA. 
 
In this instance, the iN2015 video works simultaneously to valorise and naturalise 
productive female and feminised labour, while at the same time render invisible, any 
negative aspects of the global restructuring process and its technologies. The 
dissimulation of the foreign domestic workers in the home and the foreign workers in 
the physical construction of Singapore’s global city is crucial to the idealised image of 
the iN2015 Masterplan and fundamental to shaping local consciousness in the 
acceptance of such a plan. The “disappearance” of foreign domestic workers and 
foreign workers in the iN2015 video also belies the fact that this “class of people” is 
subjected to strict controls in Singapore’s capitalist development, as compared to the 
“foreign talent” the city-state is trying to attract. 
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“Foreign talent” is human capital, in the form of skilled professional and 
managerial workers in high-end positions, deemed necessary by the state for 
Singapore to survive within global competitiveness. These workers are given 
preferential treatment, compared to foreign workers and foreign domestic workers, 
which include liberal immigration policies for them and their families, the potential 
for them to become permanent residents, and state grants given to companies to make 
their hiring attractive to companies. In contrast, foreign workers and foreign domestic 
workers, who are equally essential to capitalist development, are subjected to strict 
controls. These include short-term work permits that allow them to be easily 
repatriated, non-eligibility for permanent residency and dependent’s passes (to allow 
their spouses or children to be with them), prohibition of marriage to Singaporeans, 
and regular medical examinations for AIDS/HIV, and for foreign domestic workers, 
pregnancy. Their hire is also discouraged through the dependency ceiling, which 
regulates the proportion of foreign to local workers, the foreign worker levy (tax), and 
the security bond, which risk being forfeited from employers if their workers get 
pregnant and/or go missing (Yeoh, “Migration” 7-9).  
 The iN2015 video, apart from presenting an idealised image of the iN2015 
Masterplan to shape local consciousness, also functions as a broadcast of Singapore’s 
cosmopolitan ideology. The cosmopolitan ideology is a concurrent state-driven, neo-
liberal globalisation project, which seeks to re-engineer Singapore as a place for 
attracting and retaining “foreign talent” (Yeoh, “Cosmopolitanism” 137-151). The 
cosmopolitan lifestyle projected by the iN2015 video, therefore, operates not only as a 
mirror of the middle-class way of life for Singaporeans, but also as a looking glass for 
selective non-Singaporeans to work and settle in the country. In the cosmopolitan 
discourse, despite the strict controls against foreign workers and foreign domestic 
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workers, Singapore is painted by the ruling elites as an open, creative, vibrant and 
“inclusive” global city, with efficient, accessible and advanced technologies capable 
of high-speed connections to all parts of the globe (Yeoh, “Cosmopolitanism”142). 
However, while the cosmopolitan subject is valorised as what is needed for the 
twenty-first century, cosmopolitanism itself is reduced to matters of taste and 
consumption embodied in the culture of a trans-national capitalist class – a passive 
form of global citizenship in terms of social and political transformative power but 
active in terms of capital production and consumption (Yeoh, “Cosmopolitanism” 
138).  
Cosmopolitanism as a matter of taste and consumption is coded in the iN2015 
video by the way of Tobey, the “foreign talent,” who recommended the theatre 
performance Misty, showing at The Esplanade – Theatres on the Bay, to Mark and 
Nancy. This scene functions, on the one hand, in tandem with arts and culture being 
valorised, through massive infrastructural development like The Esplanade, to signify 
Singapore as a cultured, sophisticated global city, and a playground for “foreign 
talent” and mobile capital. On the other hand, the image also works to exhort 
Singaporeans to adopt a cosmopolitan outlook to the influx of “foreign talent” (Yeoh, 
“Cosmopolitanism”140-142), an influx presented positively as a simple matter of 
changing taste and consumption rather than actual threats to job security, livelihoods 
and ways of life in Singapore. Further to the idealised image for the cosmopolitan-
middle-class, the video effaces the possibility that with the proliferation of pervasive 
technologies and its logic of information “anytime,” “anywhere,” life in Singapore for 
this “professional class” such as the “professor” and “doctor” in the iN2015 video (if 
they are not already replaced by “intelligent” agents) will be impossibly hectic, to say 
the least. 
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While it seems that the exhortation of Singaporeans to adopt a cosmopolitan 
outlook and way of life appears oppositional to the “Asian values” espoused earlier. 
Quite the contrary, the cosmopolitan discourse and the “Asian value” ideology are 
really two sides of the same global restructuring coin. In “Globalizing the Regional, 
Regionalizing the Global: Mass Culture and Asianism in the Age of Late Capital,”  
Leo Ching argues that regionalist imaginary is fundamentally complicit with the 
globalist project even as they appear oppositional (233-257). In the current global face 
of capitalism, Ching points out, symbolic exchanges, more than economic and/or 
political exchanges, have largely become elemental and powerful for the global 
restructuring process (238-239). In fact, the conscious production of difference 
“liberates” Asia as a market and “Asian-ness” as a spectacle and commodity to be 
consumed in the globalised capitalist system (Ching 241). Here, again, women as 
metaphors for development play key roles. In the iN2015 video, this is best 
exemplified by the female avatar as the subservient sexualised Asian “woman as 
service” (Ling, Postcolonial International Relations 145-146), aiding the state’s 
ironic appeal to “foreign (white, male) talent” to work, play and stay in Singapore.23  
The consumption of “difference,” to briefly reiterate Baudrillard’s 
observations highlighted in chapter one, far from being a passive mode of assimilation 
or absorption, is an active mode of relations to objects, collectives and the world. 
Consumption, Baudrillard argues, is about the manipulation of signs and what is 
consumed are relations, system of meanings and difference (“The System of Objects” 
24-50). What is crucial in this production of needs for difference or desires for social 
                                                 
23 Ling gives two conventional examples of sexualised Asian “woman as service” in 
the Singapore context – the carefully cultivated image of the “Singapore Girl” by 
Singapore Airlines to appeal to international (white, male) travelers, and the portrayal 
of the “Sarong Party Girl” by (white, male) expatriates in Singapore (Postcolonial 
International Relations 158-161). 
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meanings is how the consumption of this manufactured code functions as a good form 
of social control. Baudrillard states needs are “produced as a force of consumption, 
and as a general potential reserve within the larger framework of productive forces” 
(“Consumer Society” 45). Hence, production and consumption are two sides of the 
same coin; they are one and same logical process of productive forces of control 
(Baudrillard, “Consumer Society” 53). 
In this sense, the production and eventual consumption of difference in the 
form of the “Asian values” ideology provide the ruling elites a cultural relativist 
position to maintain their dominance that at the same time disguises their culturally 
specific neo-liberal values and rationality. Neo-liberalism, as discussed before, is a 
political rationality that is not confined to the economic sphere. Its normative 
reasoning organises the political sphere, governance practices and citizenship, 
constructing the state in market terms and producing citizens as rational economic 
actors in every aspect of life (Brown 693-694). Furthermore, under neo-liberal 
rationality the citizens’ moral autonomy is measured by their ability to provide for 
their own needs and capacity for “self-care” (Brown 694; Harvey 65). Today, neo-
liberalism not only operates and is dependent on information technologies and 
telecommunications, but also works on an ethics that brings all human actions and 
domains into relation with the technological economy. In the iN2015 video, the potent 
mix of neo-liberal values and traditional patriarchal ideals is best represented by 
Karen and Madam Lee. Here, Karen is depicted as an independent astute teenage 
consumer of not only conventional beauty products, but also the latest information 
technologies. Meanwhile, Madam Lee is portrayed as an active, disciplined senior 
citizen, who is not only a useful caretaker of the home, but also an ideal citizen by 
taking good care of her health, with the aid of new technologies of course.  
 97
The iN2015 video’s coding of citizens as rational economic actors with the 
capacity for “self-care” thus mirrors neo-liberalism’s propensity to transfer all 
responsibility for well being back to individuals that then perpetuates the attribution 
of personal failures to personal failings rather than to the failings of the system and/or 
structures (Harvey 76). Simultaneously, the video makes inconspicuous the larger 
context, where the neo-liberal system has failed miserably to stimulate capital 
accumulation for all (156). What it has succeeded in doing instead is to restore power 
to the economic elites, redistribute wealth in favour of those at the core of capitalist 
production, and suppressed alternative forms of production and consumption (159) or 
ways of being in the world. Therefore, the iN2015 video, by harnessing identity 
politics, specifically women as metaphors for development, codes needs and desires 
that really mirror the needs and desires of the ruling elites. 
 In her insightful dissection of the middle-class in Singapore, Nirmala 
PuruShotam, in “Between Compliance and Resistance: Women and the Middle-Class 
Way of Life in Singapore,” elaborates on the role played by women as they seek to 
reproduce the middle-class way of life for themselves and their families (127-166). 
This reproduction is at once about the “better” life, access to knowledge and 
expanding (political) choices, and paradoxically about women’s own subordination 
(PuruShotam “Between Compliance” 127). “Middle-classing” in Singapore, argues 
PuruShotam, is an on-going, complex, accumulative process that “involves everyday 
life work to ensure the continued production of upward mobility” (“Between 
Compliance” 129). According to the author, the production of upward mobility is a 
complex, interconnected range of betterment, not limited to mobility through material 
consumption but also a sense of control over one’s life. In this intricate range of 
material and ideational choices, middle-class desires and expectations can take the 
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form of housing progression (upgrading one’s home), progressive technological 
consumption, employment opportunities, wage increments and alternative voices in 
parliament (“Between Compliance” 129-131). However, this range of mobility and 
choices are often performed in accordance with the kind and degree of mobility 
constructed by the Singapore government in response to what it can deliver the people 
vis-à-vis its own political interests (PuruShotam, “Between Compliance” 130).  
 As a result, the middle-class range of mobility and choices, PuruShotam 
maintains, are negotiated and performed with reference to “shared notions about the 
limits of the possible,” guided morally by Singapore’s contradictory brand of “Asian 
values” and the “fear of falling,” that is, the “fear of loosing what has been gained and 
should continue to be gained” (“Between Compliance” 131-132). The fear of falling, 
according to PuruShotam, is mirrored in the state’s official discourse about 
Singapore’s international standing in the face of globalisation and its corresponding 
threats of “Westernisation,” “welfarism” and political liberalism. This official 
discourse is used to position middle-class women in a complicit and cyclical 
relationship with the state and patriarchy, where their needs for empowerment and 
that of their families are tied to the survival of the patriarchal state. What results is a 
self-policing situation where “women continuously reproduce a middle-class way of 
life and society, mirroring the ruling elite’s images of that class” (PuruShotam 
“Between Compliance” 159). Ironically, “Westernisation,” “welfarism” and “political 
liberalism,” constructed as “threats,” have nothing to do with the survival of 
Singapore or women, but everything to do with the survival of the ruling elites and 




Today, the survival of the ruling elites and the technological systems they 
have built are dependent on the production/consumption of information technologies 
and telecommunications, which is why the promise of control and mobility are now 
sold to citizens as achievable via the consumption of these technologies. The use of 
new media technologies and their ability to make visible and invisible contents, as in 
the case of the iN2015 video, is a clear example of how such technologies abet 
discourse in potentially shaping subjects into active consumption of their content, 
while, paradoxically, subjecting consumers under the technologies’ digital logic. 
What this means is that consumption of information technologies and 
telecommunications ultimately functions as a code of social control for all in the 
nationalist project, even as it is pitched using “difference” as part of its code. Hence, 
through the iN2015 Masterplan, ensuring consumption of information technologies 
and telecommunications for all is productive at several contradictory levels.  
At one level, the consumption of information technologies and 
telecommunications is made a measure of the “better” life for the cosmopolitan-
middle-classes, in exchange for their restraints on demands for political freedom and 
individual rights (B.H. Chua, “Consuming Asians” 9; PuruShotam, “Between 
Compliance” 127-129). At another level, consumption of such technologies is 
extolled as the means to this “better” life for the rest to aspire to, which then veils the 
market imperatives and digital logic of participation required of Singapore’s 
technological systems. The next section will look specifically at how the iN2015 
Masterplan harnesses material and immaterial means to advocate consumption of 
information technologies and telecommunications. Through its creation and 
proliferation of technologised spaces, grounded on the rhetoric of empowerment, 
control and inclusion, the iN2015 Masterplan paradoxically subordinates all users 
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under the digital logic of abstraction (general equivalence), control (surveillance) and 
participation (circulation).  
 
3.3 Consumption and the Digital Logic of Participation: The Paradoxes of Control 
The role played by information technologies and telecommunications is fundamental 
to Singapore’s ambition to be a global city. The Singapore government, apart from 
building and deploying the necessary infrastructures and technologies, has always 
ensured that its education and training systems are geared towards this ambition and, 
thus, the needs of its free market economy. The iN2015 Masterplan continues this 
well-coordinated effort, which today has mutated “from the production of goods to 
the production of innovation – that is, of new knowledge for the making of goods” or 
what is known as “perpetual innovation” (Morris-Suzuki 76). As such, the iN2015 
steering committee recommends several strategies to encourage the sophisticated and 
innovative use of the latest technologies, which will, in turn, help develop the 
“infocomm-savvy workforce” and “globally competitive infocomm manpower” that it 
needs (IDA, “iN2015 Masterplan” n.p.). Specifically, they have identified two ideal 
subjects, highlighted in chapter one, to be nurtured for the technological economy or 
what are the innovative, risk-taking, entrepreneurial technological subjects, able to 
“tolerate greater ambiguity” (IDA, “Innovation. Integration. Internationalisation” 70).  
To deliver these ideal subjects, the government, together with several “key” 
industry players have come together to fund and/or collaborate on several 
programmes targeted at developing not only the “existing manpower pool,” but “the 
next generation on which the country’s future rest” (IDA, “Drive the Future” n.p.). 
Together, the government and industry put together an S$120 million investment, 
which was disbursed through several programmes. The “Infocomm Manpower 
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Development Roadmap,” for example, entails student outreach programmes such as 
the “Infocomm Clubs” where primary and secondary school as well as junior college 
students can earn Co-Curricular Activities points by participating in the club’s 
activities, which might include competitions, mentorship and inter-school 
collaborations.24 Scholarships are also available for students keen on information 
communications and new media-related undergraduate courses, both locally or abroad 
(Sadasivan, “Grooming IT Talent”). In March 2008, another S$70 million was 
pumped into this roadmap to enhance staff training and upgrading for professionals 
already in the information and communications sectors (Lam “Innovation, 
Competitiveness and Government”). Since then, another S$125 million was injected 
into the sector in face of the 2008 worldwide financial crisis. This was aimed at 
helping ten thousand information technologies professionals to keep their job and to 
train, through scholarships, the next generation of professionals. Part of this amount 
was also meant for the information and communications industry and small and 
medium-sized enterprises to develop information and communications solutions and 
stimulate IT adoption (W. Tan “$125m Prop for Infocomm”). Then in June 2009, 
S$20 million was committed to two programmes, “iTap” and “iLead,” that will 
benefit one thousand IT graduates and professionals over two years. While “iTap” is 
open to graduate students to upgrade their skills over a broad area of information and 
communications training; “iLead” targets existing IT professionals to enhance their 
skills in specialised areas, such as application development, grid computing, green IT, 
information and communications security as well as wired and wireless networking 
                                                 
24 In June 2006, there were forty schools with Infocomm Clubs. Within a year of the 
launch of the iN2015 Masterplan, this number increased to 140 schools, totalling 
6,443 members (IDA “Singapore Powers Ahead with iN2015”). Furthermore, there 
are at least 22 primary schools, 25 secondary schools and 6 junior colleges with media 
production studios, each costing between S$20,000 and S$200,000 to build and equip 
(Luo “Media Labs in Schools”). 
 102
engineering. Beneficiaries of both programmes, in return, will have to serve out a 
bond with government agencies and companies for a period that commensurate with 
the training duration (I. Tham “Treat for Infocomm Execs”). 
To further new technologies adoption in schools, S$620 million is being spent 
on a standard operating system to link up all schools on a common platform (Luo 
“Govt to Spend $1.7b”). Of these schools, fifteen to twenty percent of them are being 
turned into “Experimental Schools” as “test-beds for the innovative use of infocomm 
in teaching and learning” (IDA, “Empowering Learners” 7). Another S$80 million is 
being spent on “Schools of the Future,” a select five percent of schools that will 
integrate information technologies and telecommunications for accelerated learning, 
while experimenting with emergent technologies. Such schools expose students to a 
broad range of technologies and applications, ranging from interactive white boards to 
3-D visualisation technology and interactive computer games (I. Tham “Schools Get 
Smarter,” “When 3-D is Better than 2-D;” Oo “It’s All Fun and Games”). Here, apart 
from the government and private companies, such as Microsoft, Singapore parents too 
are enthusiastically supporting these modern classrooms by actively enrolling their 
children in such schools.25 As highlighted by the iN2015 Education and Learning 
Sub-committee, these schools act as “beacons of innovative infocomm usage in the 
education setting, for Singapore and beyond,” which also means they “serve as 
reference sites for major infocomm companies and research institutes interested in 
creating products in the education and learning space, especially for overseas 
markets” (IDA, “Empowering Learners” 7, 24).  
                                                 
25 Microsoft is not the only company coming in strongly to support the iN2015 
Masterplan. In fact, representatives from the major information technologies and 
telecommunications industries (including gaming) are serving on the iN2015 
Masterplan main and sub-committees and/or as focus and/or working group members 
(IDA, “Innovation. Integration. Internationalisation” 4-6, 125-142). 
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To ensure that less well-off students are not left behind, the government also 
initiated the “Neu PC Plus Programme” to help needy families obtain desktop or 
laptop plus broadband access at subsidised prices.26 Overall, the iN2015 Masterplan is 
envisioned to benefit not only businesses and consumers but also the larger 
population. As highlighted by Dr Lee Boon Yang, then Minister for Information, 
Communications and the Arts: 
 
The iN2015 Masterplan is not only about economic competitiveness. We will 
also be exploring ways to ensure that the elderly, less-privileged and disabled 
can also enjoy connected and enriched lives for self-improvement and life-
long learning. This is to bridge the digital divide and create opportunities for 
all. (“iN2015: Singapore,” n.p.) 
 
On top of the “Neu PC Plus Programme,” two other programmes aid this pursuit of a 
“digitally-inclusive society” – the “Silver Infocomm Initiative” and the “Infocomm 
Accessibility Centre.” The former offers training in digital lifestyle skills to senior 
citizens so that they can stay “economically active and independent in the digital 
age.” The latter provides a space where people with disabilities are taught information 
and communications skills to “enhance [their] quality of life and employability, so 
that they can integrate into mainstream society” (IDA “‘Media Factsheets”). While it 
may seem heartening that such huge amounts of money and effort are being spent on 
                                                 
26 Only families with household income of S$2,500 or less are eligible for the 
programme. A desktop with broadband access will cost them S$285 while a laptop 
with broadband access will cost S$730. As of June 2009, 27,000 families have 
benefited from this scheme, with 7,000 PCs sold through the programme (I. Tham 
“Treat for Infocomm Execs”). Additionally, under the IDA’s “Inspire” fund 
programme, students can have the computers free of charge if they serve six to twelve 
hours of community service (Supian “IDA Now Bridging the Digital Divide”). 
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education and making Singapore a “digitally-inclusive society,” what is worrying is 
the overwhelmingly economic imperatives, the single-minded direction, the impact on 
subjectivities and exacerbation of hierarchies such endeavours have in an already 
highly-competitive Singapore. Such efforts also signify the neo-liberal rationality, 
highlighted before, that aims to make citizens ultimately active and responsible, 
through technologies, for their own well-being.  
 As the ruling elites actively encourage the adoption of these technologies, 
which is clearly working as schools and corporations jump enthusiastically on the 
new technology bandwagon, children and adults alike become immensely seduced-
compelled to leverage on these technologies.27  The compulsion to engage and 
leverage on information technologies and telecommunications works through two 
divergent yet related digital logics of participation. On the one hand, Baudrillard 
argues that information technologies and telecommunications do not alienate humans; 
rather, these “intelligent” machines integrate humans into their circuits, as the 
popularity of interactive computer games (below) shows. This is because Artificial 
Intelligence, which underpins these technologies, is devoid of passion and artifice and 
hence frees users from real intelligence, thought’s ambiguity and from their at times 
difficult relationships to the world and Others (Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil 
54-58). This seeming ability of “intelligent” technologies to remove ambiguity, at the 
same time, is abetted by the rhetoric of control underpinning such technologies. This 
sense of control is evident in the iN2015 video when Nancy is able to make 
alternative arrangements, through technology, to pick up David when her meeting 
unexpectedly ran late or when Mark is able to “foresee” the available parking lots. It 
                                                 
27 Examples of such enthusiasm, to the point of fetishistic fervour, include schools 
using wireless handheld devices and/or biometric technology to take student’s 
attendance in the name of efficiency and saving time (Luo “School Attendance 
Checks Go Digital”). 
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is no coincidence, therefore, that the ideal subjects pressed for by the iN2015 
Masterplan, those who are able to “tolerate greater ambiguity” in the larger context of 
the uncertainties and instability brought by globalisation, are technological ones. 
However, such rhetorics of control, paradoxically, obscure how the technologies 
themselves are facilitating globalisation and contributing to its ambiguities, just as the 
rhetoric of control of technologies effaces the fact that it is humans who are controlled 
by technologies.  
Intrinsic to the digital logic of participation, therefore and on the other hand, is 
the logic of control, where through the process of digitalisation, vastly varied 
phenomena are abstracted and reduced to binary codes. Within this process of digital 
abstraction is a selection system that forms hierarchies of information (Peterson 135-
137) crucial not only for the efficient and fast storage, processing and flow of data, 
but for complex systems of sorting and control. Since digitalisation enables 
“monitoring, prioritization and judgement to occur across widening geographical 
distances and … on a continuous, real-time basis … [it] encourages a tendency 
towards automation” (Graham and Wood 538). Automated surveillance and 
information systems in turn “actively facilitate mobility, access, services and life 
chances for those judged electronically to have the correct credentials and exclude or 
relationally push away others…and thereby accelerate the trend away from persons 
toward data subjects” (Graham and Wood 544). In fact, observes David Lyon, 
everyday surveillance is routine in informational societies where subjects trade 
privacy for enhanced participation in the digital market place. While this may be 
empowering for some, Lyon argues that it raises other crucial issues of the 
discriminatory means, adopted by governments and corporations, of distinguishing 
and classifying different groups of people, and how far data subjects retain control 
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over their personal data. He contends, “surveillance as social sorting … suggests that 
another, perhaps more significant digital divide is created by information rather than 
having to do with access to information … [instead, it is about] … threats to justice 
and to equality of opportunity” (“Cyberspace, Surveillance” 77-78). Although this 
may be true in many instances, I argue that the iN2015 Masterplan’s objective and 
claim to give every individual seamless access to “intelligent” technology is selective, 
not so much in terms of who the individuals are, but more so with regards to what 
their technological participation entails.  
A case in point is the iN2015 Masterplan’s S$200 million centralised National 
Electronic Health Records (NEHR) system launched in 2010, allowing patients to 
have one record throughout their life that can be shared among different doctors and 
clinics. As the iN2015 Healthcare and Biomedical Sciences Sub-committee points 
out, integrating patients health record and making them available (with a strong 
framework to protect patient’s confidentiality) across a range of healthcare providers 
will ultimately benefit patients as the system allows patients to be monitored 
remotely, receive consistent and well coordinated care and reduce medical errors in 
the process. Such a system will also help patients save time and money as “the data 
travels rather than the patients” (IDA, “Integrating Healthcare” 10). The Sub-
committee adds that making personal health records available to patients themselves 
will empower them to pro-actively manage their health in line with the current shift in 
healthcare focus from treatment to prevention. But while issues of confidentiality and 
privacy have been highlighted as areas of concern, it remains possible that patients in 
future may be discriminated against if or when their health records fall into the wrong 
corporate hands; and that mistakes may occur in data entry and/or transmission, 
affecting patients’ records, doctors’ diagnosis and insurance claims. More 
 107
importantly, what continues to be unaddressed is how much control patients will have 
over their health data, particularly in the larger iN2015 Masterplan of integrating 
information between healthcare, clinical and biomedical sciences, where greater 
access of healthcare clinical data will be made available for biomedical and 
pharmaceutical research purposes; a move that feeds the Biopolis project.28  
The Biopolis, launched in 2003 is an S$500 million purpose-built biomedical 
research hub where researchers from the public and private sectors are co-located.29 
Catherine Walby, in her analysis of the Biopolis project, argues that to realise the 
Singapore government’s ambition for a thriving biomedical industry, new 
subjectivities have to be articulated (“Singapore Biopolis”). In particular, she 
highlights how there is a shift away from the old ideal of the prudential citizen to the 
cosmopolitan, entrepreneurial global citizen; and for the test subjects, an emphasis on 
their roles as consumers rather than as donors or research objects. So in order to reach 
the iN2015 promise of having the capability to take charge and the new freedom to 
connect, innovate, personalise and create, users must first be subjected to abstraction 
and relegate control to “intelligent” machines to be actively tracked, electronically 
tagged and sorted; in other words, to be data subjects in the technological economy.  
 With the proliferation of digital spaces under the iN2015 Masterplan, the trend 
away from persons to data subjects is accelerating because subjects have to actively 
engage and leverage on digital technologies in order not to loose out on services and 
                                                 
28 This point about making healthcare clinical data available for biomedical and 
pharmaceutical research purposes was made by the iN2015 Steering Committee in 
their discussion on “Strong Clinical and Health Services Research” (IDA, 
“Innovation. Integration. Internationalisation” 82). Although the Biopolis was not 
specifically mentioned by the Steering Committee, it is important to situate the 
Biopolis within the “intelligent nation” vision, as well as in the context of the larger 
global technological economy. 
29 See JTC “Biopolis” 
<http://www.jtc.gov.sg/industrycluster/Biomedical/Biopolis/Pages/index.aspx 
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life chances. Here, subjects have to (whether they like it or not) integrate these 
technologies into their work and everyday practices, engage in perpetual training to 
keep pace every step of the way with the demands of the technologies and those of the 
technological economy, and constantly compete, upgrade, innovate and create. In fact, 
the iN2015 Masterplan’s seeming inclusiveness belies a surreptitious form of 
exclusion, that is, the inability of social and embodied subjects to not partake in its 
development and related social sorting. Two examples of social sorting come to mind. 
As Singapore tops an international Facebook usage survey, clocking more time on the 
programme than most other developed countries (Loh “S’pore Tops Facebook 
Usage”), it is becoming anecdotally clear that youths here cannot not have a Facebook 
account, especially since projects, school work and socialising are all performed 
within this digital space. The other example of social sorting is the increasing trend of 
Singapore employers expecting job seekers, including blue-collar workers, to post 
their personal data directly into database repositories, making the hiring process easier 
for the former but not the latter. For despite self-help groups rolling out basic IT 
classes to help these workers, there will be those who are disadvantaged and/or do not 
see the relevance of IT skills to the blue-collar jobs they are seeking (Luo “Wiring the 
Blue-Collar Workers”).  
 In the above cases, ensuring technological access to everyone can become a 
violent enforcement in the consumption of information technologies and 
telecommunications for some. For a technological economy, widespread access to 
information is crucial since its consumption generates jobs for the technological class, 
cost-savings and revenues for software and hardware companies, and ultimately, 
further production of technologies and their contents. However, these benefits can be 
at the expense of those who do not wish to participate in digital spaces. The Singapore 
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government’s investments and drive to digitalise the infrastructure and build the 
workforce necessary for the technological economy is also limiting education not only 
in terms of choice of sectors, but also in terms of life experiences and different ways 
of being. What this means is that who or what really gets empowered in the iN2015 
Masterplan is not every individual but the technological neo-liberal subjects and 
economy.  
The ruling elites’ investments and drive to digitalise Singapore’s infrastructure 
and build the workforce necessary for its technological economic and military 
systems, come also at the expense of education by limiting it to selected sectors. 
Specifically, digital media and entertainment, and healthcare and biomedical sciences 
are two areas identified by the iN2015 Masterplan to contribute to Singapore’s 
technological economy (IDA, “Innovation. Integration. Internationalisation” 8). The 
focus on the digital media and entertainment industry is in line with the iN2015 vision 
(which enhances the earlier Media 21 vision) to establish Singapore as a digital media 
and entertainment capital, offering “innovative content, services and technologies to 
the world” (65). To this end, the valorisation of technological subjects in the active 
consumption of information technologies and telecommunications, both symbolically 
and materially, is crucial. As the iN2015 Steering Committee points out, the three 
significant spheres needed to shape digital media and entertainment development are 
not just the development of a pervasive wired and wireless infrastructure, but also the 
widespread adoption of information technologies and telecommunications, which will 
in turn bring prices down, and turn consumers into potential producers of digital 
contents (64-65). To ensure the production of this group of consumers, the Media and 
Entertainment Sub-Committee recommends targeting children “as early as in 
kindergarten” since “early exposure to digital media can spark a youngster’s interest 
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and take root” (IDA, “Digital Marketplace” 31). To this end, interactive computer 
games have been highlighted by IDA for further development.  
In the face of interactive computer games growing popularity worldwide, IDA 
has described gaming as “a serious business” and has been, together with the Media 
Development Authority (MDA), actively promoting games development through 
funding, forming alliances of games companies in Singapore and the region, and 
hosting gaming competitions such as the World Cyber Games  (IDA “Game 
Development,” “IDA and GXA”). IDA and MDA’s objectives include helping games 
developers reach gamers faster, promoting the development of cross-platform games 
so that players can play games both at their desks and even while they are on the go, 
creating opportunities for Singapore gamers to compete with international and 
regional players, and turning gamers’ passion for the games into careers (Khoong 
“Powering-Up for Tomorrow;” Y. K. Chan “Games for Work;” Tay “Let the Games 
Begin!”). To further boost the industry, an S$28 million laboratory called the 
Interactive Digital Media Lab was set up to explore better gaming technologies (H. H. 
Chua “$28m Lab”).  
Additionally, another S$1 billion have been set aside for the industry 
(including to build the ultra-fast broadband network) on top of the S$200 million that 
has already been pumped into the media industry since 2003 (Chng “The Game is 
On”). The iN2015 Masterplan’s “Connected Games” programme is thus an aspect and 
a culmination of these efforts to turn Singapore into a hub for trading and distributing 
digital media and entertainment products. Since games are digital commodities, the 
“Connected Games” programme will provide an “always-on” platform for 
developing, managing and distributing games, content, and related services, bypassing 
the need for physical trade events. IDA claims that through this infrastructure, game 
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creators can have “a new avenue to monetise their intellectual property” and gamers 
will have a wireless, networked environment for “more engaged and pervasive” 
game-play (IDA, “IDA Invites Proposals” n.p.).  
For Kline, Dyer-Whitheford and De Peuter, the interactive computer game is 
an ideal type of commodity for the technological economy. As a product of computer 
technologies, its production typifies the youthful and innovative labour that is 
archetypal of the information society. It also embodies the qualities quintessential to 
the technological economy, which are simulation, and its role as an experiential good 
subjected to intense advertising, promotional and surveillance strategies. Moreover, 
interactive computer game is characterised by the need for constant creativity to incite 
perpetual desires as a way to build new audiences. However, Kline, Dyer-Whitheford 
and De Peuter also point out that despite gaming being marketed as a “fun,” “cool” 
and “empowering” activity due to its interactive nature and rhetoric of play (and 
passion), game development is actually strongly “shaped, contained, controlled, and 
channeled within the long-standing logic of commercial marketplace dedicated to the 
profit-maximizing sale of cultural and technological commodities” (Digital Play 21). 
So not only is the game development process mundane, relentless and even brutal, but 
by making work more like play (and hinging on gamers’ passion for the games), 
employers are able to cover up any exploitative work conditions. Furthermore, such 
rhetoric also makes invisible the free volunteer labour that is very much a part of the 
gaming industry. What this means is that the “Connected Games” wireless networked 
environment, paradoxically, also facilitates the potential exploitation of consumers as 
“unpaid creators, test subjects, expert informants, and volunteer labour” indispensable 
to an entertainment industry adept at its “representation of work as play…[and] 
conversion of play into work” (Kline et al. 201-202).  
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Gaming and digital technologies in general, nevertheless, remain seductive for 
many, due, in no small part, to their digital logic of participation highlighted above. 
But under the digital logic of participation, subjects are really relating to himself or 
herself engaging with virtuality and the programme rather than with an Other. What 
this also means, paradoxically, is that the logic of participation disguises the fact that 
consumers have to work and/or play within someone else’s framework, model and/or 
code. In other words, although desires are “positively” produced through the logic of 
the technologies, what the rhetoric promises – freedom, control and empowerment – 
remains always deferred. To further game development beyond the entertainment 
arena, there are plans by the Singapore government to fund and extend interactive 
games as teaching tools (W. Tan “Boost for Video Games as Teaching Tools”). Due 
to the interactive computer game’s amazing ability to simulate and create immersive 
environments, the use of games as training tools has long been a part of the military 
and the healthcare and biomedical sciences industry. In fact, the current “repurposing” 
of entertainment research and development, especially for national defence, brings 
interactive computer games full circle to its roots since most of the technology used in 
computer games now had its origin in military research (Hertz 204-205).  
 Even though the military may continue to fund research today, tapping into 
and modifying commercial off-the-shelf games for military purposes have become 
equally important. The benefits of this practice, as highlighted by the Singapore 
military, are three-fold. Firstly, it is a cheaper and more convenient alternative to 
engaging professional game developers for customised game contents under strict 
licensing rules. Secondly, it is a “cost-effective conduit to motivate and engage a 
game-savvy generation of soldiers in repetitive tactical thinking ‘anytime, anywhere’” 
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(Fong, “Adapting” n.p.). Lastly, it is a potent recruitment tool to “lure a younger 
generation hooked on the gaming subculture into a career” in the military (DSTA, 
“DSTA in the News” n.p.). The iN2015 Masterplan’s aim of developing the digital 
media and entertainment industry and “empower” an emerging breed of gamers, 
therefore, is also empowering for the military. In fact, as the military readies itself for 
network-centric warfare, playing computer games has become “a moral obligation ... 
in the interest of national security” (Hertz 198) and consumption of information 
technologies and telecommunications transformed into the “citizen’s duty” 
(Baudrillard, “Consumer Society” 51).30  
 In the field of healthcare and biomedical sciences, games involving 
simulations are also envisioned to benefit, for example, Singapore nurses by 
providing them with a platform to “analyse situations, develop priorities and think 
critically” before entering the clinical setting (W. Tan “Boost for Video Games as 
Teaching Tools”). Perhaps, the most infamous use of simulation in the global life and 
biomedical sciences is the Visible Human Project (VHP). A US National Library of 
Medicine project initiated in 1989, the VHP involves a pair of corpses that were 
frozen, systematically sliced, imaged, converted into computer data files, then 
reconstituted and animated to form two virtual bodies intended for clinical and 
biomedical research.31 Recognising the repository’s immense value to clinical and 
                                                 
30 I develop further in chapter five the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
iN2015 Masterplan and the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces (3G SAF).  
31 The male corpse of the VHP was a prisoner, named Joseph Paul Jernigan, on death 
row and made to “redeem” himself through this project. The female corpse was an 
unnamed 59-year-old woman whose husband donated her body to the project after her 
death from a heart attack. For an analysis on the gendered implications of the VHP 
project, and the paradox of medical imaging, see Lisa Cartwright “The Visible Man: 
the Male Criminal Subject as Biomedical Norm” (123-138), and “A Cultural 
Anatomy of the Visible Human Project” (21-43). The VHP project has since enabled 
a wide range of educational, diagnostic, treatment planning, virtual reality, artistic, 
and industrial applications. See 
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biomedical research, the School of Biological Science at the Nanyang Technological 
University (NTU) obtained the rights for an official VHP mirror to be based in 
Singapore. This they hope will make the VHP mirror at the university a “major 
biomedical digital image resource” for the “growing number of educational, 
institutional, research and industrial establishments in Singapore and the region.”32 
Catherine Walby in her book The Visible Human Project insightfully connects 
the constitutive moments of the life and biomedical sciences to the corpse. Indeed, the 
use and study of corpses have been foundational to modern western science but what 
interests Walby is the irony of the situation. Particularly, how the promise of life 
(immortality) by biomedical technologies is paradoxically premised on death, and 
how this is at the same time made invisible by both the digital characteristics of and 
the discourse surrounding the technologies. While life and biomedical sciences 
purport to be about understanding life with the promise of deferring death, its 
technologies actually operate in an inverse logic – they freeze, objectify, render and 
kill. Walby argues, the alteration of the human body into digital data through 
biomedical technologies create mechanical and limited modes of understanding 
corporeality, which in turn has profound consequences for understanding life and 
death. Implicit to Walby’s analysis of the VHP is the idea of reversibility, where 
notions of life are supplanted by digital technologies that produce deathly views of the 
body that, in turn, mechanises worldviews and ideas of life in a generalised cycle.  
  
                                                                                                                                           
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/visible/visible_human.html>. Personally, I have 
also used the VHP data for my interactive artwork, entitled Virtual Bodies in Reality, 
to comment on the changing nature of violence in digital space. See 
<http://web.mac.com/margetan/iWeb/Site/VBR.html>. 
32 See “Sun Microsystems Provides High Availability Platform for Vanguard 
Biomedical Database” <http://sysdoc.doors.ch/SUN/nanyangtech.pdf>. 
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Although Walby’s observation about abstraction is somewhat similar to 
Baudrillard’s, for the latter, the implosion of meaning in digital space is not so much 
about the digital replacing the “real.” Rather, it is about how their boundaries have 
become so blurred that it is no longer possible to tell the digital apart from the “real” 
since they have both become equally “true.” In his theory of simulacra, Baudrillard 
postulates that as societies move toward a world of simulation, reality gives way to 
the hyperreal. Here, signs do not refer back to their referents and are, in fact, taken as 
the real. The logic of simulation, hence, no longer deals with facts and/or reason; 
rather, it is based on models and/or codes (which are already implicated in particular 
perspective) that then allows for different and even contradictory interpretations. As 
Baudrillard elaborates: 
 
Simulation is characterized by a precession of the model, of all the 
models based on the merest fact – the models come first, their 
circulation, orbital like that of a bomb, constitutes the genuine 
magnetic field of the event. The facts no longer have a specific 
trajectory, they are born at the intersection of the models, a single fact 
can be engendered by all the models at once. This anticipation, this 
precession, this short circuit, this confusion of the fact with its model 
… is what allows each time for all possible interpretations, even the 
most contradictory – all true, in the sense that their truth is to be 
exchanged, in the image of the models from which they derive, in a 
generalized cycle. (Simulacra 16-17) 
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Furthermore, tied to the logic of simulation is the logic of circulation. 
Baudrillard points out that in informational spaces, the value of the message is not its 
content but its circulation, since for content to be conveyed well and quickly through 
the networks it has to be as transparent and insignificant as possible. As a result, 
desires, knowledge, actions, beliefs and pleasures have become less important in 
themselves than how they are “produced, induced, solicited, media-ized or 
technicized” (Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil 46). Therefore, the success of 
Singapore’s healthcare and biomedical sciences, as with the digital media and 
entertainment industry, depends on the active participation of the population in such 
enterprises, which convert individual and masses equally to data subjects crucial for 
the current digital form of production intrinsic to mutated capitalism. Under mutated 
capitalism’s digital logic of abstraction (general equivalence), control and 
participation (circulation), constituting humans as data subjects not only facilitates the 
integration and access of such data across different institutions and informational 
economies, but also fundamentally impact our understanding corporeality, life and 
death. Singapore, through the iN2015 Masterplan, is hence an excellent example of 
mutated capitalism, highlighted in chapter one, where social control is diffused, 
motivated, defined by market and military imperatives, and underpinned by 







3.4 The Transparency of Discourse and the Transparency of Technology: Deciphering 
Form from Content 
Returning to Walby’s analysis of the Visible Human Project, what interests her are 
also the grounding gestures that enable the project in the first place. Drawing from 
critical theory, grounding gestures here refer to acts that construct our understanding 
of the world and yet remain outside of or invisible to the world they organise and 
explain (Tyson 2006). Walby highlights the Genesis rhetoric deployed in the VHP 
project (VHP figures as digital versions of Adam and Eve) that seeks to justify the 
project in a narrative of Origin and Being, while the realistic visualisation and 
animation of dead corpses as biomedical models ground the project’s authority for 
understanding corporeality and life. These grounding gestures – the discourse around 
origin of life and the particularity of digital technologies to reanimate the dead – 
disguise the fact that the life and biomedical sciences’ promise of warding off 
mortality are constructed upon the same technologies that are implicated in threats of 
cruelty, violence and death.  
In a similar ironic vein, the Singapore enterprise, via the iN2015 Masterplan, 
secures public legitimacy for its projects through a series of grounding gestures, both 
symbolic and material, which then create a cycle of consumption of information 
technologies and telecommunications that they require. Firstly, through myths of the 
need for and benefits of capitalist development, and the deployment of the “Asian 
values” ideology, subjects are constructed, moralised and naturalised into normative 
relationships with the global restructuring process and its technologies. Additionally, 
through the rhetoric of empowerment, control and inclusion, the particularity of 
digital technology to inconspicuously monitor, search and sort are made invisible. 
Consumption of information technologies and telecommunications are actively 
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created for all that then belies the fact that interactions in digitalised spaces are 
precisely based on a complex system of control and exclusion, and that the survival of 
the technological systems are exactly based on a productive citizenry that actively 
consume these technologies.  
Apart from discourse, nevertheless, the enticement to become active 
technological subjects is further enhanced by the capability of new media 
technologies to digitally and invisibly abstract contents and to draw humans into its 
circuit through its digital logic of participation. Paul Virilio, in The Aesthetics of 
Disappearance, highlights how chronophotographic technologies are about the 
production of appearances and working through the aesthetics of disappearance, these 
technologies construct appearances and shape consciousness, which are indispensable 
to the war (and peace) machine for dissuasions, pacifications and for collective 
conformity (36-45). The gathering of ideas and “visions of a colourful infocomm 
future for Singapore” from schools and the public not only provides legitimacy to the 
iN2015 Masterplan, but by integrating these ideas with the ruling elites’ vision in the 
idealised form of the iN2015 video, any differing and negative views can be 
effectively censored and erased. At the same time, the idealised image of the iN2015 
video obscures the painful global restructuring process and the logic of pervasive 
computing to inconspicuously monitor, search, sort, and dissimulate Others. 
Furthermore, through the digital logic of participation, where users forget that they 
are really relating to himself or herself engaging with virtuality or someone else’s 
codes, which means that the promise of empowerment and control through 
technological consumption remains always deferred, a deferment that is precisely 
what is needed for the continuous consumption of pervasive computing needed for 
future waves of national IT plans. This note, or promise of more to come, is most 
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visible at the end of the iN2015 video when David ponders what else will be invented 
in the next ten years from the supposed year 2015.  
 In an interesting move by IDA, the iN2015 video Imagine Your World iN2015 
was removed from its prominent location on the iN2015 Masterplan website during 
its revamp in late June 2010. In addition, the website’s rhetoric of giving every 
individual “seamless access to intelligent technology – and with it – the capability to 
take charge” and the “new freedom to connect, innovate, personalise and create” was 
archived to digital history. Although another video iN2015: Our Journey Thus Far 
has taken the spot of the iN2015 video, this new video is much less absorbing as it 
appears closer to the many other corporate videos out there. What is compelling in the 
iN2015 website revamp, nevertheless, is the Flash animation created out of new 
images and select stills from the iN2015 video, which one mouses-over to see 
different timelines and accompanying text descriptions.33 This Flash animation 
version of the iN2015 video is called Experience iN2015 and features only two of the 
original characters in the video, namely, David the student, and Nancy the 
entrepreneur. Tobey, the expatriate is replaced by a more mature-looking man, just as 
his avatar is now a young Asian male in shirt and tie. Significant changes to the 
storyline include David now taking the school bus to the zoo and public bus home. 
Tobey now has a wife who works in Singapore as well, and children who attend the 





                                                 
33 All three versions of video and animation are available on IDA website (“iN2015 
Masterplan”). 
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On the surface, this change in content can be attributed to the negative online 
comments generated by the public when the iN2015 video was posted on YouTube.34 
I argue, however, that the changes in content of the iN2015 website and video 
(through the Flash animation), in fact, point to the potential of digital technologies to 
further manage and control the populace through its logic of interactivity, which 
paradoxically gives the users a higher sense of control. David Rodowick, in The 
Virtual Life of Film, points out that films and videos are not simply moving images, 
but provide a condition of viewing or desire for a specific kind of sight (54). In other 
words, the medium of film or video also encompasses techniques. In the case of the 
interactive screen, Rodowick observes, it encourages a new kind of sociality, new 
relations to space and time, and expectations of interactivity and control (174). What 
results is a desire to control time, not in the sense of preservation, but in the 
management of it (Rodowick 138-141). Crucially, with new media, existing spatial 
and textual media are transcoded into digital forms that then allows them to be 
manipulable and communicable through information networks. But in this 
transcoding from the analogue to the digital, the nature of representation changes 
because beneath the present image is no image at all, but information and electronic 
signals (Rodowick 125). In this sense, as interactivity increases because of the Flash 
                                                 
34 These uploaded copies are essentially the same, although the earliest (first on the 
list) to be uploaded has the most viewers (18, 821) and comments (71), which were 
mostly critical, although some viewers liked what they saw. The criticisms ranged 
from the video being “racially biased” to it being a representation of the rich. With 
regards to the technologies, the general consensus was that the technologies depicted 
were too “farfetched.” There were two comments about the safety of such 








programme, the control of the images increases as well, ironically making one see less 
than what was there before. In the incorporation of the audience feedback (if that was 
really the case), the changes to the representation of the iN2015 Masterplan hide the 
fact that the national technology policy remains unchanged and is proceeding as 
usual. This brings me back to the point made by Baudrillard, highlighted in the 
epigraph, about the intelligence of the form to hide itself in its content. So, in this 
case, the changes embodied in the Flash animation Experience iN2015 should not be 
confused with a change in the structure of the iN2015 Masterplan. 
 
3.5 Connecting Local Discourse to Past, Present and Future Discourses 
This chapter explored the conditions of possibility for the iN2015 Masterplan. 
Through its discourse, the techniques and technicity of its technologies to selectively 
make visible and invisible content, the iN2015 Masterplan sets out to shape 
consciousness and subjectivities into receiving its contents. In other words, through 
the political economy of the subject and the digital logic of participation and control, 
normative relationships with pervasive computing and the larger global restructuring 
process are encouraged and sustained. However, such coding of needs and desires, 
which is in turn productive of future waves of developments, is not limited to the 
iN2015 Masterplan. Rather, it draws from a tradition of technological discourses that 
seek to present pristine and novel images of technologies as they manifest in the 
everyday life of people.  
 The next chapter looks at the discourses surrounding the research and 
development of pervasive computing, via the visions articulated by Mark Weiser, 
whom many consider the “father” of “invisible” computing. I highlight how the 
striking similarities between Weiser’s scenario, painted in his 1991 seminal article 
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“The Computer for the 21st Century,” and that of the iN2015 video, even though they 
are almost two decades apart, are far from a simple coincidence. These similarities are 
products of the academic tradition of citation and the convention of harnessing the 
politics of everyday life to socially construct, reinforce and normalise idealised views 
of technologies. At the same time, this chapter demonstrates how, through selective 
“blindness,” Weiser’s discourse and those of his opponents are equally productive of 
future waves of research and development. In particular, despite Genevieve Bell and 
Paul Dourish’s efforts to situate ubiquitous computing in the present, in order to take 
account of the “messiness” of the technology and everyday life, their discourse 
repeats Weiser’s productive move, albeit through culturally essentialist views, 
grounded on “difference” or “alternative” views/use of the technologies. In this 
instance, even as both sets of discourses are products of their time, mainstream views 
of ubiquitous computing (embodied in Weiser’s vision in the context of America) and 
alternative views of the same technology (exemplified by Bell and Dourish’s account 
of ubiquitous computing in Korea and Singapore) form two sides of the same 
academic-technological-development coin, equally productive of future ubiquitous 
computing development.  
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Chapter Four:  




“The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They  
weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are  
indistinguishable from it” (Mark Weiser, “The Computer for the  
21st Century” 66). 
 
“The smallest of everyday objects underscores a myth of the  
absolute functionality of a completely technological world,  
beyond social contradictions and history” (Jean Baudrillard,  
“Technics as Social Practice” 58) 
 
“Each and every invention of a technical object has also been the  
innovation of a particular accident. From the sum total of the  
technosciences does arise, and will arise a ‘generalized  
accident’” (Paul Virilio, Virilio Live: Selected  
Interviews 16). 
 
4.1 “Invisible” Technologies in the Research and Development of Ubiquitous 
Computing 
Chapters two and three have shown how crucial utopian visions of technologies are 
ensuring active consumption of information technologies and telecommunications 
needed by the technological economy and military. This chapter goes back 
historically to situate the discourse around pervasive computing to highlight how the 
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vision provided by the iN2015 Masterplan did not develop out of a vacuum, but is 
part of a larger network of things, situations, choices and discourses. In particular, I 
look at the discourses surrounding the research and development of ubiquitous 
computing, and point to how these discourses ground themselves on the politics of 
“everyday life.” By connecting to the familiar, while simultaneously and 
paradoxically standing apart from the everyday and/or by evading the historical and 
social contradictions that underpin today’s information technologies and 
telecommunications, these discourses ensure the continuous research and 
development of ubiquitous computing In addition, I argue that their selective 
“blindness” to the neo-liberal values and C4ISTAR techniques and technicity 
underpinning the technology is not only productive of further technological 
development, but also indicative of how the logic of the technology is shaping the 
very thoughts and discourses surrounding ubiquitous computing research and 
development. 
 This chapter has two main sections. In the first section, I look at the visions 
articulated by Mark Weiser, whom many consider the “father” of ubiquitous 
computing. I argue that Weiser creates a seamless and empowering vision of 
ubiquitous computing through the language of the familiar and technological 
continuity, which simultaneously and paradoxically entails a discontinuity with the 
historical values, social contradictions, and techniques and technicity inherent to the 
technology. Specifically, I highlight the historical mix of techniques from liberal 
trade, scientific developments, underpinned by Enlightenment notions of progress, 
and military thoughts and strategies that structure Weiser’s discourse and prototypes, 
as well as his disavowal of Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Reality – the two 
technologies fundamental to ubiquitous computing. Drawing on Baudrillard’s 
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“Technics as Social Practice,” I point to Weiser’s selective “blindness” as a form of 
social manipulation that obscures the neo-liberal values and C4ISTAR techniques and 
technicity underpinning ubiquitous computing. At the same time, using Don Ihde’s 
“A Phenomenology of Technics,” I suggest that his desire for technologies to 
disappear deny that these technologies play the role they do in the human-technology 
continuum of relations. Both his “blindness” and disavowal then work to ensure 
ubiquitous computing’s continuous research and development.  
 Following Genevieve Bell and Paul Dourish’s critique of Weiser’s vision in 
“Yesterday’s Tomorrow: Notes on Ubiquitous Computing’s Dominant Vision” (133-
143), I extend their point on how the academic practice of citation perpetuates the 
“proximate future” tone of Weiser’s discourse not only absolving the technologists 
from responsibilities, but also providing the grounding gestures for further ubiquitous 
computing development. Nevertheless, in the second section of this chapter, I argue 
that Bell and Dourish’s attempts to account for ubiquitous computing in the present 
and messiness of “everyday life” in Singapore and Korea, reflect the contemporary 
culture of producing “difference” and/or “alternative” views and use of the 
technologies, which are themselves then productive of future waves of research and 
development. Here, I demonstrate how Bell and Dourish’s discourse in fact mirrors 
that of Weiser’s, one grounded on technology’s seamless applications in the future of 
“everyday life,” the other on its present, messy and everyday social and cultural 
appropriations. Furthermore, both discourses achieve their objectives through 
selective “blindness” to their conditions of possibility, especially the continued role of 
the military and the current neo-liberal industries in sustaining and shaping the 
research and development of ubiquitous computing. I conclude that Weiser’s 
mainstream views of ubiquitous computing and Bell and Dourish’s “alternative” 
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views of the same technology form two sides of the same technological-development-
coin and are equally productive of ensuring the continued research and development 
of ubiquitous computing. 
 
4.2 Look to the Past, Ignore the Future: Military and Neo-Liberal Techniques and 
Technicity in Ubiquitous Computing Research and Development 
Mark Weiser, in his 1991 seminal article “The Computer for the 21st Century,” sealed 
the close connection between pervasive computing and “everyday life” by articulating 
the idea of weaving information technologies and telecommunications into an integral 
and “invisible” part of everyday life (66-75). For Weiser, the most profound 
technologies were those that disappeared and became indistinguishable from the 
fabric of everyday life. Pointing to writing as “the first information technology,” he 
argued that the ability to transform spoken languages into symbolic representations 
and store them for the long term, freed information from the limits of individual 
memory (66). But what was crucial for Weiser was how writing was not only 
ubiquitous and necessary for modern life, but also the media which it sat on (from 
books, magazines, newspapers to street and shop signs, billboards, graffiti and candy 
wrappers) did not require active attention; rather they allowed the information they 
carried to be conveyed and used instantly. Therefore, Weiser saw the “real potential 
of information technology” as being able to take into account the human environment 
and “vanish into the background” (66).  
 Unhappy with personal computing that made huge demands on users’ focus, 
Weiser and his colleagues at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) instead 
proposed and built “tabs” (inch-scale machines like Post-It notes), “pads” (foot-scale 
machines like sheets of paper) and “boards” (yard-scale machines like blackboards or 
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bulletin boards) that could be distributed in the environment and yet remain 
interconnected to each other (70). Weiser stressed that these machines could be 
programmed with minimal or no Artificial Intelligence to sense and track people’s 
movements and allow access to spaces accordingly, display information, be 
interactive with or without inputs from humans, and “animate objects previously 
inert” (72). Weiser maintained that through location, scale and network such 
miniaturised information technology could be distributed and embedded into daily 
environments to provide its users with “embodied virtuality” – “the process of 
drawing computers out of their electronic shells” where data processing, analysis and 
alteration occur in the “physical world” (70). He made a distinction between 
“embodied virtuality” and Virtual Reality. According to him, Virtual Reality creates a 
world inside the computer whereas “embodied virtuality” does not seek to simulate or 
replace the world; it aims instead to “invisibly enhance the world that already exists” 
(Weiser, “The Computer” 66). 
 Weiser likened the disappearance of technologies to the “vanishing electric 
motors” at the turn of the century (70). He highlighted how from the typical workshop 
or factory that contains a single machine controlling hundreds of different machines 
(through a system of shafts and pulleys), each with its own motive force, to the 
automobile with dozens of motors and solenoids, these smaller machines work 
without each of them needing special attention. The “invisibility” of technologies, 
Weiser clarified, is both “in fact as well as in metaphor” (70). He continued to point 
out how computers today are already embedded into light switches, thermostats, 
stereos and ovens in an increasingly interconnected and ubiquitous network, similar to 
the electricity that coursed through the walls, which people used unconsciously to 
accomplish everyday tasks. At the same time, this disappearance of technology was 
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“a fundamental consequence not of technology but of human psychology,” since 
“whenever people learn something sufficiently well, they cease to be aware of it” 
(66). Consequently, Weiser claimed that by relegating computers to the background, 
ubiquitous computing made users less aware of the machines and more aware of the 
people around them and on the other ends of their computer links; its “transparent 
connections” across space and time “tend to bring communities closer together” (75). 
 To give a sense of what it would be like to live in such a world of “invisible” 
technology, Weiser painted a picture of a typical workday in the life of Sal, a mother 
and designer (74-75). Sal wakes up to the smell of freshly brewed coffee, an order 
taken by her alarm clock when it sensed her stirring. As she looks out her window 
into her neighbourhood, apart from the view, she sees “electronic trails” of time 
markers left by her neighbours as they come and go during the morning, making her 
feel connected and reassured in her neighbourhood. Similarly, looking at her 
children’s windows, she can tell that they have been up for fifteen and twenty minutes 
and are now in the kitchen. At breakfast, Sal chooses to read the conventional 
newspaper but as a quote in the business section caught her eye, she scans it together 
with the name, date, and section and page number of the newspaper with a special 
pen, which then sends a message to the paper to send the quote to her office. 
Meanwhile, she receives an email from the makers of her garage door opener, not 
only to notify her of the new manual she requested that is on its way to her, but also 
how to locate her lost manual by activating the self-tracking device on the manual 
through entering a code in the garage door opener.  
 On her way to work, Sal checks the traffic condition ahead of her on her 
foreview mirror and the food shops along the way. She decides to stop for coffee at a 
new shop to avoid the traffic jam. Once Sal arrives at her office, her foreview mirror 
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locates for her the nearest available parking lot and as she walks toward her office, the 
machines in the building get ready to log her in, completing the sequence the moment 
she enters the office. Later, Sal holds a virtual meeting with her colleague Joe in a 
virtual office pre-programmed by the two of them to give each other access to their 
respective physical location and screen contents of folders and the folders’ location. 
Sal and Joe go on to verbally discuss and share particular documents through the 
“liveboard” before the latter reminds the former to get in touch with Mary Hausdorf. 
Sal cannot recall Mary and searches through past meeting records before coming 
across Mary’s name and biographical information. Sal is thankful that Mary has left 
her biographical information on even though their meeting ended a week ago and 
proceeds to send the latter a note. Although Weiser ended his article with a quick 
mention of privacy and misuse of information concerns within the above scenario, he 
quickly suggested that cryptographic techniques can easily overcome such issues. In 
fact, Weiser argued, ubiquitous computing, by making itself readily accessible to all 
groups, may diminish computer addiction in the process, just as hacking on crystal 
sets for radio signals declined when radio became pervasive. Finally, Weiser 
concluded that the technology’s ability to make “everything faster and easier to do” 
helps to overcome the problem of information overload and, as the technology fits 
into the human environment, rather than the other way around, using computers 
becomes “as refreshing as taking a walk in the woods” (75).  
 It is remarkable how fundamentally similar the scenario painted by Weiser’s 
rhetoric and the iN2015 video are, even though they are almost two decades apart and 
originate in different countries. Firstly, both visions made women/mothers central to 
their rhetoric, which I have shown in the previous chapters is a productive way of 
harnessing the political economy of the subject to actively participate in the 
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production and consumption of information technologies and telecommunications. 
Secondly, and related to the first point, both imaginations are highly optimistic and 
similarly frame pervasive computing as positively transformative, efficient, seamless 
and empowering through the control it affords users. This sense of control and ability 
to overcome ambiguities is present in Weiser’s scenario when Sal is able to check the 
traffic condition in advance and avoid the traffic jam ahead of her while on her way to 
work, a scene repeated in the iN2015 video when Mark “foresees” the available 
parking spaces. Lastly, both scenarios are based on the “mundane” activities of 
everyday life mediated every step of the way by invisible technologies. Yet, these 
fundamentally similar visions are not simply a coincidence but a result of the 
globalisation of the computing industry and the common thread of vision within.35 For 
this section, I focus on how Weiser’s vision and rhetoric ensure ubiquitous 
computing’s continuous development by grounding itself on the politics of “everyday 
life,” which entails a series of binaries and selective “blindness” to the historical 
values, social contradictions and conditions underpinning ubiquitous computing. 
The grounding of ubiquitous computing discourse on the “mundane” activities 
of everyday life works by settling any upheavals that may arise with the introduction 
of new technologies, through the language of the familiar. So while Weiser positions 
ubiquitous computing as something new (for the future), his rhetoric creates 
normative relationships with ubiquitous computing by linking it to the old – on the 
one hand, through his idealised image of the technology as it permeates familiar 
                                                 
35 See for example the “Knowledge Navigator,” a concept described by former Apple 
Computer CEO John Sculley in 1987 and the video produced to show how software 





everyday life activities and, on the other hand, through his attempts at establishing 
technological continuity. In other words, he presents ubiquitous computing not only 
as efficient and empowering in its (future) everyday applications, but also as part of a 
“natural progression” from older technologies capable of seamlessly linking the 
mechanical and electric with the electronic. In his scenario highlighted above, this 
seamless connection between the mechanical and electric with the electronic appears 
most strongly in two particular scenes. Firstly, it shows when Sal uses a special pen to 
scan a conventional newspaper in order to get a quote sent electronically to her office; 
and secondly, when she receives an email about her lost garage door manual and how 
to activate its self-tracking device by entering a code in her garage door opener. 
Additionally, throughout his article, Weiser connects ubiquitous computing 
with writing technology, equates traditional writing media with new media, likens the 
“disappearance” of the technology to electricity and the “vanishing electric motors” at 
the turn of the century, and compares using ubiquitous computers to “taking a walk in 
the woods.” These conflations work to create normative relationships with ubiquitous 
computing by highlighting what is already familiar and/or “natural,” while 
simultaneously avoiding the historical and social contradictions that are specific to the 
technology. Information technologies and telecommunications, unlike books, 
magazines, newspapers, street/shop signs, billboards, graffiti, electricity and electric 
motors, have very different techniques and technicity. Information technologies and 
telecommunications function specifically on the digital logic of abstraction (general 
equivalence), control, acceleration and their corresponding logic of simulation, 
participation (interactivity), circulation and disappearance (highlighted in the previous 
chapters). These are logic produced by and imbued with very specific history and 
values, namely, liberal trade mixed with scientific development, underpinned by 
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Enlightenment notions of progress, the measurability and perfectibility of society, as 
well as military thoughts and strategies.  
 A closer look at the “mundane” everyday activities represented in Weiser’s 
scenario shows that they are invariably work related, which also explains the 
fundamental similarity between Weiser’s vision and the iN2015 video. This emphasis 
on work as a social and institutional frame is not new and points to how information 
technologies and telecommunications are not neutral but articulate certain values and 
priorities. Armand Mattelart, in The Invention of Communication, highlights that the 
modern concept of communication that structures today’s information society draws 
from seventeenth and eighteenth century western social projects, which entail a 
complex mix of ideas about liberal trade, scientific progress, measurability and the 
perfectibility of human society (xv). Establishing trade and communication routes 
then were argued as not only necessary for the circulation of commodities, but also to 
bring about “rational” and “good” nature as well as to “correct any inequalities” 
through the distribution of goods (Mattelart, The Invention of Communication 7-11). 
The advocacy for the free circulation of goods and labour also produced the appeal 
for a universal language – a language of “geometrical certitude” – that can pass 
unchanged and transparently from scientific into the vernacular and thus general use 
(Mattelart, The Invention of Communication 44). Furthermore, under the 
Enlightenment ideals of progress and perfectibility, movement (of goods and labour) 
became a virtue and later associated with notions of freedom and emancipation 
(Mattelart, The Invention of Communication xv, 16), while “laziness” made a vice 
(Mattelart 283), and people looked to engineering and science as the answer to this 
“better,” “happier” and “gentler” life (Mattelart, The Invention of Communication 15-
16).  
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 The rise of the technically trained elites and the alliance between 
manufacturers and positivist scientists, Mattelart continues, eventually led to new 
ways of managing societies as large industries and the “government of men” moved 
towards the “administration of things” (Mattelart, The Information Society 28). By 
1911, the perfectibility of society became the perfectibility of labour when Federick 
Winslow Taylor introduced the Principles of Scientific Management, a study that 
resulted from tracking and tabulating the movements and gestures of factory workers 
according to a time-scale, which stressed standardisation and the intensive division of 
labour for efficient and fast production. The proponents of the free-market political 
economy consequently latched on to these techniques to structure not only production 
but also consumption. Scientific management hence moved beyond the factories to 
regulate the planning and administration of everyday life, which today is advanced, 
automated and refined by information technologies and telecommunications 
(Mattelart, The Information Society 37-40; Robins and Webster 96-109). 
 Historically, the desire for measurability and perfectibility is also inseparable 
from military thoughts, strategies, and its desire for certainty and control. Hence, 
Mattelart points out, the belief in scientific progress, far from being entirely based on 
egalitarian ideals, also encompasses the era of Empire (The Invention of 
Communication xv), contradictions, embargos (The Information Society 22-23) and 
revolutionary changes in military strategies. The notion of “network,” for example, 
taken from the lace-making industry to designate the warp of fabric, moved into 
scientific vocabulary to describe the “reticulated matter of the skin,” and subsequently 
inspired Sèbastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the fortification engineer of Louis XIV, to 
physically shape the territory of France in a reticular fashion for defence and 
offensive operations. In 1802, Pierre-Alexandre Allent, an officer in the engineering 
 134
corps and Vauban’s biographer, used the term “network” in his essay on military 
reconnaissance (The Information Society 14-17). The connections between the 
development of (road, rail, telegraphic) networks and the speed and movement of 
troops, in fact, concerned Europe’s military during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century – a period that established the military practice of decentralisation under a 
single command or the consolidation of the centre with the support of the periphery. 
This is a decentralisation achieved through the strategic mobilisation of civilian 
population, through conscription and for the supply of logistics, in the preparation of 
war or what is later called “Total War” (Mattelart, The Invention of Communication 
198-203; Van Creveld 90-115).  
 Urban planning and the origins of cities, therefore, Paul Virilio points out, is 
as much the product of (the preparation of) war as of mercantilism (Virilio and 
Lotringer 19). The merger between war and mercantilism, in the form of the wartime 
economy, inaugurated the military-industrial-complex and perverted the notion of 
“civilian,” as civil and military spaces blurred in the total involvement of the 
economy in war (Virilio and Lotringer 24-25). Hence the most crucial effects of the 
military on the civilian world, argues Manuel DeLanda in “Economics, Computers 
and the War Machine,” occur not during times of war but paradoxically during 
peacetime, in its slow and subtle militarisation of civilian society inaugurated by the 
strategy of “Total War” (164-172). DeLanda, for example, points to standardisation 
and routinisation, which underpin Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management, as 
military techniques developed by the French armouries in the late eighteenth century 
and the Dutch armies in the sixteenth century, to create weapons with interchangeable 
parts and train soldiers by streamlining their movements for greater efficiency and 
central command and control, respectively (165-166). DeLanda thus maintains that in 
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the transfer of military objects to the civilian world, what is crucial in that transfer is 
the production processes behind the object, such as “the entire control and command 
structure of the military” behind the computer (168). 
 The military control and command structure is present in Weiser’s discourse 
in his equating the disappearance of technology with the single machine controlling 
hundreds of different machines, each working independently without needing special 
attention. In fact, Weiser later develops this framework of centre and periphery in his 
model of calm computing, when he co-wrote “The Coming Age of Calm Technology” 
(75-85) with John Seely Brown in1996. In this article, Weiser and Brown argue that 
since ubiquitous computing has become a “fundamental trend” (78), and as it is 
characterised by a distributed network of “lots of computers sharing each of us” (77), 
there is a need for a new approach to ubiquitous computing design to focus on 
“calmness” (79). Calm technology, according to them, engages both the centre and 
periphery of human’s attention and moves back and forth between the two. The 
periphery informs without needing explicit attention from users, yet it is “anything but 
on the fringe or unimportant” and can move to the centre when necessary (Weiser and 
Brown 79). Hence, the movement back and forth between the centre and periphery is 
“encalming,” the authors claim, because the periphery informs without over-
burdening the users and enhances their control by its ability to re-centre (Weiser and 
Brown 80).  
 Additionally, Weiser and Brown contend that by empowering the periphery, 
the technology can “enhance our peripheral reach by bringing more details into the 
periphery … [which] increases our knowledge and thus our ability to act, without 
increasing information overload” (80). Calm technology, the authors maintain, puts us 
“at home, in a familiar place,” engages “our preattentive periphery so we are never 
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surprised” and “connects us effortlessly to a myriad of familiar details” (Weiser and 
Brown 81). They claim that “locatedness” or the “connection to the world” is the 
“fundamental gift” of the periphery (Weiser and Brown 81). They conclude that 
although it seems counter-intuitive to argue that more information could be encalming 
and that the best way to accommodate more information is to attend to it less, as 
ubiquitous computing intensifies, they argue, “calm technology will play a central 
role in a more humanly empowered twenty-first century” (Weiser and Brown 85). 
 It is interesting how Weiser and Brown’s follow-up article from Weiser’s 
initial 1991 article actually establishes the need for continuous research and 
development of ubiquitous computing. At the same time, the later article also 
contradicts Weiser’s earlier claim that ubiquitous computing fits into the human 
environment, rather than the other way around, since the requirement for a new 
approach to ubiquitous computing design to focus on “calmness” suggests that it is 
humans who need to adjust to the demands of the technology. Moreover, calm 
computing’s quest to “never be surprised” signals the quest for total control that is 
very much a part of the illusion of the technology that also draws from the military 
logic of deterrence. This article demonstrates how Weiser and Brown’s model of the 
centre and periphery repeats the control and command structure of the military and its 
strategy of decentralisation under a single command developed since the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century. This is also the decentralisation that gave us the Internet 
during the Cold War, when the Arpanet structure was decentralised to ensure the 
survival of American military command and communications infrastructure in case of 
nuclear war (DeLanda, “Meshworks, Hierarchies, and Interfaces” 281). This notion of 
decentralisation that retains a central command and control now imbues electronic 
networks and netwars. 
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 In Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt observe that netwar is an emerging mode of societal 
conflict and crime adopting network forms of organisation and related doctrines, 
strategies and technologies of or adapted to the information age (6). Although some 
protagonists of netwar may aim at destruction, more often than not they prefer the 
Cold War strategy of soft power, that is, attraction and disorientation, rather than 
coercion (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2, 7). The authors further point out that netwar is an 
ambivalent mode of conflict with a dual nature (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 314) that blurs 
offense and defense, state and society, the public and private, war and peace, war and 
crime, the civilian and military, the police and military, and the legal and illegal 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 14). Netwar, a “cross-cutting meta-pattern … network forms 
of organization, doctrine, and strategy” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 20), therefore, lends 
itself equally to globalist and “autonomist” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 18), to activist as 
well as terrorist. Today, the reticulated network, highlighted above, has become the 
archetypical netwar design (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 10), and the “spider’s web” 
network, or “a set of interconnected center/periphery networks” characterise not only 
social netwars used by activists but also terrorist and criminal networks (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt 323). 
 Nevertheless, utopian views of “network” persist, such as in the notion of the 
global city. Historically, Claude Henri de Saint-Simon advanced the notion of the 
global city by combining the metaphor of the organism with mechanism to describe 
the functioning of society as a network of interconnected parts. At the same time, 
combining industrialist cause with the virtues of Christian fraternity or communion, 
Saint-Simon and his followers eventually created a new morality, where industrial 
interests in production, security and freedom of exchange joined with Christian 
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notions of spiritual bond and the idea of a single code of morality and ethics 
(Mattelart, The Invention of Communication 85-89). Under this doctrine, redemptive 
virtues imbued the productions of artificial networks, which in turn spurred the 
desires for more universalistic projects of communication (Mattelart, The Invention of 
Communication 92-111).  
Such Enlightenment notions of the efficiency and perfectibility of human 
society under a common code are also what led to the invention of cybernetics. 
Cybernetics is an interdisciplinary science proposed by Norbert Wiener, which 
brought together a wide area of research from information theory to communication 
theory and eventually biomedical science, under a standardized system of control and 
communication based on informational patterns and feedback (Wiener, Cybernetics 
11-12). Feedback in this instant is understood as a voluntary activity that needs only 
to be precise, rather than fully conscious and/or excessive (Wiener, Cybernetics 6-8), 
thus paving the way for efficient, “intelligent” machines and strategies. Weiser’s 
utopian view of a network of “transparent connections” across space/time that brings 
communities closer together is, thus, historically connected to such Enlightenment 
notions of scientific progress and the perfectibility of human society under one 
language and/or code. It is, at the same time, inseparable from and a product of 
military thoughts and strategies.  
Furthermore, Weiser’s rhetoric cannot be separated from futurology, a practice 
that took hold in the 1960s, especially in the United States, of technical forecasting 
designed to announce and/or explain humanity on the cusp of a new information age 
and, thus, a new universalism (Mattelart, The Invention of Communication 73). 
Futurology works through three different sources, namely, the social sciences, 
forecasting expertise and geopolitics, and is historically part of the Cold War strategy 
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of soft power and its tactic of attraction or disorientation, highlighted above. Mattelart 
recounts that in 1955, the Congress for Cultural Freedom based in Berlin (secretly 
funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) held an international conference in 
Milan on the topic “The Future of Freedom,” where a hundred and fifty-six political 
and intellectual figures gathered to discuss the notion of a “free society.” The agenda 
focused on the “end-of” discourse – the end of ideology, end of politics, end of social 
class and class struggle, end of protest by intellectuals and political commitment 
(Mattelart, The Information Society 73-74). A community of thought eventually 
emerged with sociologist Daniel Bell leading the pack with his concept of the “post-
industrial society,” astutely keeping his distance from the notion of “post-capitalist 
society” expounded by Ralf Dahrendorf (Mattelart, The Information Society 78). In 
the post-industrial society forwarded by Bell, technical decision-making is valorised 
and posed as rational, in opposition to ideology that is positioned as emotional. 
Furthermore, Bell placed scientists and technologists as being above and beyond the 
influence of ideology, playing key roles in monitoring social changes and anticipating 
futures in order to minimise indeterminacies in the economic future (Mattelart, The 
Information Society 79-81).  
 The desire for certainty by governments and corporations eventually led to the 
growth of networks of forecasting professionals and the proliferation of 
interdisciplinary think tanks, many of whom subscribe to renowned forecaster Alvin 
Toffler’s idea of “interactive democracy,” that is plans to “cable cities and make them 
the locus of experimentation in techno-communitarian ideology” (Mattelart, The 
Information Society 89).36 The role of the United States as a superpower ensured the 
                                                 
36 Toffler also introduced the idea of the “prosumer” in his 1970 book Future Shock, 
where he describes the merging role of the producer and consumer, an idea repeated 
by the iN2015 Masterplan, highlighted in the previous chapter.  
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spread of faith in these scientists and academics as well as in the “positive” roles of 
networks and information in bringing the world together as one. These post-
industrialist utopian discourses, nonetheless, belie the fact that the lexicon of “global-
ness,” historically connected to industrialist (and Christian) interests, is fundamentally 
about freeing production and consumption from the constraints of national boundaries 
(Mattelart, The Information Society 91-98). Today, they continue to provide the 
grounding gestures for the current neo-liberal project of globalisation. Adopting 
revolutionary language, the neo-liberals paradoxically position “network” as a 
“symbol of the end of contradiction between labour and capital” (Mattelart, The 
Information Society 143), even as its doctrine of the free flow of information entails 
vital control of networks and a new strategy of global security aimed at universalising 
the model of “free-market democracy” (Mattelart, The Information Society 133). 
 Weiser’s account of a seamless ubiquitous computing set in the future, 
therefore, depends on a selective “blindness” towards the complex and contradictory 
history that shapes today’s information technologies and telecommunications. For 
Mattelart, “[e]ach new generation of technology revived the discourse of salvation, 
the promise of universal concord, decentralized democracy, social justice and general 
prosperity. Each time, the amnesia regarding earlier technology would be confirmed” 
(Mattelart, The Information Society 23). I argue, however, that perhaps more than 
amnesia, Weiser’s selective “blindness” (intended or otherwise) borders on social 
manipulation that is productive of sustaining the research and development of 
ubiquitous computing. In “Technics as Social Practice” Baudrillard argues that every 
technical practice is a social practice “soaked with social determination;” yet, through 
the guise of autonomy, technical rationality and objectivity, “it doesn’t present itself 
as such” (51). Technical practice separated from social reason, Baudrillard continues, 
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becomes a form of social manipulation, a “technique of the social” and hence a 
“technics of power” (“Technics as Social Practice” 51).37  
Baudrillard observes that while the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were 
marked predominantly by avant-garde techniques, the twentieth century was marked 
by that of military techniques. I have shown that as we enter the twenty-first century, 
military techniques and technicity, inflected with neo-liberal values and rationality are 
sustained by the proliferation of information technologies and telecommunications. 
The result is a technical culture, which grounds itself on and, simultaneously, 
perpetuates a set of myths about technics. Such myths, according to Baudrillard, 
include the notion that technical knowledge is itself rational, democratic and virtually 
accessible to all through academic training and practice. In other words, technics are 
neutral because they are about the mastery of nature, as opposed to the culture, 
economics and politics that are concerned with social mastery and organisation. 
According to this myth, it follows then that individuals, regardless of their social 
origins, are more naturally and spontaneously equal before technics than they are 
before culture and art (Baudrillard, “Technics as Social Practice” 52).  
 However, Baudrillard reiterates that technics is “simultaneously an instrument 
for restructuring social relations and for elaborating a social rationale” (“Technics as 
Social Practice” 53). He gives the examples of how technics concerns itself politically 
with exclusive control of advanced (military) technological operations to the profit of 
power, and how it discriminates culturally through artificially created hierarchies 
between disciplines and within the practice of research and science itself – 
differentiations based on status and not of knowledge or concrete differences in 
                                                 
37 Baudrillard makes a distinction between “techniques” and “technics” even as both 
are soaked with social, cultural and political determinations. I believe in his use, 
“techniques” suggests processes and/or procedures, while “technics” points to 
principles, beliefs and/or reasoning. I will keep to his distinction here. 
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knowledge (“Technics as Social Practice” 53-54). This system of technical order and 
“parallel system of acculturation” (55), according to Baudrillard, works through a 
constructed division between “transcendent” and “banal” technics, where “everyday 
life, maintained (for strategic reasons) in a state of technical infantilism, would 
benefit from high tech ‘effects’” (“Technics as Social Practice” 56). Therefore, 
through the tactical division of technics into the sublime and banal, the fictional and 
everyday, the prestigious and the obsolete, and between the educated culture and mass 
culture, advanced technics removes itself from everyday technical practice, identifies 
itself with science, in order to act as the imagery of banal technics of consumption, as 
a promise of total technological revolution (“Technics as Social Practice” 57-58).  
 Weiser’s positioning of ubiquitous computing as part of the future imaginary, 
just as in the iN2015 video, hence, serves as a promise of total technological 
revolution, whereby the technologically “new” ubiquitous computing is “perceived as 
aesthetics and desired for privileged consumption” (Baudrillard, “Technics as Social 
Practice” 59). So even as Weiser connects ubiquitous computing to the “everyday 
life,” his technology (and his discourse) is simultaneously set apart from the everyday 
– as advanced technology (techniques) produced by scientists and/or  technologists 
not for (of) today but for future mass consumption. I argued earlier that Weiser’s 
attempts at technological continuity link ubiquitous computing with some older 
technologies, which paradoxically entail a selective discontinuity with history. What I 
want to add here is how his endeavours at technological continuity, ironically, also 
entail a further disavowal of the very technologies immediately associated with and 
fundamentally required by ubiquitous computing, that is, Virtual Reality and 
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Artificial Intelligence.38 
 In order to set ubiquitous computing apart as avant-garde or technologically 
new, Weiser maintains a conscious distinction between ubiquitous computing and 
Virtual Reality and claims that ubiquitous computing requires little or no Artificial 
Intelligence. These are strategic moves, since at the point of Weiser’s writing, Virtual 
Reality, and especially Artificial Intelligence were facing setbacks and mounting 
disenchantments over their respective claims and promises. However, while Weiser 
asserts he is uninterested in creating artificial worlds, such as the way in which 
Virtual Reality creates a world inside the computer, his alternative of “embodied 
virtuality,” based on freeing information and liberating data from their “electronic 
shells,” paradoxically creates the world as a computer. Weiser’s liberation of 
information into the “physical world,” in fact, entails the spread of artificiality to all 
facets of everyday life. This dispersal of data or the logic of simulation, together with 
the logic of abstraction and participation, as I have highlighted in the previous 
chapters, leads to the implosion of meanings.  
 To reiterate Baudrillard’s observations on simulation, it is no longer an issue 
of the replacement of “the real world” since simulation no longer deals with the logic 
of facts and the order of reason (Simulacra and Simulation 16); rather, under its logic, 
what is “real” and “virtual,” “true” or “untrue,” have become inseparable, reversible 
and ambivalent. As information “devours its own content … [and] devours 
communication and the social,” Baudrillard points out, the resulting hyperreality of 
communication and meaning, the more real than real, devours reality (Simulacra and 
                                                 
38 Virtual Reality here refers to computer-simulated environments that can encompass 
any of the following: simulation, interaction, artificiality, immersion, telepresence, 
full-body immersion, and network communication (Heim). Artificial Intelligence 
denotes the branch of computer science studies that aims, through programming, to 
create machine “intelligence” or “intelligent” agents that can perceive their 
environments and take actions accordingly. 
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Simulation  80-81). Contrary to Weiser’s assertion that “embodied virtuality,” as 
opposed to Virtual Reality, does not simulate the “real world” but “invisibly 
enhances” or “augments” the existing world, simulation does not happen only with 
full-scale Virtual Reality. Through information technologies and telecommunications 
and the data subjects they create, as well as the Cold War strategy of attraction or 
disorientation that pervades networks, simulation is already structuring everyday life. 
Consequently, Weiser’s ubiquitous computing intensifies, rather than reduces, the 
proliferation of the virtual and artificial. 
 Moreover, the notion of ubiquitous computing “invisibly enhancing” or 
“augmenting” the existing world also assumes the technology itself as a benign or 
transparent medium that manifests its positive or negative aspects, depending on how 
it is used. This seeming neutrality of the technical object, however, is a consequence 
of the grand myths of technics that sets it apart from the everyday life. As Baudrillard 
contends, “the technical objects do not intervene directly in everyday life, as 
mediators of structures and new social functions, but on the contrary as already 
mediated by the idea of technology and by a metaphysics of rationality” (“Technics as 
Social Practice” 58). Don Ihde, in “A Phenomenology of Technics,” observes that our 
embodied (bodily) relations with technology often moves between the desire for the 
transformative power of technology and the contradictory desire for total transparency 
to escape the material limitations of technology (137-159). This contradictory desire 
for power and transparency overlooks and neglects the transformational effects of 
technology in human-technology relationships as the technology “disappears” into the 
human (truly “become me”) (Ihde 139-140). He gives the example of writing as a 
technology and points to how writing embodies hermeneutic techniques. So what is 
referred to, is referred to by and through text, while what is presented is a “world” of 
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the text. Writing as a technology then transforms experiential structures, including 
how we take the phenomenon of reading for granted (Ihde 145). Then the crucial 
question from here is what sorts of hermeneutic techniques are embodied in 
writing/reading through ubiquitous computing? 
I have shown earlier that Weiser’s notions, rhetoric and prototypes of 
ubiquitous computing are already mediated not only by a global capitalist work ethics 
that draws from the time of the Enlightenment, but also its military rationality and 
strategies. Paul Virilio, in Pure War, highlights the importance of disappearance to 
war, traditionally in the military strategy of camouflage, and increasingly today, in its 
tactic of dissimulation, of making bodies and people disappear (101-102). Weiser’s 
rhetoric of freeing information from “the limits of individual memory,” overcoming 
information overload through fast and efficient technologies, making ubiquitous 
computing interactive with or without human inputs, and animating objects previously 
inert, are all fundamentally about taking humans out of the cybernetic loop, a 
discourse that corresponds perfectly to the military’s vision machines. As highlighted 
in chapter two, vision machines are capable of automated perception, which then 
replace humans from the realm of direct observation. In this replacement, human 
intentionality, responsibility and control are removed, in contradiction to the promise 
or myth of control. Because vision machines function on absolute speed, they leave 
little time for human reflection, leading to “blindness” not only to the mediation of 
their existence under C4ISTAR techniques and technicity, but also to the violence of 
its speed and accidents (Virilio, The Vision Machine 59-73). This is a central paradox 
that Don Ihde also highlights, that in the extension of the sense of sight, there is a 
simultaneous reduction of sight (“A Phenomenology of Technics” 142), and in 
making technology invisible – relegated to automatic, semi-automatic, pervasive and 
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mundane contexts (“A Phenomenology of Technics” 156) – we fail to take notice of 
how they are making humans disappear. 
 Apart from Weiser’s paradoxical disavowal of simulation and Artificial 
Intelligence, in his contention that the ubiquity of information technologies and 
telecommunications diminishes computer addiction, Weiser fails to take into account 
that these technologies in fact draw humans into their electronic circuits. As pointed 
out in the previous chapter, these technologies do not alienate human participation but 
draw them into an interaction with the programme and virtuality, precisely because it 
is not based on a genuine communication with an Other. Crucially, by arguing that 
ubiquitous computing’s transparent connections across space and time bring 
communities closer together, Weiser also ignores the point made by Virilio 
highlighted in the epigraph that every technology invented also creates an accident 
along with it. Moreover, in today’s context of globalised networks and distributed but 
interconnected technologies that function on absolute speed, these accidents are no 
longer local but general (Virilio Live 29-32).  
 In his pursuit of perpetual technological development, Weiser’s vision of a 
positively transformative, efficient, seamless and empowering ubiquitous computing 
that simultaneously blinds itself to the negative implications of the technology, is a 
result of the larger technical culture, underpinned by neo-liberal values and C4ISTAR 
techniques and technicity. As Weiser himself ironically points out, the disappearance 
of technology is a fundamental consequence of human psychology, since “whenever 
people learn something sufficiently well, they cease to be aware of it” (“The 
Computer for the 21st Century” 66). Just as Weiser’s account of a seamless ubiquitous 
computing embodies a history of military thoughts and strategies, from total war 
tactics of “empowering” the fringes, to the Cold War practice of futurology, his 
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discourse also reflects the dot-com optimism of the late 80s and early 90s. This is why 
there are many fundamental similarities between Weiser’s vision of ubiquitous 
computing and his contemporary Steve Mann’s views on wearable computing. In the 
next section, I look at how the current changing contexts within universities are 
shaping the discourses around ubiquitous computing. I argue that the seeming 
neutrality of technical knowledge is present not only in the utopian views of pervasive 
computing, but also pervades reflexive academic practices, equally aimed at ensuring 
the technology’s continued research and development.  
 
4.3 Locating the Present: Rethinking the Politics of “Everyday Life” under Neo-
Liberal Academic Practices 
In an interesting article called “Yesterday’s Tomorrows: Notes on Ubiquitous 
Computing’s Dominant Vision,” Genevieve Bell and Paul Dourish, two famous 
contemporary researchers of ubiquitous computing, proposed developing a “’ubicomp 
of the present’ which takes the messiness of everyday life as a central theme” (133). 
They argue that the dominant vision provided by Weiser in his 1991 foundational 
article and his subsequent writings, not only articulated a research agenda, but also set 
the rhetorical tone for ubiquitous computing that has been adopted by researchers ever 
since.39 This, the authors maintain, is problematic since Weiser’s vision is not only 
dated and culturally specific to America, it also creates normative social relationships 
where the problems of today are perceived, framed and understood through the lens of 
the past or future but not the present (Bell and Dourish 133-134). Through a mixture 
of content and textual analysis of 108 papers published in Ubicomp conferences 
                                                 
39 For example, following Weiser’s line of argument, Donald Norman in The Invisible 
Computer states that “the best computer is the one that is hardly noticed; we should 
notice our tools only when they give trouble.” For Norman the ultimate appliances are 
those embedded in clothes and implanted in bodies (243).  
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between the years 2001 and 2005, Bell and Dourish demonstrate that forty-seven 
percent of them are framed, just like Weiser’s articles, in the “proximate future,” that 
is, a future tense that is “just round the corner.” The authors point out that this is not 
surprising since a quarter of these papers cite Weiser’s article, and some even claim 
his vision as fundamental for their own work (Bell and Dourish134). Drawing from 
the works of Bruno Latour on the sociology of science, Bell and Dourish paint a 
larger context of how the academic practice of citation builds intellectual networks by 
acknowledging intellectual debts, while providing defensible positions for the writers 
as they align their research with existing paradigms and traditions (135). This practice 
is significant, as it has created a prevalent situation of framing pervasive computing as 
exploring prototypes for the future of everyday life, even as the research has been 
around for over two decades. Furthermore, as the authors point out, this “proximate 
future” framing not only absolves the technologists from responsibilities for the 
present, but also continually places ubiquitous computing achievements out of reach, 
while simultaneously “blinding” it to current and/or culturally different techno-social 
contexts and practices (Bell and Dourish 134).  
Bell and Dourish then provide a competing view by arguing that ubiquitous 
computing is already here but has simply taken an appearance different from that 
which Weiser had envisioned. They give two case studies drawn from Singapore and 
Korea to support this position. Through official reports and statistics, the authors look 
at the network structure of Singapore, such as the penetration of mobile phone 
ownership and usage, the wireless hotspots landscape, the success of the cashless, 
“seamless and safe” transportation system, the Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system 
in controlling car movements, the smart-postal network, the CCTV coverage as well 
as internet and broadband sign-up rates, and argue that Singapore already represents a 
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kind of ubiquitous computing environment (Bell and Dourish 136). Bell and Dourish 
contend that ubiquitous computing must be understood also in terms of the collective 
and community practices that have emerged around the technology. Specifically, they 
give the example of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and how the Singapore government 
strategically deployed the Internet and cell phones as a way to distribute critical 
information and provide “cyber alternatives” to the on-going Ching Ming festival. 
Online “shrines” were created to encourage the Chinese community to venerate their 
dead at home rather than at the cemeteries to cut the transmission rate of SARS (Bell 
and Dourish 136). The authors also give the examples of how the Singaporean 
community relies on mobile phones for everything from basic communication to 
social interaction and political engagement, which have in turn spawned all sorts of 
short-hands and speed in text messaging and the use of Singlish (colloquial English) 
(Bell and Dourish 136). Moreover, drawing on several official documents from 
Singapore’s Ministry of Information and the Arts, Censorship Review Committee and 
National Internet Advisory Committee, Bell and Dourish surmise that although 
Singapore’s development as an “intelligent island” raises issues of content, 
surveillance and control, its “collaborative nature,” “clearly articulated principles,” 
“transparency,” “vision of cyber wellness… [that] incorporates a sense of personal 
responsibility” make “collective practice, rather than a set of discrete individual 
actions” an important new frame for understanding ubiquitous computing (137-138). 
Similarly, Bell and Dourish point to Korea as another key example of 
technological vision rooted in society and/or the collective, opposite to Weiser’s 
imagination based on the individual. As examples, they highlight the views of the 
Korean Minister of Information and Communication to make Korea “a society where 
all the people can enjoy the benefits of state-of-the-art IT at anywhere and anytime,” 
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and the close co-operation between the Korean government and large information 
technology and network corporations to realise this vision (138-139). The authors also 
note that in contrast to the urban sprawl of America, the heavily populated high-rise 
buildings in Korea make wiring up households relatively simple and faster, resulting 
in cheap and fast Internet connections for the Koreans. Therefore, Korea’s physical 
infrastructures coupled with its cultural practices have enabled it to be one of the most 
connected countries and leading broadband markets in the world (Bell and Dourish 
138). At the same time, Bell and Dourish observe, because Koreans consider their 
homes as extremely private, socialising, including gaming, has a place also in public 
spaces like Internet cafes and gaming parlours. Korea, hence, displays different 
technological usage patterns, in terms of the almost equal numbers of people who 
connect to the Internet at home and on the move, as well as the number of women 
slightly outpacing men in the consumption of mobile Internet experiences (Bell and 
Dourish 138).  
Bell and Dourish argue that their instances of ubiquitous computing in 
Singapore and Korea are different from other studies of daily life in “non-Western” 
environments because of their departure from the “paradigmatic examples of 
ubiquitous computing” set by Weiser’s vision (139). The authors insist that by 
focusing on current practices outside research laboratories and recognising the 
diversity of cultural, social and political contexts, ubiquitous computing research and 
development can avoid the “misguided” visions of the technology provided by “1950s 
science fiction’s speculations about twenty-first century clothing and gender 
relations” (Bell and Dourish 139). The authors contend that their “alternative and 
contemporary views” of ubiquitous computing, based on the “messiness of every day 
practice,” take into account the relational dynamics between people and technologies, 
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including the fact that infrastructures “must be actively maintained, and relationships 
to them must be continually negotiated” (Bell and Dourish 139). 
Correspondingly, they give three examples to highlight how the cultural 
production of infrastructures and attitudes toward the infrastructures are themselves 
messy and full of social contradictions. In the first example, they point to the way 
Ghana customises second- or third-hand vehicles imported from Europe for their 
specific context, including setting up networks of makeshift car mechanics across the 
country. Secondly, they highlight how the International Classification of Diseases in 
providing a common infrastructure for the collection and comparison of mortality 
statistics worldwide, ends up complicating funding for AIDS research because AIDS 
deaths are typically recorded as the result of other infections, even as the patients’ 
compromised immunities were due to AIDS. Finally, the authors show how power 
sources, with their varying voltage, frequency and socket shapes, highlight the 
complex realities of uneven distribution of production and consumption of power 
supplies and the unequal relationship between “Western power” and the “developing 
world” (140).   
Insisting on looking at the present and messy interaction between 
infrastructure and everyday life, Bell and Dourish maintain that Weiser’s seamless 
ubiquitous computing is too much “a tool for labour” and too narrowly “directed 
towards the needs of corporate efficiency” (141). Instead, the authors see ubiquitous 
computing as reflecting existing social and cultural needs and hence “a site of social 
and cultural production” (141). Recognising how technologies “both exploit and 
reproduce a range of power concentrations and relationships,” the authors suggest that 
Weiser’s vision of a clean, gleaming and seamless ubiquitous computing 
infrastructure and adoption amounted to a sort of “fundamental technological 
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determinism at work … one in which technology would play a liberating role” (Bell 
and Dourish 142). Alternatively, Bell and Dourish conclude, seeing ubiquitous 
computing as inherently messy, heterogeneous and “characterized by improvisation 
and appropriation,” makes the technology “a resource for active engagement,” which 
the authors surmise is “not a depressing conclusion” but “a rather wonderful thing” 
(142). 
 I agree with Bell and Dourish’s assessment that Weiser’s “proximate future” 
tone provides a common problematic framework of ubiquitous computing research 
and discourse, which absolves the technologists from responsibilities for the present. 
In fact, I contend that such “proximate future” framing testifies to the desire for the 
promise of the technology to be deferred, just as in the discourse of the iN2015 
Masterplan, because it is productive of future waves of research and development. As 
noted by Robbins and Webster, in Times of the Technoculture, the futurists’ tactics of 
discontinuity with the past and present as well as their discourse of an amazing 
technological future, serves them well as many of them often benefit from 
engineering and/or financing their predictions into existence (233). One can argue that 
this is certainly the case with Weiser. Nevertheless, while I applaud Bell and Dourish 
for departing from Weiser’s seamless account of ubiquitous computing by 
considering the social contradictions and messiness of the present relationships 
between infrastructure and everyday life, their discourse begs a closer look.  
 It seems that Bell and Dourish’s attempts to situate ubiquitous computing in 
the present, to take into account the messiness of the technology and everyday life, 
depart from Weiser’s productivist moves. On the contrary, I argue that their discourse, 
in fact, mirrors Weiser’s discourse. Bell and Dourish’s arguments, bordering on 
culturally essentialist views, are themselves productive too of future waves of 
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research and development, grounded on the basis of “difference” or “alternative” 
views on the use of ubiquitous computing. Written at a time of growing 
disenchantments with the “West” and academic focus on “alternative” views to 
“Western” thoughts, which in turn coincides with the economic rise of the “East,” 
their article opens up new spaces of enquiry for what they seem to imply as a 
stagnating “Western” ubiquitous computing research and development. Crucially, 
Bell and Dourish’s discourse, focused on “difference,” reflects the current impact of 
globalisation and its technologies on certain academic practices. 
 The production of “difference” that is tied to globalisation, neo-liberal values 
and the capability of information technologies and telecommunications to simulate 
difference for consumption, has pervaded the universities. Bill Readings argues, in 
The University in Ruins, that globalisation is changing the character of the university 
into a trans-national bureaucratic corporation in the pursuit of “excellence” (3). He 
contends that excellence, used to gain general assent for this change, however, is an 
empty signifier that applies equally as a criterion to radically different areas without 
them sharing any specific qualities or effects (Readings 23-24). In this changing 
university culture, Readings points out, students are treated like consumers and what 
is taught and/or researched matters less than the fact that they are done excellently 
(Readings 11-13). Readings maintains excellence meets the needs of technological 
capitalism and its production and distribution of information, by allowing for “the 
increasing integration of all activities into the generalized market, while permitting a 
large degree of flexibility and innovation at the local level” (32). Excellence, hence, 
functions as an “integrating principle that allows ‘diversity’ (the other watchword of 
the University prospectus) to be tolerated without threatening the unity of the system” 
(Readings 32). 
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 In other words, the proliferation of information technologies and 
telecommunications, underpinned by the neo-liberal logic of communication and 
circulation, are structuring universities to focus on producing “difference” as a 
commodity in the context of the globalised capitalist system of competition. As 
highlighted before, the notion of communication is fundamentally about 
unencumbered flow of goods and services and freeing production and consumption 
from national boundaries. Under this logic of circulation of information, where the 
value of the message is its circulation rather than its content, relative difference 
becomes liberated, exalted and equated with regulated exchange. Furthermore, in the 
current context of the knowledge production economy, academics and researchers 
become immaterial labour responsible not only for producing informational and 
cultural contents for consumption, but also for producing subjectivities in the active 
consumption of such contents to ensure future productions.  
 Bell and Dourish’s ironic comment on Weiser’s vision of ubiquitous 
computing as a sort of “fundamental technological determinism at work,” fails to see 
that their socially deterministic discourse is equally the result of the logic of 
circulation generated by the proliferation of information technologies and 
telecommunications. In their simple reversal of valorising banal (everyday) 
techniques against Weiser’s supposed advanced (scientific) techniques, they leave the 
structure of information technologies and telecommunications untouched, assuming 
their techniques as fundamentally neutral. So even as the authors highlight how 
technologies reflect existing social and cultural needs (socially not neutral), their 
argument that these technologies can also be a “resource for active engagement,” 
improvisation and appropriation, assumes the technology as inherently benign, and 
repeats the neo-liberal logic of technological empowerment that is structuring the 
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technologies and that also constitute their discourse. 
Through a series of simple binaries and reversals that sidestep the 
complexities of history and the current globalised and interconnected world, Bell and 
Dourish pitch their discourse against Weiser’s (and those of his followers) by 
positioning Weiser’s views as American and their views as “non-Western.” 
Romanticising the “East versus West” divide, they valorise “Eastern” practices as 
based on the collective, with close public/private sector co-operations, as opposed to 
Weiser’s “Western” individualism.  But as I have discussed in the previous chapter, 
especially in the case of Singapore, the notion of the collective, embodied in the neo-
Confucianist “Asian values” discourse, is a commonly-used ideology by the ruling 
elites to regulate subjects needed by the technological systems, and maintain their 
dominance at the same time. Ironically, this “Asian values” ideology is driven by a 
western neo-liberal rationality that consciously constructs “difference” as a 
commodity for the globalised capitalist system.  
 In celebrating “difference,” Bell and Dourish fail to see that collectivism and 
the rhetoric of inclusion (by both the Korean and Singapore governments) belie a 
surreptitious form of exclusion – the inability of individuals to not partake in the 
technological development. Returning to the “seamless transportation” of Singapore 
that they highlighted, the Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system, which requires all 
vehicles in Singapore to have a unique in-vehicle identification (IU) unit and smart 
(cash) card, has made the collection of toll seamless for the government but at the 
expense of the public. Not only do drivers have to ensure they have sufficient funds in 
their cash card (and therefore a bank account to top up their cash cards), faulty cash 
cards and IU units have resulted in wrongful penalties for drivers when the gantries 
fail to detect these units. Moreover, the ERP system has not led to a reduction in 
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congestions on the roads, but has instead led to more gantries to be erected all over 
the island (including expressways), as drivers find alternative routes to travel to work. 
This has also impacted on non-drivers as public transport fares increased to account 
for the toll. Moreover, as the transport system becomes automated and cashless, 
commuters have to pay for their trips on buses and trains via an EZcard, which 
automatically deducts cash amounts when the cards are tapped on units upon 
embarkation and disembarkation. On several occasions, commuters have been over-
charged because the automated fees have been wrongly calculated (or not updated) 
according to distance travelled and existing road conditions. 
Bell and Dourish’s emphasis on Korea as one of the most connected and 
leading broadband markets in the world, even as they denounce Weiser’s ubiquitous 
computing as too narrowly “directed towards the needs of corporate efficiency,” fails 
to take into account the social contradictions that result from Korea’s (corporate) 
Internet successes. Here, Internet access is seen as benign, if not an empowering 
condition, as the authors seem to rejoice in the different technological usage patterns, 
especially the fact of women slightly outpacing men (another axis of “difference’) in 
the consumption of mobile experiences. Consequently, Bell and Dourish pay no 
attention to how the universal Internet access in Korea is generating Internet addiction 
to the point of users dropping dead from exhaustion after playing online games for 
days on end, and where compulsive Internet use has become a national issue, 
requiring aggressive counter-measures (Fackler “In Korea, a Boot Camp Cure for 
Web Obsession”). 
 Concurrently, Bell and Dourish’s simple dichotomy of “Eastern” collectivism 
and “Western” individualism ignores the globalist desires for a single collective based 
on industrialist interests and the belief of Christian fraternity (highlighted in the 
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previous section), which ground the very notions of communication and network 
developed in the west. The authors also neglect the close public/private sector co-
operations between the military and economy since the time of “Total War,” which 
eventually enabled the American development of information technologies and 
telecommunications during the Cold War. Nick Turse, in The Complex, points out that 
as early as World War II, American corporate economy and military bureaucracy 
merged and eventually became a full-blown military-industrial-complex after the war. 
Today, the military-industrial-complex has not only intensified, but also diversified to 
become “the Complex.” The case of Singapore’s iN2015 Masterplan is a clear 
example of the mutually constitutive relationship between the state, military and 
industry. 
 Apart from disavowing the military connection, another public/private sector 
co-operation Bell and Dourish disregard, directly connected to their own discourse, is 
that between industries and universities.40 I have highlighted earlier Readings’ point 
on the impact of globalisation in changing the character of the university. 
Specifically, the impact of globalisation is re-structuring the ways universities 
worldwide conduct their research as well. These include the proliferation of networks 
of research and development alliances among universities, and partnerships between 
universities and industries, in a distributed knowledge production system (King 53). 
In this context of increased market relations, universities such as those in Singapore, 
subjected to dynamic competition, are adopting more trans-disciplinary approaches to 
research problems, mobilising and not simply managing creative solutions, 
incorporating greater diversity of sites and types of knowledge production 
                                                 
40 At the point of their writing, Genevieve Bell is from Intel Corporation, Santa Clara 
and Paul Dourish is from the University of California, Irvine. One of them is a 
computer scientist and the other a cultural anthropologist (“Yesterday’s Tomorrow” 
134). 
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(geographically, culturally), and demonstrating a more reflexive, rather than 
objective, tone as the research projects become more dialogic (96-99). Bell and 
Dourish’s research should be situated in this context.  
 However, despite the trans-disciplinary and reflexive approaches, ubiquitous 
computing research and development, nonetheless, enacts selective “blindness” to 
what they include and/or exclude in their discourses. The positioning of Weiser’s 
vision as the dominant vision of ubiquitous computing ignores earlier and other 
sources of similar visions. Although Bell and Dourish note briefly the “misguided” 
visions of the technology in 1950s science fiction speculations, their commentary is 
on the (lack of) accuracy of these speculations in terms of fashion and gender 
relations, and not on the relationship of these speculations to Weiser’s and/or their 
own discourse. In fact, before the 1950s, the speculative fictions of the early twentieth 
century, especially those of H.G. Wells, already express visions of incorporating 
technologies invisibly into everyday life, and in much more ambivalent tones.41 
Selective (disciplinary) “blindness” in this case, enables the repetition of existing 
paradigms to be couched as “new” and, hence, “progressive.” This is productive in 
terms of the premium placed on predictions in academic-technological-development 
discourse, closely linked to the practice of futurology.  
 Although Bell and Dourish position their discourse as “alternative” to 
Weiser’s rhetoric by focusing on the present and messiness of ubiquitous computing 
and everyday life, their discourse mirrors Weiser’s rhetoric in many ways, in terms of 
                                                 
41 Although critics of Wells have accused him of advocating utopian views of science 
and the future, I agree with John Hammond’s assessment that Wells is much more 
ironic in predicting (not advocating) the future (H. G. Wells 163-174). In particular, 
“The Time Machine” touches on the issue of class divide in the extreme and the 
eventual reversal of the master-slave relationship (The Complete Short Stories 9-91). 
“The Crystal Egg” pre-empts Internet addiction and tells the story of a man who 
escapes from his unhappy family by gazing into a special crystal that allows him to 
see into another space/time (625-643). 
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the kinds of “mess” or social contradictions they choose to ignore and highlight. In 
their examples of Singapore and Korea, they focus extensively on the positive and 
sidestep the negative aspects of ubiquitous computing as it structures the everyday life 
of the respective communities. Notably, in their three examples of the messy 
interaction between infrastructures and everyday life, none of them is of information 
technologies and telecommunications. In fact, their discourse on power sources and 
its uneven distribution reflecting uneven power relations, fails to acknowledge the 
role of ubiquitous computing exacerbating the situation.42 As the next chapter shows, 
the military’s demand for power is intensifying as they prepare for network centric 
warfare, underpinned by pervasive computing. Here, commercial and academic 
developments form easy sources that can be appropriated for military use. 
 Therefore, through a series of simple binaries, Bell and Dourish ignore the 
intricate and mutually constituting relationships between academia, industry and the 
military, which provide the conditions of possibility for their (as well as that of 
                                                 
42 Other concerns of pervasive computing is highlighted in the 2002 study on the 
potential impact of pervasive computing on human health and the environment, 
commissioned by the Swiss Center for Technology Assessment (TA-SWISS). Some 
of the areas of concern that emerged include non-ionizing radiation (NIR), which is 
expected to increase and impact users who wear these numerous NIR transmitters to 
greater exposure. What is significant is also how non-users of pervasive computing 
will be involuntarily exposed to these invisible electromagnetic fields. In addition, 
stress can result for users from poor usability, misuse, disturbance and distraction. For 
non-users, coping in a society that has become dependent on the technology and 
where the infrastructure presents itself as permanent, can be equally stressful. Market 
imperatives might also restrict freedom of consumers and patients, where they are 
compelled to use the technology and/or co-finance it against their will (Hilty, Som 
and Köhler 853-874). Ecologically, the need for scarce raw materials for the 
production of electronics and the total energy consumption to support the 
infrastructure may increase sharply, as per pollution, cross-contamination and the 
problem of toxic waste disposal. For the latter, the small “invisible” microelectronics 
that are embedded in increasing number of everyday items will complicate waste 
separation as it makes it difficult for users to distinguish electronics from non-
electronics. This will lead to social conflict not only on the personal level but also 
international level when “rich” countries ship their waste to “poorer” countries for 
sorting and disposal (Hilty, Som and Köhler 871; Köhler and Erdman 831-852).  
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Weiser’s) discourse and research and development. At the same time, their overly 
optimistic focus on social and cultural practices, neglects, like Weiser, the 
transformational effects of technology in human-technology relationships. Recently, 
the Singapore government announced plans to build a dual four-lane road to ease 
congestion that will tear into nearly a quarter of an eighty-six hectare cemetery, 
known as the Bukit Brown cemetery. This cemetery is significant historically and 
ecologically as it is the burial ground of many of Singapore’s famous pioneers dating 
back to the 1890s, and habitat to eighty-five bird species, a few of them already 
endangered. Despite numerous protest and petitions, the urban planning in land-scarce 
Singapore is proceeding. Now, there is a state-funded effort, joined by individuals, to 
document graves, map and recreate the entire Bukit Brown universe online (Yen 
“Bukit Brown Battle 2.0”). Since the time of the 2003 experiment with online shrines 
that Bell and Dourish used to make a case of Singapore as a kind of ubiquitous 
computing environment, the current virtual conservation effort and transfer of 
heritage online indicate the expanding virtuality that is reshaping the population’s 
perception of space, heritage and sense of history.  
 
4.4 The Intimate and Reversible Relationships between Science, Technology, 
Industry and the Military  
This chapter has shown how the discourses of Weiser and Bell and Dourish are 
essentially the same even as they appear as oppositional. Bell and Dourish’s discourse 
is encouraging active subjects in the messy daily improvisation and appropriation of 
ubiquitous computing, just as Weiser’s discourse is producing active subjects in the 
seamless consumption of the same technology in future everyday life. In this instance, 
Weiser’s mainstream views of ubiquitous computing and Bell and Dourish’s 
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“alternative” views of the same technology form two sides of the same academic-
technological-development coin, grounded on “everyday life,” to ensure the 
technology’s continuous research and development. At the same time, by 
simultaneously and paradoxically neglecting the historical and social contradictions 
underpinning ubiquitous computing in the current context of “the Complex,” they 
obfuscate the fact that C4ISTAR techniques and technicity are structuring their 
discourses and pervading everyday life, and academic research and development 
becoming increasingly appropriable by the military.  
 In fact, looking at the connections between science, technology and the 
military, Mendelsohn, Smith and Weingart in Science, Technology and the Military 
observe a confluence in their ideologies. They highlight how in politics, all military 
preparations are presented as a direct response to threats from outside with science 
and technology merely serving as necessary tools. Simultaneously, scientific ideology 
depicts its involvement in the military and corresponding destruction as only playing 
a patriotic role and ultimately for “truth” and the “betterment” of humankind. In 
actuality, the authors argue, science and technology are not mere tools, but have an 
active role in shaping the thinking and actions of political and military leaders; they 
enable the potential for arms race, which is contingent more upon scientific and 
technological development rather than upon political and military strategies 
(Mendelsohn, Smith and Weingart xii-xx). The mutually constitutive relationship 
between science, technology and the military is played out today, where the 
postulation of threats of annihilation (real or imagined) under the legitimation of 
military preparedness, carries over to science in a reciprocal expansionist connection, 
blurring the lines between scientific knowledge and military relevant knowledge. As 
the authors further point out, today it matters little if technology is developed for 
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civilian or military purposes; in fact, economic development and weapons 
development source from the same general stock of scientific and technical 
knowledge that may be utilised and expanded for a wide range of applications and 
purposes, both civilian and military. What results, significantly, is a “circulation of 
elites” in science, technology, the military and industry, where despite differences in 
style, goals and interests, there remain strong commonalities that allow the elites’ 
mobility across the different sectors (Mendelsohn, Smith and Weingart xviii-xxi). 
 The next chapter returns to Singapore to look at the circular and mutually 
constitutive relationships between science, technology, industry and the military. 
Through the mutually constitutive relationship between the iN2015 Masterplan and 
the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces (3G SAF), I highlight their common 
underpinning neo-liberal values and C4ISTAR techniques and technicity. I emphasise 
how structures put in place politically, historically and under the rubric of “Total 
Defence,” a complex militarised network and circulation of elites is created. In fact, 
this chapter situates the iN2015 Masterplan as part of the larger militarisation of 
Singapore society. I argue that “Total Defence,” historically linked to total war 
strategies and Cold War tactics, not only makes everyone potentially a target for the 
ideological state apparatuses, but also the target of attacks as a result of the blurring of 
military and civilian spaces. Therefore, this chapter argues that the iN2015 
Masterplan has set up the necessary architecture, produced highly technologised 
spaces and created insatiable needs for technological consumption using the rhetoric 
of empowerment, control and inclusion, but what got “liberated” are the technological 





Chapter Five:  
The Politics of Science, Technology, the Military and Industry: The Paradoxical 
and Reversible Relationship of the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces 
(3G SAF) and the iN2015 Masterplan 
 
“We make no enemies. We want no enemies. We have no enemies. 
But if you want peace, be prepared for war…” (Lee Hsien Loong, 
Second Minister of Defence (Services) [currently Prime Minister of 
Singapore], qtd. in K. W. Chin, “Singapore: Threat Perception and 
Defence Spending in a City-State” 198). 
 
“We have to invest in defence so that we do not need to go to war. 
There is nothing more tempting to a potential aggressor than a soft 
and easy target … If we want peace, we have to prepare for war” (Dr 
Tony Tan, Deputy Prime Minister and Co-ordinating Minister for 
Security and Defence of Singapore [currently President of 
Singapore], “Committee of Supply Debate” n.p.). 
 
“The technical environment is our hyper-production of obsolescent, 
fragile, polluting objects… An economy of stable products and of 
good objects is unthinkable: the economy only develops by hiding 
danger, pollution, usury, deception, obsession. The economy only 
lives through the suspension of death that it maintains through 
material products – by renewing the available stockpile of death, 
even if it must arrange it by overcharging for safety: blackmail and 




5.1 Connecting the iN2015 Masterplan and the 3G SAF: An Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I showed how academia, industry and the military are 
intimately intertwined and productive of ensuring the continuous research and 
development of ubiquitous computing or pervasive computing. I also demonstrated 
how this perpetual technological development, achieved through the discourse of 
transparent relationships with the technology, simultaneously entails a selective 
“blindness” to the paradoxes of pervasive computing and its conditions of possibility. 
This chapter looks at the circular and mutually constitutive relationships between 
science, technology, industry and the military in the context of Singapore, in 
particular, through the close connections between the iN2015 Masterplan and the 
Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces (3G SAF).  
 In this chapter, I highlight how the specific science and technologies identified 
and promoted by the iN2015 Masterplan for research and development are the same 
ones ensuring the current transformation of the Singapore Armed Forces into a 
network-centric, knowledge-based fighting force. Likewise, the subjects extolled and 
nurtured by the iN2015 Masterplan not only provide overt support for information 
technologies and telecommunications industries, but also covert buttressing for the 
manpower needs of the 3G SAF, pointing to the reversibility of technologies and 
technical knowledge. Therefore, looking at the discourse underpinning the 3G SAF, I 
focus on how neo-liberal values and C4ISTAR techniques and technicity structuring 
the iN2015 Masterplan are equally present in 3G SAF, and argue that far from being a 
simple coincidence, their synchronised logic point to the larger militarisation of 
Singapore society. I emphasise how through structures put in place historically and 
under the rubric of “Total Defence” promoted by the government and tasked to every 
citizen, complex militarised networks are created, resulting in a circulation of elites 
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sharing and perpetuating the same neo-liberal values and C4ISTAR techniques and 
technicity. 
This chapter contains two main sections. In the first section, I concentrate on 
the discourses surrounding the current transformation of SAF into a network-centric 
fighting force. Through a close reading of some of the 3G SAF monographs, I draw 
out the neo-liberal values, C4ISTAR techniques and technicity structuring their 
discourse. Specifically, I show how the 3G SAF’s latest doctrine of Integrated 
Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2), establish transparent and 
“empowering” relationships with C4ISTAR technologies through the rhetoric of 
control, speed, accuracy and “intelligent” technologies that obscure the limits and 
vulnerabilities of these technologies. Simultaneously, by valorising innovative, risk-
taking technological subjects, the 3G SAF discourse, paradoxically, entail a careful 
monitoring of deviating thoughts. Highlighting the paradoxes and reversals 
underpinning the 3G SAF arguments and logic, I contend that their discourse not only 
repeats the violence and neo-liberal logic underpinning C4ISTAR technologies, but 
also turns a blind eye to their limitations, putting everyone at risk.  
 In the next section, through parallels between the 3G SAF and the iN2015 
Masterplan discourse and the same kind of subjects they commend, I contend how 
structures put in place historically result in the circulation of military elites, the 
convergence of military, economic and political power, and the perpetuation of their 
neo-liberal values, as well as C4ISTAR techniques and technicity. Under the rubric of 
“Total Defence,” which draws from Cold War and total war strategies of tactical 
decentralisation of control, civilian populations are mobilised in the active production 
and preparation for war. In the intimate and reversible links between 3G SAF and the 
iN2015 Masterplan, I argue that the iN2015 Masterplan is an operation in the 
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production and preparation for war rather than a purely economic exercise. 
Furthermore, I point to how, under the rubric of “Total Defence,” security, like 
consumption, becomes a political technology to ensure the continued production of 
deadly products and systems, exacerbated by the development of the war economy. 
Finally, drawing from Virilio, I maintain that deterrence is less about peace than about 
the perpetuation of war. What results from such exercises are a critical disappearance 
of civilian space and the clearing away of radical singular thought – thought’s ability 
to decentre itself and see how it is its environment that thinks it. “Total Defence” 
eventually, turns every citizen into a target not only of defence, but also for attack. 
 
5.2 The Technology and Business of Network-Centric Warfare in the Third 
Generation Singapore Armed Forces (3G SAF) 
In 2004, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) embarked on a journey to modernise and 
transform itself into a Third Generation (3G) network-centric fighting force. 3G SAF 
aims to integrate the Singapore Army, Republic of Singapore Air Force and Republic 
of Singapore Navy under a single platform for real-time information sharing and 
communication in order for the various services to fight as a single unit. Awed by the 
television images of U.S. attacks on Iraqi targets in the Gulf War that prompted this 
revolution in Singapore’s military affairs, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) aspires 
not only to keep pace with precision strike technologies, but also to keep on building 
up and maintaining its technological capabilities (Defending Singapore 10).43 In this 
planned technological build up, nurturing “quality people able to master the new 
                                                 
43 MINDEF oversees not only the SAF but also, among others, the Defence Science 
and Technology Agency (DSTA), the Future System Architect group (FSA) and the 
DSO National Laboratories. For details of the MINDEF structure and websites to the 





technologies and weapon systems … to fight smart” also becomes a crucial 
component of SAF’s current transformation (MINDEF 10-11). Hence, accompanying 
this transformation underway in Singapore’s military are a series of monographs in 
the SAF journal Pointer, extolling changes to conventional military mindsets, 
leadership development, and new strategies for fighting urban warfare, encapsulated 
in their latest doctrine of Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2). 
This section of the chapter looks at some of these SAF monographs to pinpoint the 
neo-liberal values, and C4ISTAR techniques and technicity underpinning the 
discourse, as well as the paradoxes and reversals operating in their arguments and 
logic. 
 In the first monograph to signal Singapore’s revolution in military affairs, 
entitled “Creating the Capacity to Change: Defence Entrepreneurship for the 21st 
Century,” Choy et al. argued that conventional military mindsets based on the 
hierarchical command and control structure can no longer deal with today’s complex 
strategic environment (1-64). These complexities, the authors pointed out, arise from 
emerging trends tied to globalisation and advances in information technologies and 
telecommunications. Now, due to the proliferation of increasingly powerful 
computers and advances in life sciences and nanotechnology, the authors contended 
that radical appropriations of such technologies can have disconcerting effects and 
gave the U.S. September 11, 2001 tragedy as an example, where an economic 
superpower with billions to spend on defence cannot prevent the terrorist operation 
that costs “less than a million dollars” to mount, underlining the asymmetry of power 
that turns “conventional understanding of power on its head” (Choy et al. 3). At the 
same time, the authors continued, with the effects of globalisation, such localised 
problems can and do have significant global effects. Therefore, Choy et al. suggested 
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changing the military organisational strategy to deal with such complexities – a 
strategy that operates on a dual nature of effectiveness and efficiency embodied in the 
old hierarchical order, together with the capacity to change encapsulated in the “free-
wheeling and innovative” culture of business entrepreneurship (3-4, 13-15). 
 Key to the authors’ ideas is the creation of “Capacity to Change” (C2C) spaces 
modelled after complex adaptive system, where leaders and managers provide 
avenues and the right conditions for multi-disciplinary interactions and creativity to 
occur “naturally,” without them imposing pre-conceived solutions (Choy et al. 3-4, 
13-15). In this new (business management) organisational strategy, the new roles of 
leaders and managers then are to equip their followers and employees with “the right 
set of cognitive skills to operate in a complex world,” and to ensure their people are 
“motivated, even inspired … to dream, innovate, experiment and try” (Choy et al. 17). 
However, instead of cooperation, the authors envisioned the C2C spaces to be 
competitive environments, an “internal market” to test ideas (Choy et al. 18), where 
only the best ideas get resources for implementation (Choy et al. 24). They argued 
that instead of the “smooth coordination of cooperation … competition generates 
energy and unleashes creativity” (Choy et al. 28). Therefore, the authors pointed out, 
at the heart of the C2C model is the “spirit of defence entrepreneurship,” where the 
“defence entrepreneur” is “empowered with the right skills to take advantage of this 
creative space” to “independently search and explore, and ultimately define, his own 
parameters and chart out his own directions” (Choy et al. 18, 21). They added that 
placing the “individual aspirations” of the defence entrepreneur in a “primary place,” 
a new “moral code” can be struck between the individual and the organisation, where 
his or her passion can be harnessed as the “engine for organisational change” (Choy et 
al. 23).  
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 Within the C2C space, Choy et al. added, personnel can tap on other 
knowledge and perspectives through external networks, which the authors argue are 
important for MINDEF to guard against intellectual lock-ins and for spawning 
“interesting hybrids” (31). These external networks also enable complex “real-world 
problems” to be broken up and distributed throughout the networks, like distributed 
computing, and be solved beyond the confines of neat disciplinary boundaries (Choy 
et al. 32). Furthermore, harnessing external networks, like multi-disciplinary think 
tanks, academic institutions, individual thinkers, et cetera, provides a “‘virtual’ 
organisational expansion” needed to deal with the expanding definition of security 
today (Choy et al. 34). The authors concluded that the example of the U.S. failure to 
prevent the Al Qaeda attack was due to the former’s bureaucratic and hierarchical 
command and control structure, as opposed to the latter’s flexible and complex 
adaptive system. Choy et al. then point to DARPA’s “flat organisation” and 
innovative culture (56-57), as well as its “ability to adapt to rapidly changing 
environments and to seek and embrace opportunities in both technology and 
processes” (60) as a “thought-provoking model” for 3G SAF (46). 
 Following closely from the first monograph, therefore, the second monograph, 
entitled “Realising Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control: 
Transforming the SAF” (1-58), set out the new doctrine for 3G SAF, which 
fundamentally argued for leveraging on C4ISTAR technologies. In the second 
monograph, Lee et al. highlighted how advances in information technologies and 
telecommunications are creating new operational concepts as exemplified by the 1991 
Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo campaign and the recent Ops Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan. Additionally, the authors pointed to the declining cost of information 
technologies and telecommunications and the “innate strength of our people” – youths 
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“bred on a diet of the Internet and are experts at computer games” – as key reasons to 
pursue the doctrine of Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2) to 
guide SAF’s current transformation (Choy et al. 7). The authors stressed that IKC2 is 
an information-led revolution in military affairs as it harnesses the latest C4ISTAR 
technologies to “do things faster and better” for network-enabled, knowledge-based 
warfare, predicated on the “Observing, Orienting, Deciding, Acting” (OODA) loop, 
while simultaneously aiming to disrupt the enemy’s OODA cycle (Choy et al. 12-13).  
 Fundamental to the OODA loop and structuring the IKC2 architecture are a 
pervasive “always available” network, networks of interconnected sensors, automated 
“intelligent” agents, and a database of “past knowledge” and models that provide the 
commander and decision-maker “contextualised information” and support for “better 
decisions, quicker” (Choy et al. 15-16). In short, hoping to exploit technological 
advances in pervasive computing, precision strike technologies and new fighting 
concepts, Lee et al. proposed the following code for 3G SAF – “see first and see 
more,” “understand faster and better,” “decide better and faster” and “act faster and 
more decisively” (14). The authors claimed that IKC2 “will enhance the quality of 
decisions through the new knowledge that is created through collaboration in the 
information domain.” They declared that IKC2 “reduces uncertainty,” results in better 
and faster decision-making that, in turn, enables a “higher tempo of operations” (J. 
Lee et al. 17). In fact, the authors argued that the possibilities with IKC2 are endless, 
depending on how innovatively exploited the technologies are in the war-fighting 
processes. Drawing from the experiences of the U.S. Navy, they highlight that the 




To assuage apprehensions among the military personnel, Lee et al. stressed 
that C4ISTAR technologies play “supporting” roles to the commander, who remains at 
the centre of the information cycle and decision-making process (J. Lee et al. 19). 
Sensors will act as “eyes and ears of the war-fighters,” while “intelligent data fusion 
algorithms” will provide the commander with “a consistent battlefield picture” and 
“heightened situational awareness” (J. Lee et al. 19-20). Additionally, “intelligent 
software agents” will consolidate and “interpret” the various relevant data to “produce 
knowledge” and help the commander plan his mission (J. Lee et al. 20-21). The 
commander can also use “advanced” war-gaming and simulation tools to generate and 
evaluate possible courses of action to help him come to a final decision (J. Lee et al. 
22-23). The authors contended that this “man-man-machine interaction” is crucial to 
the command and control system, where “the machine ‘presents’ knowledge to the 
commander to enable him to make critical decisions” (J. Lee et al. 23). They stressed 
that network-centric warfare, through digitalisation and networking, allows the 
sharing of information across platforms, and enables synchronisation among the 
services and dramatically increases combat power and speed (J. Lee et al. 45). It 
reduces uncertainty because of the network of sensors providing fast and “accurate” 
information, and facilitates key decisions on “when to engage a target and which 
shooter/weapon combination maximises the probability of a kill” (J. Lee et al. 47). 
Network-centric warfare, therefore, they argued, provides commanders increased 
control in dictating the sequence of battle and nature of engagements (J. Lee et al. 48). 
In terms of the range of hardware and software needed by the system, the authors 
proposed an “enterprise architecture” based on “plug and play” characteristics to 
allow for “device independence;” in other words, “no restriction on the types of 
applications and devices that can be “plugged” into the system” (J. Lee et al. 26). 
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 As part of the IKC2 implementation, Lee et al. restated the need for a more 
flexible and flatter command and control structure, where top-down strategies co-exist 
with bottom-up experimentations to enable a new culture of “innovation and 
intelligent risk-taking,” and where failures are tolerated and experimentation 
encouraged (35).  In fact, the authors pointed out that because technological 
developments have historically and fundamentally shaped new and more “effective” 
ways of fighting, it is the “thought and innovativeness of the individual” that will be 
crucial for the 3G SAF transformation (J. Lee et al. 30-33). Hence, experimentations, 
the authors argued, are critical since network-centric operations are “non-intuitive” (J. 
Lee et al. 48). Additionally, Lee et al. argued the 3G SAF’s transformation requires 
the adoption of a “new strategic deterrence that relies not so much on retaliation as on 
prevention” and which, “demands a balanced application of both civil and military 
power to shape behaviour” (51). Under this “new” strategy of deterrence, human 
actions are recognised as having both physical and psychological effects that can 
potentially affect everyone and not just the enemy. Moreover, the authors pointed out, 
these effects cannot be isolated and can be cumulative over time, across different 
realms from military operations to the economic arena, influencing national and even 
international politics (J. Lee et al. 53). Hence, Lee et al. called for “effects-based 
operations” that are “focused on actions and their links to behaviour;” in short, on the 
“human dimension of war” such as will and shock (52). To achieve “effects-based 
operations,” the authors proposed creating a cycle of actions and reactions that is 
repeated many times in different contexts from crisis, to war and peacetime 
interaction (J. Lee et al. 53). “Effects-based operations,” the authors concluded, 
should be the ultimate aim of network-centric operations, where a series of outcomes 
can be identified and, in turn, feedback for planning, effective mobilisation of diverse 
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knowledge and expertise, as well as for agility and co-ordination in operations (J. Lee 
et al. 54-58). 
However, not everyone in the SAF is enamoured by the IKC2 doctrine.44 One 
notable response from Lieutenant (LTA) Ng Pak Shun, a Weapons Systems Officer 
argues that the use of technology to dictate future battles can backfire due to the 
technology’s inherent limitations (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). Quoting from Virilio, he 
contends that technological innovation is not an “unambiguous good” and that it is 
crucial to recognise the “possible side effects of a technology-driven military 
revolution” (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). Although technology has played a key role in 
warfare development, Ng points out that the use of computers throughout the history 
of Cold War and beyond, where machines are replacing humans in information 
gathering and decision-making processes, are not “necessarily successful examples of 
military transformation” and have had “detrimental effects on the U.S. military” 
(“Realising IKC2” n.p.). Such problems and failures of technological development, 
Ng argues, must be placed alongside the usually acknowledged successes, in order to 
understand the cost and benefits of military innovations (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). 
Turning his attention to the IKC2 architecture, Ng counters that pervasive coverage of 
                                                 
44 For example, in monograph four, “Spirit and System: Leadership Development for 
a Third Generation SAF,” K. Y. Chan et al. provided a historical account of the first 
and second generation SAF, their respective philosophies, values and management 
styles (1-82). They highlighted the tensions that developed in the 1990s, when SAF 
adopted market-based, commercial human resource practices and systems in its 
design of military careers, before arguing for a balance between spirit (embodied in 
the first generation SAF) and system (exemplified by the second generation SAF) to 
meet the needs of the current SAF transformation. Although the authors urged SAF 
leaders to acknowledge and embrace the “postmodern military,” they added that the 
leaders have to develop critical thinking, challenge their own thoughts and 
assumptions, not follow blindly others’ models, concepts and doctrines (32-38), and 
finally, not let the “market-driven occupationalism” seep into SAF, risking its 
“institutional soul” (42). This monograph seems to indicate that the 1990s divide may 
still be present today but more crucially that not everyone in SAF is convinced by the 
IKC2 doctrine or at least the neo-liberal values underpinning the doctrine. 
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the battle-space as highly unstable and unreliable, since the military might ignore 
other sources of non-machine generated information and disinformation, either 
because of limitations of the technology or caused by the enemy, affects the reliability 
of information (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). Ng brings in examples from the Vietnam War 
and wars in Iraq to highlight how active and passive disinformation successfully 
worked against the technologically advanced U.S. military (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). 
Moreover, he argues, the instances of “friendly fire” incidents in both Gulf Wars 
attest to the fallibility of machines (“Realising IKC2” n.p.).  
Relying on machines to provide contextualised “knowledge,” Ng argues 
ignores the assumptions built into the specifications of the technology. He highlights 
the nuclear war game developed by RAND in the 1950s as an example of how war-
gaming exercises easily skew the military’s perception of reality and distort human 
understanding of warfare with dire consequences. In the RAND war-game simulation, 
there was an inherent bias for conflict over cooperation because it was modelled on a 
zero-sum rationality that disregards “non-rational” choices and the changing 
dynamics during battle. Apart from technology shaping strategic thinking through 
human interactions with machines, Ng contends that language too is part and parcel of 
the technology (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). Technology-specific discourses, he 
highlights, have a way of shaping thoughts with their built-in assumptions and 
rationale, which “necessarily excludes people who do not understand or agree” with 
them. He gives the example of how the use of various acronyms in nuclear warfare 
confined the discussions of military leaders to a fixed set of concepts and reason, 
without leaving space for certain questions and values to be asked and expressed. In 
Addition, Ng highlights how abstract theories such as “strategic stability” and 
“collateral damage,” remove military thinkers from reality by shaping their thoughts 
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according to “surviving weapon strength instead of human deaths” (“Realising IKC2” 
n.p.). 
The use of “intelligent” agents to help commanders make “faster and better 
decisions,” as envisioned by IKC2, Ng continues, paradoxically, subject humans 
under the speed of information transmission, compressing the time-frame for warning 
and human decision-making, which in turn creates costly mistakes. Hence, Ng draws 
attention to the “danger of military accidents” as “humans are forced to react more 
and more quickly to high-speed technological systems” (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). 
Thus, Ng cautions, the trumpeting of speed, accuracy and consistency of machines is 
problematic since it encourages humans to become more reliant on these machines for 
technological output and eventually for decision-making. This then demands 
“absolutely error-free computations of machines that are themselves built by fallible 
human beings,” which means “soldiers will live and die on the best guess of 
programmers” (“Realising IKC2” n.p.). Finally, Ng points out, the success of the 
IKC2 structure rests on the assumption of the enemy having more inferior technology 
and/or functioning under the same logic of technological reliance. This rationale, he 
argues, fails to take into account that the disparity in technology is precisely what 
drives the enemy to asymmetric warfare.  
Although Ng’s points are made in the context of the military and its use of (the 
wrong) technology, I want to appropriate his arguments and extend it further to 
discuss the 3G SAF as well as the iN2015 Masterplan. The great trust in digital 
technologies and telecommunications, whether by 3G SAF or the iN2015 Masterplan, 
belies the fact that computers are imperfect and prone to mistakes. Sources of system 
failure, whether in a centralised or decentralised architecture and apart from human 
errors, can range from incorrect or incomplete system speculations, hardware failure, 
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hardware design errors, software coding errors, software design errors, network 
failure, and any unusual combination of the above (Borning 122-123). In fact, 
software developments are based on an evolutionary process, where failures are 
expected in order to lead to corrections (Parnas 221-227). Lee et al. seem to be aware 
of this fact when they appeal for failures to be tolerated in the new culture of 
innovation and risk-taking. Yet their calls for risk-taking, and for fully exploiting 
information technologies and telecommunications to see the endless possibilities of 
IKC2, ignores the chance that any arbitrary creations can result in programmes too 
complex for humans to grasp, and where minor discrepancies in code can have 
catastrophic results (Parnas  220-221).   
Furthermore, as failures in software remain latent until they are uncovered, 
this then creates the need for incessant testing and simulations, with no guarantee that 
coding errors will be discovered, especially in large, complex systems (Ornstein 27-
29). In the IKC2 architecture, the chances of the commander, at the centre of the 
information cycle, dealing with disinformation without discerning it or realising it too 
late, are relatively high. Moreover, as Ng points out, the enemy can also cause 
disinformation, which means that the network of “ready-to-use knowledge” available 
“anytime, anywhere and to anyone,” in turn, demands a spiralling need for 
cryptographic techniques and number-crunching power. DeLanda, in War in the Age 
of Intelligent Machines, highlights that information technologies and 
telecommunications have given rise to intelligence acquisition, which in turn created 
the need for counter-measures. The proliferation of wireless networks, in particular, 
with its broadcast aesthetics, has placed a premium on the development of 
cryptological techniques (DeLanda, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines 180). 
DeLanda points out that just as military needs for miniaturised components affected 
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the evolution of the computer, their demand for cryptanalysis, in turn, necessitates 
increased speed (War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, 213-214) and the intensified 
development of Artificial Intelligence. Although currently, human analysts are still in 
the loop in encoding and decoding communication, with increasing military demands 
for speed in reconnaissance, espionage and counter-espionage, and the continued 
development of Artificial Intelligence, the function of intelligence analyst will 
become increasingly automated (War in the Age of Intelligent Machines 181, 213). 
Additionally, DeLanda observes that since cryptanalysis involves detecting patterns 
out of random images and/or texts, it thrives on redundancy, which means “every new 
generation of computers redefines the limits of security of a given cryptosystem” 
leading to “another spiralling arms race, not of missile power but of number-
crunching power” (War in the Age of Intelligent Machines 209). 
Therefore, the claim by Lee et al. that “contextualised information creates 
knowledge,” “certainty” and “accuracy,” paradoxically, fails to take into account how 
“contextualised knowledge” is not only vulnerable, but also limited in the awareness 
of its own range of hardware and software failures. Their claim also neglects how the 
processes of digitalisation and networking, fundamental to network-centric warfare, 
are paradoxically the root cause of inaccuracy and uncertainty since digitalisation is 
inherently reductive, and networking is potentially about disorientation. That the 
contextualised information is filtered through “intelligent” software agents, not only 
creates more complications, but also a false sense of security. This is because 
Artificial Intelligence is made of precise rules written in formal languages interacting 
unambiguously with mathematically encoded descriptions of objects, situations and 
relationships (Athanasiuo 234). In short, Artificial Intelligence is not about actual 
open-ended worlds but artificially tidy worlds constructed by computer programmers. 
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These “intelligent” systems cannot always cope with the complexity of real world 
scenarios because they cannot break their own rules, determine for themselves the 
relevance of new and unexpected information and certainly do not know the limits of 
their own knowledge, nor recognise them (Athanasiuo 241-242). As J. Lee et al. point 
out, network-centric operations are “non-intuitive;” their solution, ironically, is to turn 
to more “experimentation in the information domain” to generate a database of 
models for commanders to tap for their decision-making, influencing the latter’s 
intuition with non-intuitive machine models.45 In fact, the “effects-based operations,” 
proposed by the authors, turn humans into “automatons” through their repetitive cycle 
of actions and reactions, numbing human will and shock in the process (J. Lee et al.). 
Since the limits of Artificial Intelligence are ultimately imposed by the nature of the 
computer programmes themselves, while their complexities reside in the ingenuity of 
programmers to code instructions (Ornstein 12), Ng is therefore right to highlight that 
in network-centric warfare, the soldiers’ fates lie in the hands of the programmers.  
I also agree with Ng about the costly mistakes and military accidents that will 
unfold (or are already unfolding) as humans have to react ever faster to high-speed 
technological systems, which, paradoxically, entails their further dependence on the 
same “intelligent” machines for technological output and decision-making. However, 
I want to push this point further by pointing out that Lee et al.’s promise of “control,” 
“better” and quicker decisions for the commander, obfuscates the crucial detail that 
the desire for speed is precisely what is necessitating the removal of humans, 
                                                 
45 One simple example is how PowerPoint, a common programme used in office 
presentations, has crept obsessively into the daily lives of military commanders of 
Nato forces in Afghanistan because of the way the programme is able to create 
hierarchical ordering of a confused world. This has in turn caused serious concerns 
among military personnel that PowerPoint creates the illusion of understanding and 
control, stifles discussion, critical thinking and thoughtful decision-making (Bumiller 
“We’ve Met the Enemy”). 
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including their will and responsibility, from the cybernetic loop. Hence, contrary to 
what Lee et al. claim, in the IKC2 architecture, humans are playing the supporting 
roles to these technologies and not the other way around. The relegation of control 
from humans to machines is what provides the conditions of possibility for the IKC2 
model and network-centric warfare. As DeLanda points out, “this migration of control 
from humans to hardware, from hardware to software, and from software to data is at 
the source of machine intelligence, and thus at the origin of autonomous weapons 
systems” (War in the Age of Intelligent Machines 157-158).  
Although military demands will intensify the development of Artificial 
Intelligence, as highlighted above, this only creates another false sense of security. 
DeLanda notes, “even if Artificial Intelligence is not at present sufficiently 
sophisticated to create true ‘killer robots,’ when synthetic intelligence does make its 
appearance on the planet, there will already be a predatory role awaiting it” (War in 
the Age of Intelligent Machines 1). In fact, DeLanda stresses, the “will to endow 
machines with predatory capabilities has been institutionalized in the military” (War 
in the Age of Intelligent Machines 128). This is certainly apparent in the IKC2 
discourse, where Lee et al. obsess over the “kill factor” of the network-centric force, 
its combat power and speed, and its ability to maximise “the probability of a kill.” 
Unfortunately, the increase in combat power and speed of such “intelligent” machines 
has actually made war more deadly for civilians. Contrary to the claims of 
“accuracy,” the advancements of technologies have led to a corresponding rise in 
civilian casualties. While civilians constitute fifty percent of war casualties in World 
War II, this figure rose steadily to eighty percent in the 1980s and ninety percent in 
the 1990s, with women and children forming the vast majority of these casualties 
(Turpin 4). To further exacerbate this tragedy, the mediating effects of technology and 
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the notion of “collateral damage,” both mask the material conditions of war and 
human violations (Hammer 294).46 
Technological developments are not value-free, and certainly their related 
discourse is also proper of the technology. This is why the both the iN2015 
Masterplan and 3G SAF discourse reflect C4ISTAR techniques and technicity, which 
include the logic of deterrence, disappearance and tactic of dissimulation, that is, 
making bodies and people disappear. Just as the television images of U.S. attacks on 
Iraqi targets are highly sanitised and carefully managed, the iN2015 Masterplan and 
3G SAF discourse, too, conscientiously control and shape the views surrounding its 
desire to integrate through information technologies and telecommunications. So, 
apart from establishing transparent and “empowering” relationships with C4ISTAR 
technologies by obscuring their limits and vulnerabilities, their discourse also 
functions to carefully monitor and contain deviating thoughts. In the case of 3G SAF, 
as Lee et al. point out, the strategy of deterrence is about shaping behaviour, which 
has physical and psychological effects that can be cumulative over time and 
potentially affect everyone and not just the enemy. A series of rebuttals and counter-
opinions, thus, ensued following Ng’s feedback.47 
                                                 
46 Philip Alston, in a report to the UN Human Rights Council, warns that the 
deployment of killer drones by the U.S. to kill terrorism suspects is undermining the 
global constraints on the use of military force. He adds, because the drones are 
operated thousands of miles away from the battlefield and entirely through computer 
screens and remote audio-feed, they are encouraging a “’Playstation’ mentality to 
killing,” including killing many hundreds of innocent civilians. Such operations, 
especially by the CIA, are also bypassing the rules of war, as the agency remains 
accountable only to its own paymaster (The New York Times “Rules of War Hit by 
Killer Drones”). 
47 As I have indicated in footnote 41, Lieutenant Ng is not the only one unconvinced 
by the IKC2 doctrine underpinning the 3G SAF transformation. With the exception of 
the first rebuttal that addresses Ng’s response specifically, the rest of the 3G SAF 
discourse are directed more generally to all military personnel. 
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In the first rebuttal to Ng, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Roland Ng, LTC Khee 
Loon and Dr Kenneth Kwok insist that IKC2 is “people-based rather than system-
based” (“Viewpoints: IKC2” n.p.). They point out that IKC2 needs and depends on 
people who are “properly educated and trained, and willing to embrace new concepts” 
in order to translate “information to knowledge to decisions and finally into military 
actions” (“Viewpoints: IKC2” n.p.). They stress that technologists and systems 
developers are playing supporting roles to translate knowledge and concepts from the 
commanders into supporting architecture, infrastructure and combat systems, and not 
the other way around. The IKC2 concept, according to the authors, is “in essence an 
operational framing … to help SAF develop warfighting concepts in the Information 
Age rather than a purely technological framing” (“Viewpoints: IKC2” n.p.). The 
authors reiterate that the “thought and innovativeness of individuals … to make the 
right decisions and enable the right actions in network-centric, knowledge-based 
environment” are what is needed to realise the potential of IKC2. While tacitly 
agreeing on the vulnerabilities and limitations of technologies, the authors point out 
that if there is belief in the potential of technology, then the conclusion should be to 
“seriously and actively” resolve the limitations of the technologies, rather than to give 
them up (“Viewpoints: IKC2” n.p.). 
Another noteworthy counter-opinion piece is by the Director of Networked 
Systems, Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA)48 and his team who argue 
“IKC2 is about how we harness the power of the networks to win” (Teo et al., “Tech 
Edge” n.p.). They point out “it is often said that NCW [Network-Centric Warfare] is 
                                                 
48 DSTA is a statutory board set up under MINDEF to advise it on all defence science 
and technology matters. It also designs, develops and maintains Singapore’s defence 





not about the technology but the people. This may be a truism but technologies must 
underlie this RMA [Revolution of Military Affairs]” (Teo et al., “Tech Edge” n.p.).  
The authors stress that the key is to identify the right technologies “to realize a 
quantum jump in operational capabilities” and to master these technologies (Teo et 
al., “Tech Edge” n.p.). They continue their argument by listing seven key 
technologies that would dramatically change the way SAF fights with IKC2, which 
include networks, sensors, power, shooter, security, “sensemaking” and collaboration. 
Teo et al. point out that to pursue information anytime, anywhere, ubiquitous 
connectivity is fundamental, but this, in turn, creates demand for bandwidth. To meet 
military bandwidth demand in built-up areas (like Singapore), they suggest exploiting 
commercial off-the-shelf wireless communications such as WiFi and WiMax for 
affordable options. Additionally, meshed networks with their “spider-web” 
configurations can be used for mobility, since every node in this architecture can be a 
router or “intelligent access point.” To complement the “network backbone,” Teo et 
al. suggest a matrix of “unblinking eyes,” but they also point out that the main 
challenge for sensing is persistence and coverage because the “man-in-the-loop” 
sensors are limiting and expensive. They recommend innovatively harnessing 
unmanned technologies instead, since these are becoming commonplace, highly 
affordable and capable of a multitude of functions, including autonomous 
operations.49 As for unmanned ground sensors, Teo et al. advocate using commercial 
versions, called Motes, commonly used by scientists to monitor climates and 
                                                 
49 In fact, the authors point out that Singapore is already exploiting unmanned 
technologies in the form of the Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), used by the navy 
for “force protection” at safe “stand-off distances.” In addition, the “high-speed” 
Protector USVs, equipped with an electro-optic system and remote-control General 
Purpose Machine Gun, have been deployed in the recent Gulf war to “establish and 
enforce protection zones.” The authors further note that a similar manned operation 
would require a sizeable crew. 
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ecological environments. They argue that with “commercial push” these unmanned 
sensors, which can be disguised as natural objects like rocks and “adapted for 
battlefield deployment,” will become affordable enough to deploy widely. 
Highlighting how the Gulf Wars have demonstrated the precision of shooters, 
Teo et al. suggest the “innovative” use of networks to “coordinate and mass multiple 
shooters” for “not just one target but over an influence network of interdependent 
targets.” Here, the authors argue that cost effectiveness is an important factor since it 
is not sustainable to buy expensive missiles to shoot “cheaper targets” like Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAV). In terms of the power requirements of network-centric 
warfare, according to the authors, reliability and scale are the two key challenges for 
distributed, mass and persistent sensing, as well as for mobility. Drawing on the 
experiments to power laptops by a couple of companies, Teo et al. note that fuel cells, 
in particular, show the most promise with their higher energy storage capacity and 
amenability to miniaturisation, although they still present over-heating problems and 
the need for replenishment. The authors declare “innovation in the area of power 
supply for mobility must be made,” including tapping on natural resources and 
combining various power sources (Teo et al., “Tech Edge” n.p.). To address the issue 
of information overload and how “the commander may become the ‘weakest link’ in 
the system of systems,” Teo et al. propose capitalising on computing to “alleviate the 
cognitive limitations of humans and at the same time amplify his cognitive strengths” 
for a more adaptive, ready, sharper, faster and coherent SAF. Giving the example of 
“sensemaking” – information technologies “built around the cognition of the human” 
– the authors argue that this system is coded with “a sound understanding of human 
cognition” to aid analysts in monitoring electronic communications. In addition, Teo 
et al. point to web-enabled technologies that facilitate collaboration as a good 
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resource for SAF to engage in “creative ways of knowledge sharing” to nurture “a 
new generation of network warriors” for them to fully “synchronise their actions” and 
“fulfil their goals.”50 However, recognising the dangers of being dependent on the 
network, the authors state that network security is an important issue to address. They 
turn to examples from Hewlett-Packard, IBM and the academic research on Artificial 
Immune Systems, where adaptive networks with sensors that can automatically detect 
viral attacks, take remedial actions, and even develop solutions that parallel biological 
immune systems, as possible solutions for cyber-attacks. Teo et al. conclude that these 
seven technological challenges are also opportunities for IKC2, depending on the 
“ingenuity of people to innovate with them to create viable solutions,” which is why 
they argue that SAF “must tap the technology savvy generation … to invent and break 
new ground in both concepts and technology” (“Tech Edge” n.p.). 
In both rebuttals to Ng’s feedback above, there seems to be a tension between 
whether IKC2 is about the people or the technology. In the first rebuttal, the stress 
appears to be on the people, when Roland Ng et al. argue that IKC2 is “people-based 
rather than system-based.” In Teo et al.’s response, they emphasise that technologies 
“must underlie” Singapore’s Revolution in Military Affairs. I argue, however, that 
this dichotomy between the people and technology is, in fact, a false construct. In 
Roland Ng et al.’s argument, the people needed to ensure the success of IKC2 are 
those who are “properly educated and trained.” However, these are not any subjects 
                                                 
50 Deputy Prime Minister (then Defence Minister as well) Teo Chee Hean in an 
interview with The Straits Times points out that the training tools of SAF have to be 
changed because national service-man of today are “very well educated, very much 
able to do things on their own, look for knowledge themselves.” He adds, “If you 
don’t give them laptops and computers, they will feel very odd.” All recruits are now 
issued with laptops for them to take online tutorials on assembling and handling their 
rifles, throwing grenades, carrying out first aid and clearing battle obstacles, before 
hitting the fields for their hands-on experiences (Chow “SAF Upgrade Plugs into 
Software Phase”).  
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but technological ones “willing to embrace new concepts” (R. Ng et al. n.p.). Yet 
these subjects have to embrace not just any concept but specifically the IKC2 concept. 
In other words, IKC2 depends on subjects who are already enframed with its logic 
and techniques to sustain its operations and technologies. The false binary created by 
Roland Ng et al. between “operational framing” and “technological framing” 
therefore erases the fact that operations, including concepts and discourse, are all part 
and parcel of the technology. Additionally, the hierarchy Roland Ng et al. make 
between the commanders and the technologists and systems developers ignores the 
point that underlying the IKC2 structure are programmes that are prone to fail, 
regardless of the commanders’ knowledge. Moreover, the hierarchy Roland Ng et al. 
creates between the commanders and the technologists, acts as a simple reversal of 
power relations that, ultimately, leaves the IKC2 structure and framing intact, thus 
ensuring its continuance. Despite, or precisely because of, Roland Ng et al.’s 
emphasis on innovative technological subjects, the limitations and vulnerabilities of 
technologies can be side-stepped and turned into opportunities for further 
technological productions. 
As a mirror to Roland Ng et al.’s discourse, the priority Teo et al. place on the 
IKC2 technologies, in turn, ensures the production of innovative, technological 
subjectivities, since these subjects are needed to “master” these technologies. It is 
hence unsurprising that Teo et al.’s conclusion about technological challenges being 
opportunities for “people to innovate” and “create viable solutions” is almost identical 
with Roland Ng et al.’s closing. Their mutually reinforcing discourse of emphasising 
the IKC2 people and the IKC2 technologies, work through inducing “blindness” to 
the paradoxes of such technologies and subjects, as well as their reversible 
relationships. In other words, the IKC2 system requires both the technologies and the 
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technological subjects to function in synch with each other and with its codes; in 
short, to be the same. Since humans are more adaptable than machines, it falls on 
humans to make the necessary changes. So, despite Roland Ng et al.’s attention to the 
people underpinning IKC2 and Teo et al.’s discourse on “mastery” over IKC2 
technologies, these technologies, in fact, structure human thought and determine the 
course of human actions, not the other way around. As Teo et al. ironically point out, 
“technologies must underlie RMA,” and this is what is demanding the SAF to 
transform, dictating changes to human mind-sets and practices, in order to meet the 
requirements set by the technologies.  
Therefore, in Teo et al.’s discourse of human “mastery” over technologies, 
their suggestions, paradoxically, entail turning humans into machines or removing 
them from the cybernetic loop altogether. In the first instance, Teo et al. (just as J. Lee 
et al.) turn to computing to “alleviate the cognitive limitations of humans” and 
“amplify” their cognitive strengths. This desire to turn humans into machines, by 
synchronising human thoughts with machine logic, suggests enframed minds that 
think like machines. These enframed minds work using machines as the measure of 
and for understanding the human condition. The example of “sensemaking” 
highlighted by Teo et al. above, where information technologies “built around the 
cognition of the human,” obscures the fact that these technologies’ “sound 
understanding of human cognition” are an imprecise science modelled after machine 
logic to begin with. Cognitive psychology, which developed in America during World 
War II, is a war product that draws on earlier communications theories, specifically 
information theory and cybernetics (Edwards 209-237). Fundamental to cognitive 
psychology is the reductive idea of human as “an information processing system, in a 
precise, quantifiable sense” (Edwards 212) and conversely, the notion of information 
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machines as potential minds (Edwards 236). This “neat” reversibility between humans 
and machines, of course, entails a disembodied information theory and cybernetics 
and a simultaneous dematerialised notion of the body.51 Hence, it is not surprising that 
as Teo et al. look to machines to “amplify” human’s “cognitive strength,” they 
simultaneously champion adaptive networks modelled after biological immune 
systems, which are themselves referred to by popular shorthand as the “body at war,” 
although immunology actually works as a complex regulatory system not so easily 
characterised.52 
In the second instance, taking humans out of the cybernetic loop because, as 
Teo et al. argue, they are “the ‘weakest link’ in the system of systems” and 
“expensive,” reflects enframed minds under the logic of the technology’s speed and 
efficiency. Efficiency is, of course, part of the capitalist and neo-liberal logic of profit 
maximisation. As the previous chapter showed, the development of cities and their 
technologies are as much the result of war as of mercantilism, and as Virilio contends, 
“wealth is the hidden side of speed and speed the hidden side of wealth” (Virilio and 
Lotringer 44). It is apparent throughout Teo et al.’s discourse that “cost effectiveness” 
is a major consideration in the appropriation of technologies from non-military 
                                                 
51 In How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and 
Informatics (1999), Katherine Hayles traces the historical development, through the 
Macys conference, of the disembodiment of information theory and cybernetics and 
argues that this invariably led to a simultaneously dematerialised notion of the body. 
She highlights how at the foundational era of cybernetics, in order to make the theory 
of communication and control apply equally to machines, animals and humans, new 
ways of looking at humans and their neurological functioning had to be formulated. 
As a result, instead of machines becoming more like humans it became the other way 
round, where hu mans were made to be more like the machines. Finally, she points 
out that as information became disembodied and the organism dematerialised, the 
merging of two different systems can finally occur and what emerges is the notion of 
the cyborg. Although Hayles correctly attributes the post-human condition and the 
ontology of the cyborg identity to the foundational era of cybernetics, she ultimately 
appeals for an embodiment of information through her focus on cyberpunk fiction and 
seems to tacitly embrace the post-human condition. 
52 See Lugwig Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. 
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sources, and in the push for “innovative ways” of harnessing certain technologies. 
Therefore, despite the warnings by Lieutenant Ng of “friendly fire” in the Gulf Wars, 
Teo et al., paradoxically, argue for “innovative” use of the network to “mass 
multiply” the “precision” shooters used in the Gulf Wars as a more “sustainable” 
option to using expensive missiles to shoot “cheaper targets.”  
Capitalist rationale, underpinned by neo-liberal values, in fact pervades the 
larger 3G SAF discourse. The rhetoric of Lee et al. highlights how the declining cost 
of information technologies and telecommunications, as well as a “ready-made” 
population of technologists, form the key reasons for the IKC2 doctrine. MINDEF too 
argues that technology is a force multiplier and leveraging on it increases “individual 
combat effectiveness” or allows the military to “do more with fewer people” 
(Defending Singapore 56). In particular, neo-liberal values are clear in Choy et al.’s 
suggestions of the “defence entrepreneur” and C2C space, inspired by the “free-
wheeling and innovative” culture of business entrepreneurship. Their discourse of the 
defence entrepreneur as an active, competitive individual “empowered” to pursue his 
or her aspirations independently, engages the political economy of the subject to 
produce innovative, technological subjects. These subjects, as Choy et al. point out, 
are crucial for the organisational change of 3G SAF, but what they fail to reveal is 
that there are limits to their “empowerment.” In the C2C space where defence 
entrepreneurs gather, the Complex Adaptive System that the space is modelled after is 
actually based on an inherently self-same (fractal) system.53 Therefore, despite Choy 
                                                 
53 I argue that this is so especially in the context of the military space. Although 
complexity does arise from the clash of opposite forces, these are at the same time 
marked by a “unity of opposites.” Furthermore, complexity is usually found in living 
organisms subjected to evolution or in complex adaptive systems that have a long 
history and have grown over a long period of time, which 3G SAF is not. See 




et al.’s claims of individual “empowerment,” there is no room for individual deviation 
(as Lieutenant Ng’s case demonstrates) from the prescribed role of the defence 
entrepreneur, which is to be a competitive, motivated, innovative, risk-taking 
“network warrior.”  
In fact, it is precisely through the rhetoric of empowerment and a series of 
false binaries (between competition and cooperation, the individual and the 
organisation) that Choy et al. produce competitive, motivated technological subjects, 
who also function under a “moral code” to, ultimately, serve the organisation. This 
neo-liberal strategy reflects that used by Singapore’s ruling elites to govern the rest of 
Singapore society, highlighted in chapter three. It is obvious that the “defence 
entrepreneur” of 3G SAF is not far off from the “risk-taking, entrepreneurial” subjects 
nurtured by the iN2015 Masterplan. Furthermore, the competitive environment in the 
C2C space proposed by Choy et al. that is, paradoxically, based on an inherently self-
same system, parallels the larger national discourse of meritocracy, vis-à-vis the 
collective, espoused by Singapore’s ruling elites. Choy et al. and Teo et al.’s 
insistence on relying on technologies in critical situations despite their limitations and 
vulnerabilities, points to a strong desire to believe that these technologies will work, a 
faith in technology that pervades the government and many parts of Singapore 
society, noted even in the early years of nation building. Chan Heng Chee observes: 
 
The Singapore approach to government – as an exercise in state  
management – has its roots in the current widespread social doctrine  
originating in the West that Technology holds all the answers to the  
important problems facing human civilisation and that society is better  
off with a rational application of scientific techniques to production  
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and administration as if administration could be separated from  
politics. (“Politics of an Administrative State” 2) 
 
The next section, therefore, looks at the intimate and reversible links between 3G SAF 
and the iN2015 Masterplan to highlight the larger architecture of Singapore. I show 
how structures put in place historically and under the rubric of “Total Defence” result 
in the circulation of military elites, the perpetuation of their neo-liberal values, as well 
as C4ISTAR techniques and technicity – in short, in the militarisation of Singapore.  
 
5.3 The Militarisation of Singapore Society: The Intimate and Reversible Links 
between 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan 
Comparing the discourse between 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan, many 
parallels can be drawn in terms of how they deploy constructed binaries and the 
political economy of the subject to produce the technological subjects needed for their 
projects. At the same time, by rendering invisible the contradictions and paradoxes 
underpinning pervasive computing, which is presented as benign, efficient, seamless 
and empowering, normative relationships are established to the technology that, in 
turn, ensure the technology’s continued consumption, research and development, as 
well as the perpetuation of their techniques and technicity. This synchronicity of 
discourses between the 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan, in fact, points to the 
larger militarisation of Singapore society, where military, economic and political 
powers converge to the point that it is difficult to tell them apart.  
 The militarisation of society, Patrick Regan observes, in Organizing Societies 
for War, is a process that involves the whole of society and not just the military-
industrial complex (xiv). To reflect on how militarised a society is, he argues, it is not 
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enough simply to look at the size of the society’s military and defence industry. What 
is also crucial is the organisation of the political, economic and social aspects of the 
society around the production and preparation for war. The author points out that the 
mechanisms through which citizens are socialised to accept and participate in the 
mobilisation process are numerous. These include, primarily, the creation of a 
perpetual expectation of violence, where the ruling elites continually point to threats 
to extract internal compliance, and the use of symbols of nationalism to obtain 
popular support for increasing military influence over civilian affairs (Regan 1-2). 
According to Regan, a militarised society, therefore, is one where the military 
penetrates deeply into civilian life and where civilians play an equally important role 
in military affairs. The blurring of military and civilian spaces, their close contacts, 
confluence of interests and cooperation, in turn, result in a resemblance between 
military officers and civilian executives in politics, science and business, and where 
the military becomes mixed in the government and large corporations. In this 
instance, the author points out, it makes no sense to question if civilians control the 
military since the military, economic and political powers have become so dependent 
on each other, with goals and interests so complementary, it is difficult to tell them 
apart (Regan 5-6). 
 In the case of Singapore, the birth of the nation coincided closely with the 
emergence of its military and defence industry. In 1965, Singapore seceded from 
Malaysia and became an independent state. Its small size (physically and in terms of 
population size), volatile geopolitical and race relations with its neighbours and within 
itself, as well as the imminent withdrawal of British troops that had till then guarded 
Singapore as its colonial trading port, ensured the mostly immigrant populace was 
quickly and easily galvanised to support the national defence objectives. The 
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Singapore conscription policy, which requires compulsory national service for all 
male citizens passed swiftly in 1967, and the Singapore Defence Fund launched in 
1968, collected within one-and-a-half years S$8.5 million, mostly contributions from 
individuals, companies and institutions (H.C. Chan, “Singapore” 139-142; Singh, The 
Vulnerability of Small States Revisited 11-19).54 So right from the start, Singapore 
civilians and military are intimately linked, with many regarding national security as 
inseparable from national and economic development (Chin 219).  
This intertwined relationship between national security and economic 
development extends to the Singapore Defence Industries. The Singapore Defence 
Industries began in 1967 to produce small arms ammunition, mainly to meet the 
nation’s political and military needs. At that time, the political reasons stemmed from 
the “suddenness” of independence and the need for surviving a politically unstable 
context. Militarily, having its own defence industries (in niche areas) allowed 
Singapore to reduce its reliance on foreign suppliers and be self-sufficient. It also 
guaranteed Singapore its own supply and maintenance of critical systems, and enabled 
imported technologies to be adapted more specifically to local conditions. Economic 
imperatives for developing the defence industries, however, were not paramount until 
the late 1980s when the continued heavy military expenditure became hard to justify 
and sustain for such a small country (Singh, Singapore’s Defence Industries 11, 38-
59; Bitzinger 261-262). The Singapore Defence Industries was renamed Singapore 
Technologies in 1989 to downplay its military role and to reflect the long-term 
                                                 
54 Although there were grievances from national servicemen over the conditions of 
training and army life that played out in the newspapers, these were quickly put to rest 
through a combination of laws against public complaints, the setting up of proper 
channels within the army to handle the complaints and the banning of certain 
newspapers. By 1976, national service became a non-issue for the ruling elites (H. C. 
Chan “Singapore” 144). 
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importance of its industrial role (Singh, Singapore’s Defence Industries Preface).55 
This name change signals not only how defence and economics are intimately 
connected and reversible, but also how defence is assumed in technologies. Today, 
not only is Singapore Technologies (Engineering) a vital component of Singapore’s 
defence capabilities, supporting 3G SAF with high technology weapons, essential 
products and services, it has also become the leading and most advanced arms 
producer in the region (Singh, Singapore’s Defence Industries Preface; MINDEF, 
Defending Singapore 67).  
The success of Singapore’s defence industries has been attributed mainly to 
the quality of its skills and expertise in research and development, a direct result of 
the government hand-picking the best of Singapore’s engineering and scientific brains 
for the defence of Singapore (Singh, Singapore Defence’s Industries 35-36; Bitzinger 
266). Although the economic success of Singapore yielded tangible benefits for SAF 
in terms of the correspondingly high defence budgets, the increasing convergence of 
skills for both defence and economic development, nevertheless, created a 
competitive environment for the elite manpower needs of the military. Therefore, as 
early as 1971, and to ensure the military has its share of the “best and brightest,” the 
government inaugurated the SAF Overseas Scholarship scheme, where academically 
talented national servicemen are sponsored through tertiary education at prestigious 
foreign universities.56 Upon their return, these scholars are bonded to the SAF for 
eight years, given “market-rate” salaries, promoted rapidly and often co-opted into the 
government decision-making spheres (Huxley 2-6). To further make military careers 
attractive, MINDEF in 1982 introduced a “dual-career” scheme where middle- or 
                                                 
55 See Singapore Technologies (Engineering) at 
<http://www.stengg.com/home/home.aspx>. 
56 Since then, two other prestigious SAF scholarships have been added, the 
President’s Scholarship and Overseas Merit Scholarship. 
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high-ranking scholars are seconded to positions in civil service or statutory boards, on 
two-year appointments. Crucially, upon their retirement from active duty in the SAF, 
these scholars can expect to be appointed senior positions in the public sector (6-7).  
Since its inception, of the two hundred and sixty-nine servicemen awarded the 
SAF Overseas Scholarship, six have gone on to become ministers, while another 
twenty-one hold high-level positions in public service (Yong, “Six Join Ranks of 
‘National Resource’”).57 Even for those who do not make it to public service, a past 
career in the military almost invariably provides a bright future in the economy. As 
observed by Chan Heng Chee in the 1980s, “in the Singapore Armed Forces 
dissatisfied young officers do not stage coups. They merely resign to join the lucrative 
private sector with their highly marketable skills” (“Singapore” 147). Therefore, just 
as defence provides security for economic development and economic growth sustains 
defence capability, their seeming competition for similar manpower is solved by the 
creation of a circulation of elites who move seamlessly from one sector to another. 
This is still the case today and will become more so in the future as SAF’s 
transformation into a network-centric, knowledge-based outfit merge with the iN2015 
Masterplan for an “intelligent nation, a global city, powered by infocomm” (IDA, 
“iN2015 Masterplan” n.p.). 
Apart from compulsory national service for the men, the setting up of the 
defence industries, and the creation of a circulation of military elites, another policy 
                                                 
57 Currently, ex-SAF scholars in the Singapore Cabinet (out of fifteen appointments) 
include: Lee Hsien Loong (Prime Minister of Singapore), Teo Chee Hean (Deputy 
Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for 
Home Affairs), Lim Hng Kiang (Minister for Trade and Industry), Dr Vivian 
Balakrishnan (Minister for the Environment and Water Resources), Lim Swee Say 
(Minister, Prime Minister’s Office), Gan Kim Yong (Minister for Health), Lui Tuck 
Yew (Minister for Transport and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs), and MG(NS) 
Chan Chun Sing (Acting Minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports 




that intensifies the intertwined relationship between Singapore civilians and the 
military is the “Total Defence” policy, formally instituted in 1984. “Total Defence,” 
conceived on the notion that modern wars are “no longer pure confrontations between 
armies, but conflicts involving entire nations and peoples,” includes “psychological 
defence,” “social defence,” “economic defence,” “civil defence” and “military 
defence” (Foo and Rocha 83). “Psychological defence” calls for the commitment and 
confidence of Singaporeans in the defence of Singapore. “Social defence” stresses on 
the population working, playing and living together harmoniously regardless of race, 
language or religion. “Economic defence” safeguards the economy to continue 
functioning in times of emergencies, war or threats of war, so that “life goes on as 
normally as possible” (Foo and Rocha 83). “Civil defence” organises and trains 
civilians how to respond during emergencies, and “military defence” ensures that SAF 
is operationally ready to ensure Singapore’s peace and security, and “contribute 
towards regional stability” (Foo and Rocha 83). 
“Total Defence,” therefore, aims to unite and commit all sectors of society to 
the defence of Singapore and its national interests. This is “an all-round deterrence 
effort in which every citizen plays a part” (MINDEF 12). Such efforts include public 
emergency exercises, the setting up of civil defence grassroots organisations, the 
training of civil defence volunteers, and the National Education programme launched 
in schools in 1996 to enhance the continuous commitment of citizens to the nation 
(MINDEF 12). Critically, the “Total Defence” policy has ensured a stable defence 
budget (currently capped at six percent of GDP) for the SAF’s “relentless” build-up 
and “incessant securitisation” of the nation (Tan and Chew 247-248). It has further 
allowed military spending to be hidden in estimates of national and/or economic 
development and opened up the nation’s entire population and resources for military 
196 
 
use (Chin 204, 219). Indeed, the “Total Defence” policy harks back to the “Total 
War” strategy initiated by militaries during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, where military powers are strengthened through the strategic mobilisation of 
civilian populations in the production and preparation for war. It also draws on the 
Cold War tactic of attraction and disorientation, rather than coercion. Here, the 
populace are mobilised, through the discourse of defence that obscures its character as 
a preparation for war, structurally, institutionally and morally to see defence 
positively and essential to the survival of the city-state. 
This tactical decentralisation of control, empowerment of peripheries to 
consolidate the centre is evident in the 3G SAF discourse. Hence, contrary to Lee et 
al.’s point (in the previous section) on the “new” strategy of deterrence adopted by 3G 
SAF, this strategy is not a new development. The 3G SAF discourse, in fact, reflect 
the national discourse of deterrence that, ultimately, draws from total strategies 
strategies and Cold War techniques and technicity. Choy et al.’s text, for example, 
suggests tapping networks outside the military, not only to guard MINDEF against 
intellectual lock-ins, but also to provide it a “’virtual’ organisational expansion” to 
generate solutions for the military and to spawn “interesting hybrids.” This is similar 
to Lee et al.’s example of the “enterprise architecture” based on “plug and play” 
characteristics that allows all types of applications and devices to be “plugged” into 
the IKC2 system. Likewise, in Teo et al.’s analysis, scientific and technological 
research and developments, from businesses to academia, are all potentially 
appropriable for military use. Moreover, as they highlight, with “commercial push” or 
mass consumption, some of these technologies can be applied widely as they become 
“highly affordable.” Even within the military, Teo et al. advocate tapping the 
technology-savvy generation and deploying web-enabled technologies that facilitate 
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collaboration among “network warriors” to fully “synchronise their actions,” “fulfil 
their goals,” and to ultimately serve the organisation. As Teo et al. point out, a vital 
result of IKC2 is better command and control.  
In this sense, “Total Defence” is what Virilio contends as the “Total Peace of 
deterrence” or “Total War pursued by other means” (Virilio and Lotringer 39). Hence, 
the iN2015 Masterplan should be regarded as an operation in the production and 
preparation for war, than as a purely economic exercise. This is especially so since 
representatives from MINDEF, DSTA and Singapore Technologies (Engineering) 
form part of the iN2015 Masterplan’s Council and Working Groups, advising on the 
kinds of information communication-savvy workforce and technologies needed for 
the future of the nation (IDA, “Innovate. Integrate. Internationalisation” 138, 141). In 
fact, the intimate and reversible links between 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan 
can be exposed by the infrastructural and manpower needs to make IKC2 a success. 
One of the pre-requisites for IKC2 is a communications infrastructure not only robust 
but also cheap enough to support the network of sensors for enhanced and shared 
situational awareness among the various military services and among the different 
levels of command (J. Lee et al. 10, 15; Chen et al. 42). To this end, the iN2015 
Masterplan’s focus on developing grid computing (highlighted by Choy et al. earlier) 
“essential in furthering research capabilities,” and its aim of wiring up the whole of 
Singapore with an ultra-fast broadband network to meet gaming and industry needs, is 
liberating too for 3G SAF (IDA, “Orchestrating Global Supply Chains” 16). A case in 
point is the iN2015 Masterplan’s successful implementation of the wireless mobile 
WiMax (highlighted by Teo et al. above) for the maritime industry.58 This 
                                                 
58 WiMax (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) is a wireless wide-area 
broadband access technology constructed on the IEEE 802.16 standard, which departs 
from the 802.11 Medium Access Control standard that is connectionless and based on 
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infrastructure allows ships that call on the port of Singapore wireless mobile 
broadband connectivity up to 15km from Singapore’s southern coastline (IDA, “First 
in the World”). Appropriating this commercial WiMax solution, 3G SAF created the 
Command Post of the Future (CPoF), a flexible architecture where military 
commanders can explore and experiment with new fighting concepts in operational 
contexts, be it from the air, land or sea domain, without compromising on the speed 
and quality of communications. Furthermore, by spreading out geographically and 
without depending on a single command post, CPoF is seen as enhancing military 
survivability. According to 3G SAF, experimenting on commercial WiMax solutions 
has “allowed warfighters the opportunity to concentrate on new concepts of fighting 
and information sharing” (Chen et al. 43).  
Additionally, harnessing and modifying commercial off-the-shelf technologies 
is aiding 3G SAF in several ways. As highlighted in chapter three, off-the-shelf 
interactive computer games, in particular, benefit 3G SAF by providing a cheaper and 
more convenient alternative to engaging professional game developers for customised 
game content under strict licensing rules. They also make attractive recruitment tools 
and cost-effective training conduits for a game-savvy generation of (future) “network 
warriors.” Engaging civilians and to further exploit this game-savvy generation, 3G 
SAF together with the DSTA have extended their reach to involve academia as 
another ready source to meet their military needs. For example, Nanyang 
Technological University (NTU) and DSTA have teamed up with the University of 
Southern California (USC) to create applications of technology for gaming, media and 
defence applications (NTU and DSTA, “Unleashing Creative Technologies”). SAF 
                                                                                                                                            
a listen-before-talk model. WiMax, on the other hand, uses as a basis the bandwidth-
on-demand model, which is connection oriented, supports multimedia as well as 
centralised control and scheduling (Poslad 352). 
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and DSTA have also tied up with Nanyang Polytechnic to get the younger polytechnic 
students to test their military systems, so that their engineers can find out what 
features the youths like about their consoles and panels. The students’ feedback will 
then allow the military to develop new machines that will be familiar when the time 
comes for these students to enlist in the army. As Chief Armour Officer Philip Lim 
points out, “it’s important to incorporate their feedback so when they come into the 
force, they will feel absolutely intuitive when using the systems that they are 
accustomed to” (Chow “Students Get to Test War Machines”). To ensure the military 
bring teens on board “as early as possible,” there are plans to expand these tie-ups to 
include upper secondary students in the future (Chow “Students Get to Test War 
Machines”).59 
 This engagement with students is in accord with the iN2015 Masterplan’s 
push, especially in schools, for sophisticated and innovative use of the latest 
technology to establish Singapore as a digital media and entertainment capital, 
discussed in chapter three. Seen in this light, the iN2015 Masterplan’s deployment of 
education to serve the needs of mutated capitalism is also extremely crucial for the 
military, since the reversibility of technologies and technical knowledge erases the 
fine line between the objectives of the 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan. However, 
the recruitment of younger and younger students in Singapore to test war 
technologies, in the guise of games, brings up ethical issues about the exploitation of 
children in the service of the military and the kinds of subjects such action 
encourages. The conflation of playing computer games with military training can have 
far-reaching implications on teenagers, since computer games glamorise war by 
providing impressionable players with an avenue to fantasise about military missions 
                                                 
59 The typical age for polytechnic students is between seventeen to twenty years old 
and for upper secondary students, between fifteen and sixteen years old. 
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without the real dangers (Hertz 212) and sanitise violence through their mediating 
effects. This lethal combination may very likely produce future soldiers who think of 
war as exciting, cool and just a game.60 Equally important, the lack of objections from 
parents and the active participation of schools in such exercises points to the 
convergence of military and economic interests in the larger militarisation of 
Singapore society.61   
In this mutually constitutive relationship, defence and economic development 
have become indispensable to each other, but ultimately, both require a willing and 
competent society as a foundational base for their expansion. Therefore, through 
“Total Defence,” military control is achieved not by military force, but by means of 
motivation and mobilisation via accepted social orders and technologies, as the 
intimate and reversible links between 3G SAF and iN2015 Masterplan show. When 
societies become highly militarised, Regan observes, the civil sectors, particularly the 
                                                 
60 The 2007 assault of unarmed civilians in Baghdad by an Army Apache helicopter, 
while the soldiers joked and jeered as they shot the people, is a good case in point. In 
the aftermath of this leaked video in WikiLeaks.org, veterans point to military training 
as, primarily, an exercise to overcome the fear of killing another human, and seeing it 
as a game is one way to create the psychological distance from the “enemy” (The 
New York Times “Psychologists Attempt to Explain Airstrike Video”). This example, 
however, also indicate that computer games and simulation are being faithful to its 
source and original purpose. 
61 The irony of this situation is that video game addiction is becoming a growing 
problem, prompting the government to set aside S$10 million to fund cyber-wellness 
projects. Nearly nine percent of youngsters are found to be addicted to video games in 
Singapore, putting the proportion of problematic gamers here slightly higher than the 
U.S. and Australia, but lower than South Korea and Germany (Chua and Poon “Stress 
May Turn Youngsters”). In another study funded by the Ministry of Education and 
MDA, 3000 primary pupils and secondary students in Singapore were tracked 
between 2007 to 2009, and it was found that eighty-four percent of students who were 
already addicted to gaming were still hooked two years later. The remaining sixteen 
percent managed to kick their addiction, while one percent of those not originally 
hooked became addicts. This study also found that video game addiction can fuel 
depression, as opposed to the conventional view that it is the other way around (Chua 
and Poon “Many Gamers”). Another worrying trend of video game addiction in 
Singapore is the profile of addicts are getting younger, from the typical fourteen to 
fifteen year-olds, to eleven to twelve year-olds (Musfirah “More Gaming Addiction”). 
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industries, media-entertainment and services arms, become active participants in the 
military mobilisation and socialisation efforts. Through such efforts, the public learns 
to accept the elites’ worldview as their own and becomes an easy advocate for war 
preparations, perceiving military service, military production and “national security” 
as noble values performed by outstanding citizens (Organizing Societies for War 6-
10). In this case, technological development, as exemplified by the iN2015 
Masterplan, engages the whole of Singapore society in the militarisation process. 
At this point, it is worthwhile to bring in Louis Althusser and his “Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses” to point out how the iN2015 Masterplan and its 
projects are themselves already shaped by a larger techno-military-culture present at 
the founding of Singapore as an independent state and extend beyond the city-state’s 
shores (121-173). According to Althusser, ideology is a system of ideas that is imbued 
with a structure that makes itself seem real, immutable, even as it is a representation 
of human relations and their conditions of existence (151-155). Pivotally, for 
Althusser, “the category of the subject … is the constitutive category of all ideology” 
(160). Conversely, the “obviousness” of subjectivities and the “transparency” of 
language are all ideological effects (161). In other words, “ideology has always-
already interpellated individuals as subjects … [and] individuals are always-already 
interpellated by ideology as subjects” (Althusser164). Furthermore, Althusser points 
to how ideology exists materially through apparatuses and their techniques and how 
these in turn shape the consciousness, beliefs and actions of subjects (156-159). The 
use of education by the iN2015 Masterplan to shape active technological subjects not 
only reflects a long-standing national strategy, but also demonstrates how education is 
one of the most dominant ideological state apparatuses engaged by mature capitalist 
states, whereby specific relations of production (or the ideology of the ruling elites) 
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are inculcated and learnt (144-145). The iN2015 Masterplan’s targeting of not only 
the existing manpower pool, but children as early as in kindergarten, moreover, points 
to how the “ultimate condition of production is therefore the reproduction of the 
conditions of production” (Althusser 123). In other words, the technological subjects 
active in the innovative consumption and production of information technologies and 
telecommunications provide the condition of possibility for the iN2015 Masterplan 
and 3G SAF. 
Nevertheless, for ideology or interpellation to work, Althusser points out, 
individuals need to acknowledge or accept the hailing (166). This is why it is crucial 
for ideology to make itself transparent and to interpellate the individual as a free 
(empowered) subject (169). The iN2015 Masterplan’s deployment of the rhetoric of 
empowerment, control and inclusion, coupled with the idealised image of Singapore 
as a seamlessly wired up global city, functions to valorise and entice individuals into 
active consumption of information technologies and telecommunications. This 
consumption itself then functions not only to perpetuate the ideology of the ruling 
elites, but also the digital logic underpinning information technologies and 
telecommunications. In situations where there is non-conformity, these can be quickly 
corrected or addressed by using other state apparatuses, such as through legal means. 
One example is that of the resistance posed by private home-owners to cable up their 
home with the new fibre-optic Next Generation Broadband Network. This has 
prompted IDA to put their foot down to enact fines of up to S$1000 a day for 
condominium management committees who refuse to cooperate (H. H. Chua “Condo 
Must Allow”). Meanwhile, IDA is proposing changes to its building code to legally 
require all new homes to be ready for this fibre-optic broadband services, and for 
building owners to set aside additional space in their premises, at no cost, to house 
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mobile telephony equipment. IDA’s director-general of telecoms and post Leong 
Keng Thai noted, “With the increasing pervasiveness of smartphones and high mobile 
penetration rates in Singapore, mobile operators need to meet increasing expectations 
for mobile services” (D. Chin “IDA Updating Building Code”). This circular chain of 
discourse and events, where needs are created that then justifies further needs is also 
present in how the government engages the whole of Singapore society in its 
militarisation process. 
Regan points out that in militarised societies, threat perception has become 
increasingly driven by social, political and economic factors, even after the actual 
threat dissipates. He observes, “the perception of threat is still a necessary justification 
– because the society does not view the production of war as an intrinsic good – but 
the threat is no longer what drives the [militarisation] process: the process now drives 
the threat” (Regan 19). This is why in the official discourse on “Total Defence,” 
despite “Total Defence” mirroring “Total War,” there is a crucial disavowal of the 
latter. In the 1995 inaugural issue of Total Defence Focus or TD Focus, a newsletter 
circulated nationwide to “remind our people of the importance of Total Defence,” Dr 
Tony Tan, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, wrote: 
 
In modern warfare, an aggressor wages Total War where he can use  
propaganda to play on people’s fear and apprehension or destroy a  
  country’s cohesion by exploiting language, race or cultural differences.  
The only response to Total War is Total Defence and Total Defence  




The crucial disavowal of “Total War” in Total Defence works by first creating a false 
binary between the “war” and “defence.” This then allows the official discourse to 
distance itself from what “Total War” entails, that is, propaganda and the constant 
harping on people’s fears and apprehensions to get their cooperation in the production 
and preparation for war, as demonstrated by the quotations from Singapore’s ruling 
elites at the start of this chapter. In the same 2003 Committee of Supply Debate, Dr 
Tan justifies the maintenance of a high defence budget stating, “Without security, 
there can be no economic development or political stability. There will be no foreign 
investments … And, most critically of all, without security Singaporeans will have no 
confidence in our future” (2). 
The need for security, however, is as much the cause of circumstances as of 
the effects of politics. Anthony Burke, in Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, points 
to the “vampyric” and paradoxical nature of security; how, like a malevolent parental 
power, it is a “source of revulsion and struggle, as of comfort” (55-56). He argues that 
with contemporary states, security functions less as an end than as a form of power. 
As a political technology, it mobilises  
 
horror and pleasure, coercion and desire in equal measures, through 
linked systems of language, force, administration and freedom. 
Security is both a mode of administrative and governmental action – 
bureaucratic, ideological, military and economic – and a system of 
‘truths’ that reach into people’s hearts, framing their identities, feelings 




Burke further points out that the power of security as a form of political technology 
draws its power partly from its aporetic structure (32). In other words, security, like 
consumption, becomes a productive force, a system of politics grounded on insecurity 
or the impossibility of total security.  
 The creation of “a common feeling of insecurity” Virilio highlights, is what 
“will lead to a new kind of consumption, the consumption of protection,” that will 
“progressively come to the fore and become the target of the whole merchandising 
system” (Speed and Politics 122). In short, the consumption of security is shaping 
subjects into producing technological weaponries. Hence, the consumption of 
protection, paradoxically and conversely, is linked to the production of deadly 
products suggested by Baudrillard in the epigraph. To be sure, Singapore’s need for 
security has turned into a lucrative reason for the continued production of deadly 
weapons and systems. In the context of Singapore Technologies (Engineering) 
posting a record order book of S$10 billion in 2008, Chan Chin Bock, the former 
chairman of the Economic Development Board, argues that defence is one of the key 
industries that will propel Singapore economically forward because of its “man-made 
competitive advantage.” He contends, “We have skills in micro-electronics, quality 
control, computer, information technology and software. The defence industry 
requires all of those skills brought together in one” (Kor “Defence Harnesses 
Singapore’s ‘Man-Made Competitive Advantage’”).62 Therefore, in this age of 
deterrence and with the development of the war economy, Virilio maintains, “logistics 
has become the whole of war” and “war is no longer in its execution, but in its 
preparation” (Virilio and Lotringer 103-104). Deterrence then is, ultimately, not about 
peace but “Pure War” or the “infinite preparation” or “perpetuation of war” (Virilio 
                                                 
62 The other industry identified by Chan to also drive Singapore economically forward 
is biomedical sciences. 
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and Lotringer 104), and peace and security are its grounding gestures. The belief in 
peace “by means of the ultimate weapon” is “obscurantism” not only of the accidents 
that are tied to these technologies, but also of the disappearance of civilian space 
through militarisation (Virilio and Lotringer 67-68). Virilio adds that in this “era of 
the integral accident” (emphasis in original text), the speed of the military-industrial-
complex is the driving force of cultural and social development (Virilio Live 172, 
182). However, in this process, the world is not simply transformed by the speed of 
light, it becomes the speed of light, as in globalisation and its demands of “real time” 
(185), and the city is not only subjected to general policing, but also becomes 
overexposed (Virilio Live 187-188). 
 The politics of science, technology, the military and industry is what 
characterises the global city. Ryan Bishop and Gregory Clancey, in “The City as 
Target, or Perpetuation and Death,” argue that the global city is also a city of targets, 
equally for global capital investments and the military (74). The authors point to the 
“imprint of the Cold War” that is everywhere in the global city, from its infrastructure 
and technologies to its practices, including the range of civil defence exercises and 
emergency plans (Bishop and Clancey 75). Bishop and Clancey insist, “Global cities 
became, and remain, global insofar as they are targets for attack. It is their status as 
targets that renders them, de facto, ‘global’” (75). They stress the dual nature of the 
city as target for both “settlers and sackers” and as something to “shoot for as well as 
shoot at” (Bishop and Clancey 64). Therefore, ignoring the negative aspects in the 





Under the rubric of “Total Defence,” where the production and preparation for 
war now involves the entire populace, the roles and desires of civilians and the 
military are becoming indistinguishable. In this disappearance of civilian space, 
radical singular thought and responsibility are cleared away as well. This erasure of 
singularity is not necessarily achieved through repression only; rather, it works also 
through a process of persuasion, disorientation and induction into the governing 
codes. Hence, under the “Total Defence” strategy everyone becomes a target of 
defence, and the special focus on children and education, to reiterate Althusser’s 
point, is to ensure the reproduction of the conditions of production. That is, in this 
case, defence entrepreneurs who are also competitive, motivated, innovative, risk-
taking network warriors. The role of information technologies and 
telecommunications is crucial for this process of reproduction and induction, because 
of their C4ISTAR techniques, technicity and neo-liberal rationality, but also their 
aesthetics of disappearance and digital logic of participation.  
 A good example of how these technologies entice subjects into consuming 
their codes is the N.E.mation (pun on animation) competition. This competition 
targets youths using unconventional media as part of the National Education outreach 
programme for all schools, under the “Total Defence” policy. It provides a platform 
for students to express their ideas on “Total Defence” through animation, and has 
received very positive responses from students because National Education is made a 
fun subject through new media.63 As Associate Professor Koo Tsai Kee, then Minister 
                                                 
63 SAF too has jumped on the new media bandwagon in producing an eighteen-part 
mini-series, to be uploaded on YouTube, to highlight the nine-week-long Basic 
Military Training stint all Singaporean men have to go through when they turn 
eighteen. The objective of the series is to emphasise the need for national service. 
Deputy Prime Minister Teo points out that besides the troops, there is a whole eco-
system essential for the defence of Singapore and these groups, including families of 
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of State for Defence reports in parliament, students, including female students, are 
increasingly won over to the idea of “Total Defence” and the unconventional 
engagement efforts have “paid off handsomely” to the extent that “women [are] 
suggesting that girls should do National Service too” (“Head J: Ministry of Defence” 
40-41).64 However, the enthusiasm around “Total Defence” and its technologies 
comes at a price. It is instructive that the essay by Bishop and Clancey was completed 
just prior to the September 11 attack. It is a clear reminder that Singapore’s ambition 
to be a global city that necessitates the military targeting of every citizen in the 
defence of Singapore is also making everyone a potential target for attack. Virilio 
notes in Pure War that with the proliferation of information technologies and 
telecommunications, the margin or space for movement also decreases (76). 
Singapore’s strategy of deterrence, based on the active production and consumption of 
C4ISTAR technologies and technicity, is precisely what will fuel and abet these 
                                                                                                                                            
servicemen and employers, need to and can be reached via new media (Chow 
“Coming to YouTube”). 
64 Indeed, more and more women are keen to join the ranks, even as they do not need 
to serve mandatory national service in Singapore. The enthusiasm of girls to join the 
military is due also to the privileges accorded to national servicemen, especially in 
terms of opportunities and life chances. Therefore, for example, this year’s SAF 
scholarship recipients include three female (out of thirteen) for the SAF Merit 
Scholarship and six (out of seven) for the Defence Merit Scholarships (Ang “NSF 
Hero Among 13”); and for the first time, a woman is awarded the Singapore Armed 
Forces Overseas Scholarship, which is the second most prestigious scholarship in the 
nation (Chow “First Woman to Bag Top SAF Scholarship”). These developments 
signal a clear and inevitable co-option of women into the service. Although the 
introduction of new technologies in battlefields have opened the door for more 
women participation in the military, critical feminists argue that women’s 
participation in the military signal less their empowerment and more the larger 
militarisation of society. This is because women’s presence in the military has done 
little to re-define militarised conceptions of citizenship (based on one’s capacity to 
fight for one’s country) and the military’s masculine values and power structures. In 
fact, critical feminists point out, women’s participation help legitimise the military 
under an egalitarian facade while leaving the gendered (and racialised) militarisation 
process intact (D’amico 120-122; Turpin 10; Klein 126). Moreover, when a large 
section of society becomes tied directly or indirectly to the military as means of 
subsistence, employment, research, education and skills training, “civilian rule then 
legitimises military rule” (Regan 11). 
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potential attacks. After all, as Virilio recalls “terrorism is intimately connected with 
technologization” (Virilio and Lotringer 123).  
Therefore, Choy et al.’s turn to DARPA as the solution for U.S. failure (in the 
first monograph), paradoxically, fails to consider DARPA and technocracy as part of 
the problem of the superpower with billions to spend on defence. Moreover, despite 
their ironic point that the proliferation and appropriation of increasingly powerful 
technologies is underlining the asymmetry of power, there is continued push to use 
and produce sophisticated technologies in 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan. Such 
moves, as expected, will fuel more frightening types of techno-war, such as chemical 
or biological warfare, as weaker nations or groups seek out cheaper alternatives as a 
response to stronger overdeveloped foes (Kellner 234). This failure by Choy et al. to 
see the solution as the source of the problem and to use the problem as the solution is 
mirrored in the general populace. As civilians become targets of defence and for 
attacks, what seems to be missed, paradoxically, is that the enthusiasm around “Total 
Defence” and its technologies is also the cause for more defence and security.   
 
5.4 The Paradoxical and the Reversible: Some Concluding Thoughts  
This chapter has teased out, through 3G SAF and the iN2015 Masterplan, the circular 
and mutually constitutive relationship between science, technology, the military and 
industry. I demonstrated how the intimate and reversible links between the iN2015 
Masterplan and the 3G SAF, in terms of their infrastructural and manpower needs, as 
well as converging interests and objectives, are facilitated by the reversibility of 
technologies and technical knowledge in the larger militarisation of Singapore society 
and the circulation of elites. However, in this circulation of elites, it seems that the 
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military itself, ironically, is not spared of the feeling of insecurity under the logic of 
deterrence the Singapore populace is subjected to. 
 Returning to the 3G SAF discourse, in the latest monograph on 3G SAF, 
entitled “Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control for One SAF: Building 
the 3rd Spiral, 3rd Generation SAF” (1-78), Chen et al. draw up a number of failed 
examples from business history to argue for the need to “constantly evolve or reinvent 
oneself to remain relevant and competitive” (1). This is a “truism” they stress, even 
for the military, except that “the stakes are much higher” in the military domain, 
where its failure means hardship for the homeland and its citizens (Chen et al.1). The 
authors reiterate that “a defence entrepreneur spirit must continue to be nurtured as 
advocated in the C2C monograph to bring about changes in thinking and innovative 
application of technologies that are integral to realising new IKC2 warfighting 
concepts” (Chen et al. 3). They state that the purpose of their monograph is to “elicit 
thoughts and challenge prevailing mindsets,” by looking into “the future to shape the 
present waypoints” (Chen et al. 3). They then proceed to rehash most of the points 
made in the first two monographs, but supplementing these with “emerging trends 
that offer new opportunities and paradigms of thinking about operations” (Chen et al. 
3). 
 The current realisation of 3G SAF, as with the iN2015 Masterplan, is driven 
by a technocracy that has been building up since the founding of the city-state, 
marked by a capitalist neo-liberal rationality and a blind faith in C4ISTAR 
technologies and technicity. In its current attraction to Artificial Intelligence’s 
promise of substituting technology for people, through “intelligent” technology and 
“smart weapons” (Athanasiou 236), these technologies are looked to by both 3G SAF 
and the iN2015 Masterplan as the ultimate solution to a whole host of problems. This 
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is despite the fact that the predictions of Artificial Intelligence have always relied on 
ideological commitment to high technology, rather than on the actual science, and that 
its research and development is subjected to the interlocking networks of economic, 
political and military interests and ideologies (Athanasiou 239-245). Ironically, Chen 
et al. argue “the stakes are much higher” in the military domain; yet, the converging 
interests of politics and business with the military, run the risk of subjugating 
prudence under the dynamics of power and money. 
 The success of Singapore’s defence industries that is now part of the driving 
force behind 3G SAF’s transformation and the iN2015 Masterplan is putting 
Singapore’s populace and the region at risk with its aggressive arms production in the 
name of “national security.” Since “the search for national security… usually ends up 
securing greater insecurity due to the actions they provoke earlier,” this creates a 
spiralling and destabilising effect for all (Singh, The Challenge of Conventional Arms 
85). As Choy et. al (in the first monograph) ironically point out, with globalisation, 
localised problems have significant effects. The insistence on producing and 
consuming C4ISTAR technologies, with all their limitations and integral accident, has 
serious implications beyond the confines of the military and Singapore. More 
fundamentally, this insistence on the intensified proliferation, production and 
consumption of C4ISTAR technologies and technicity will influence the very core of 
beings and of being. 
 The escape into informational space or “Integral Reality,” Baudrillard 
contends, where everything becomes real, visible, transparent, and must come to 
fruition, all events, singularity and imaginary gets excised (The Intelligence of Evil 
17-18). Hence, the erasure of events, enemies and death (in the insistence of “zero-
casualties”) are all part of “Integral Reality” and the obsession with security, law and 
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order (Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil 119). In this quest to overcome ambiguity, 
this escape to the virtual also “absorbs us and absolves us of any personal 
responsibility” (Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil 90). Crucially, the current 
attraction to Artificial Intelligence, with its infinite “intelligence,” as opposed to 
thought that is finite, will create a situation where “the more intelligent beings there 
are (and, by the grace of information technology, they are virtually all intelligent), the 
rarer thought will be” (Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil 181). Baudrillard reminds 
us, “The world is not intelligent, but thought has nothing to do with intelligence. The 






Chapter Six:  
What Next for Singapore? Building Towards the Fatal… 
 
“All events described here are susceptible to two kinds of diagnosis: 
physical and metaphysical” (Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of 
Evil 100) 
 
This dissertation has shown that the iN2015 Masterplan and pervasive computing 
cannot be seen and understood in isolation. They shape each other through their 
discourse and both, in turn, are shaped by and shape their contexts. Chapters two and 
four showed that the notion of technological “empowerment” in wearable computing 
and ubiquitous computing are closely tied to the neo-liberal political economy and 
cybernetic techniques that are themselves products of a historical mix of techniques 
and technicity. These include liberal trade and its utopian views of networks or the 
global city, underpinned by the desire for one system, language or code, as well as 
Enlightenment notions of “progress” that tie “progress” narrowly to work and 
technological development. They also entail the total war strategies of “empowering” 
the peripheries in order to enhance the core, and Cold War tactics of decentralisation, 
persuasion and disorientation, as well as its practice of technical forecasting.  
 The neo-liberal values and Cold War techniques and technicity embodied in 
pervasive computing, consequently, also influence Singapore, its iN2015 Masterplan 
and 3G SAF. This is because of Singapore’s embrace of Cold War technologies and 
technicity that have intensified under its current ambition to be “an intelligent nation, 
a global city, powered by infocomm” (IDA, “iN2015 Masterplan” n.p.). In particular, 
pervasive computing’s vision of seamless integration, connectivity, constant and 




iN2015 Masterplan and the 3G SAF. Likewise, their production of active 
technological subjects needed for the perpetuation of their projects, through the 
rhetoric of empowerment, control and inclusion, is mirrored in the iN2015 Masterplan 
and the 3G SAF’s valorisation of active technological entrepreneurs or network 
warriors, highlighted in chapters three and five. Here, the synchronicity of discourse 
results from the synchronicity of the technologies shaping discourse. Therefore, 
technology and discourse are in synch in terms of their embodiment of neo-liberal 
values and rationality, as well as how they structure thoughts through their techniques 
and technicity. Both rely on the consumption of their codes in order to sustain and 
perpetuate their structures. Finally, both discourse and technology operate on the 
production of “blindness,” making themselves and their dual structures invisible. In 
short, discourse and technology speak as one, just as their environment speaks them. 
Hence, wearable computing, ubiquitous computing, the iN2015 Masterplan and the 
3G SAF are parts of and add up to what Baudrillard describes as “Integral Reality,” 
highlighted in the previous chapter. 
 Within “Integral Reality,” the forces of globalisation, virtualisation and the 
moral-political economy make “liberation” a moral duty for subjects, and present it as 
achievable only via immersion in screens, networks, and technologies of Virtual 
Reality (Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil 50-55). Here, the machines’ limitless 
possibility of functioning entices (80) and is presented to subjects as the source of 
their “empowerment,” when in fact the production and consumption of codes is what 
sustains “Integral Reality.” In this process, simulated difference is produced and 
consumed – as I highlighted in chapters three and four, between “East” and “West,” 
the “individual” and the “collective,” “men” and “women” – when subjects are really 




In this incessant production and consumption of information, the forces of 
globalisation, virtualisation and the moral-political economy reach the highest stage 
of reality, where information goes into over-drive as with the logic of abstraction 
(general equivalence), simulation and circulation (Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil 
48). As a result, the image and reality are destroyed, not in their actual eradication, 
but in the loss of their symbolic value due to the over-production of meaning. This 
then leads to indifference, banality and ineffectual politics, as in the case of certain 
cyber-feminist politics, pointed out in chapter two.   
 At the same time, as chapter three showed, most subjects willingly enter the 
electronic circuits under its logic of participation (interaction and circulation). The 
“ecstasy of communication,” Baudrillard highlights, is that there is “no ‘Other’” (The 
Intelligence of Evil 81). Instead, the subjects’ disappearance into the networks, require 
them becoming their own terminals, coder and decoder, and their being one with the 
machine (80-81). Here, the enticement of the subjects into the networks is facilitated 
by the electronic circuits’ ability to absorb and absolve them from responsibilities. 
This is best demonstrated by the way people and bodies are easily dissimulated by 
new media technologies as in the erasure of the foreign workers and foreign domestic 
workers, and civilian casualties, pointed out in chapters three and five. This 
disappearance of bodies and ultimately death is not without consequence. Virilio 
points out, “the gravest danger in post-monarchic society is the concealment of death” 
since “the consciousness of death is the origin of consciousness” (Virilio and 
Lotringer 133-134). He adds that to forget death is to forget that we are mortals, 
which today is increasingly obscured by the objectives of science and technology 




 This paradox of over production of images and simultaneous dissimulation of 
death and the Other is fundamental to the military logic of persuasion and 
disorientation, tied to its logistics of military perception and production of 
“blindness,” discussed in chapters one and two. In fact, “Integral Reality” and its 
demand for transparency and visibility, where everything has to have a meaning, 
come to fruition, and where all imaginaries and events are arrested and/or require 
constant policing, is very much a part of the military logic of deterrence. This 
obsession with security, with law and order, and therefore, with control, is also 
embodied in post-Cold War technologies and technicity. Singapore’s “natural 
progression” from a developing nation to a modern city-state and now its current 
desire to be a global city and “intelligent” nation are evidence of the spiralling 
techniques and technicity that come with its embrace of Cold War technologies and 
technicity. The desires embodied in the iN2015 Masterplan and the 3G SAF reflect an 
intensified technocracy, an effect of “Integral Reality” that is already structuring 
subjects under its logic. In other words, the iN2015 Masterplan’s desire to integrate 
all aspects of everyday life through information technologies and telecommunications, 
and the 3G SAF’s integration of all forces into one network-centric fighting force, are 
part of “Integral Reality’ and its propensity to abolish distance everywhere 
(Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil 75), just as information removes the distance 
between humans and things under its logic of immediacy (Baudrillard, Passwords 27-
28).  
Additionally, both the iN2015 Masterplan’s and 3G SAF’s determination to 
overcome ambiguities are effects of “Integral Reality” and its promise of certainty, 
visibility, transparency, and the logic of control underpinning information 




suppress all events and singularities, including its own integral accident, as 
highlighted in chapter five. Under the C4ISTAR logic of control, abetted by the 
rhetoric of control of technology, human thought and actions, paradoxically, are 
determined by the demands of the technology, where human control, intentions and 
responsibilities are eventually taken out of the cybernetic loop, stipulated by the speed 
of the technology. Simultaneous to the purging of human thought is the embrace of 
Artificial Intelligence, which according to Baudrillard is the “highest stage of 
intelligence” – integral, limitless, asexual, fractal, but above all, “never opposed to 
itself … an absolute progress” (The Intelligence of Evil 178). Artificial Intelligence, 
based on the “zero degree of thought,” sees itself as “purged of all stupidity” (The 
Intelligence of Evil 178-179). It is what, ultimately, the iN2015 Masterplan and the 
3G SAF are modelled after, in their purging of radical singular thought, as 
demonstrated by Lieutenant Ng’s case, and in their production of One and the Same 
technological subjects.  
Singapore’s building towards “Integral Reality” and, thus, its integral accident, 
not only risk its own demise, but also repercussions beyond its shores. Yet, its only 
saving grace – radical singular thought – is increasingly threatened by the city-state’s 
proliferation and intensification of artificiality, both through material construction of 
technologised spaces and through ideological production of active technological 
subjects. Therefore, it is imperative to return to Baudrillard’s point, highlighted in the 
beginning of this dissertation, that our created environment is what thinks us, and that 
it is the “created object which thinks us … better than we do and quicker than we do: 
which thinks us before we have thought it” (The Transparency of Evil 42). This is a 
reminder for us to be aware of the artificiality of our own conditions that result from 




“intelligence,” works through abstraction and not the social. It is adept at producing 
“difference” for consumption that adds very little to our understanding of caring and 
sparing. In fact, its twin strategy of dissimulating death and the Other, as well as its 
over-production of images robbed of their symbolic value, only creates indifference 
and encourages a circulation of responsibility. Meanwhile, the incessant integration 
and control or the hyper-integration and over-management of Singapore can only lead 
to the catastrophic collapse of its system and defence, much like the over-protected 
body that loses its defence (Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil 62). This is the 
inevitable result of Singapore’s build up to the fatal, to the principle of Evil. 
The principle of Evil is inherent to the dual structure or reversibility of 
“Integral Reality.” Baudrillard points to this reversibility as the “theorem of the 
accursed share,” that is, the “inseparability of good and evil, and hence the 
impossibility of mobilizing the one without the other” (Baudrillard, The Transparency 
of Evil 105). This reversibility is something “Integral Reality” cannot escape from, 
even as it tries relentlessly to police and suppress all events, because this reversibility 
is inherent to its form (Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil 159). The principle of 
Evil is antithetical to the repressed; it is not desire but indifference (Baudrillard, 
“Fatal Strategies” 202). It is, at the same time, opposite to the accidental, which is 
peripheral to the system, whereas the fatal is immanent to it. Baudrillard elaborates: 
 
An outcome is fatal when the same sign presides over both the advent  
of something and its demise, when the same star that gave hope leads  
eventually to disaster, or (as in the case of computer viruses) when the  
logic that informs a system’s expansion then proceeds to devastate it.  




is peripheral to a system, whereas fatality is immanent. (The 
Transparency of Evil 40) 
 
The fatal is the metaphysical aspect of the system that cannot be ignored or controlled 
for every attempt to over-manage and hyper-integrate will lead to an excess. Hence, 
Baudrillard argues: 
 
The excess of health engenders viruses and virulence. The excess of  
security produces a new threat, that of immune system failure. The  
excess of capital engenders speculation and financial collapse. The  
excess of information engenders undecidability of facts and confusion  
of minds. The excess of reason engenders the unjustifiable. The excess  
of transparency engenders terror. (The Intelligence of Evil 192-193) 
 
What this means then is that  as integration increases and the spaces for 
manoeuvring diminish, vulnerability increases, which, in turn, demands more 
integration, control and policing, in a generalised cycle. The turn to C4ISTAR 
technologies, the cause of the problems as the solution for more control is an effect of 
the technologies’ technicity, as well as a disavowal of the structure’s own inherent 
limitations and reversibility; a paradox of the Virtual that denies its own reality 
(Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil 83). Yet, precisely because of the increase in 
integration and the resulting need for movement and spaces for manoeuvring; 
resistance and frictions are always inherent in attempts at totalisation. After all, the 
Smart Apron is proof of this. However, the key here is to recognise that these  




and my dissertation is an attempt to come to grips with this, through radical singular 
thought – thought’s ability to decentre, to recognise its own fallacy, to acknowledge 
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